MEDIUM 6.4

CVE-2026-6673: Mattermost Atlassian Connect Authentication Bypass – Jira Integration Risk

Mattermost is vulnerable to an authentication bypass in how it handles Atlassian Connect integration callbacks. During the window when a Jira integration is being installed, an attacker with valid Mattermost user credentials can craft a malicious POST request to trick the system into accepting a fake shared secret. This compromises the trust relationship between Mattermost and Jira, allowing disruption of the integration and potentially enabling further attacks. The vulnerability affects multiple versions across the 10.11, 11.5, 11.6, and 11.7 release lines.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 6.4 MEDIUM · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-306
Affected products
1 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-22 / 2026-06-23

NVD description (verbatim)

Mattermost versions 11.7.x <= 11.7.0, 11.6.x <= 11.6.2, 11.5.x <= 11.5.5, 10.11.x <= 10.11.17 fail to authenticate Atlassian Connect installed callbacks, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to inject a rogue sharedSecret and disrupt the Jira integration via POST to /ac/installed during the pending-install window.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00654

1 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability stems from insufficient authentication validation of Atlassian Connect callbacks, specifically in the `/ac/installed` endpoint. Mattermost fails to properly verify callback authenticity during the initial installation handshake, which relies on a shared secret exchange. An authenticated attacker can POST a rogue sharedSecret to this endpoint while the integration is in a pending-install state, overwriting the legitimate secret. This breaks the HMAC-based signature verification that normally protects subsequent Atlassian callbacks, allowing an attacker to forge authenticated requests to Mattermost from the supposed Jira/Atlassian system. The issue is categorized as CWE-306 (Missing Authentication), indicating the core problem is absent or insufficient verification of the callback source.

Business impact

Jira-Mattermost integrations are widely used for incident management, project tracking, and cross-tool visibility. Exploitation allows an attacker to disrupt this integration—causing Jira notifications to fail, sync issues to malfunction, or forge fake Jira-originated messages within Mattermost. For organizations relying on this integration for critical workflows, the impact includes loss of real-time visibility, broken automation, and potential confusion or social engineering opportunities. Because the attacker must have valid Mattermost credentials, the risk is primarily from insider threats or accounts compromised through credential theft, phishing, or lateral movement.

Affected systems

Mattermost Server versions 11.7.0 and earlier in the 11.7.x line, 11.6.2 and earlier in 11.6.x, 11.5.5 and earlier in 11.5.x, and 10.11.17 and earlier in 10.11.x are vulnerable. Organizations running any of these versions with an active or pending Atlassian Connect / Jira Cloud integration are at risk. Verify your exact Mattermost version via the System Console (Settings > About) or by running `mattermost version` on the server.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires valid Mattermost user credentials (PR:L in the CVSS vector), making it a credential-dependent attack rather than a zero-day that any anonymous user can trigger. However, the attack surface is significant in any organization where user accounts exist—including low-privileged employees or contractors. The vulnerability is easiest to exploit when an administrator is actively installing or reconfiguring the Jira integration, since the /ac/installed endpoint is most vulnerable during the pending-install window. No public exploit code or in-the-wild activity has been reported (KEV status: not listed), but the straightforward nature of the attack (crafting a POST request with a malicious secret) makes it trivial to weaponize.

Remediation

Update Mattermost Server to patched versions: 11.7.1 or later, 11.6.3 or later, 11.5.6 or later, or 10.11.18 or later. Verify the exact patch version against the Mattermost security advisory MMSA-2026-00654 before deployment. Organizations unable to patch immediately should disable or temporarily remove the Atlassian Connect integration in Settings > Integrations > Atlassian Connect until patching is complete. Additionally, review Mattermost user access logs for suspicious POST requests to `/ac/installed` to detect any attempted exploitation.

Patch guidance

Download the patched version from Mattermost's official release page corresponding to your current release line. Before applying in production, test in a staging environment to ensure no conflicts with custom integrations or plugins. Mattermost updates typically do not require database migration for minor version increments, but always back up your Mattermost database and configuration before patching. Restart the Mattermost service after updating the binary. If you are running Mattermost in a containerized environment, pull the updated image tag (e.g., `mattermost:11.7.1`) and redeploy. Verify the patch by confirming the version in System Console and checking that Jira integration still functions correctly post-update.

Detection guidance

Monitor Mattermost audit logs and access logs for POST requests to `/ac/installed` from unexpected source IPs or at unusual times. Enable detailed logging for Atlassian Connect callbacks if available in your deployment. Check the `SharedSecret` field in your Jira integration configuration; if it has changed unexpectedly or does not match your initial setup, this may indicate exploitation. Monitor Jira webhook and callback logs for failed or rejected signatures, which would occur if the shared secret was tampered with. Use SIEM tools to correlate unusual authentication-related events in Mattermost with network traffic to `/ac/installed`.

Why prioritize this

Although the CVSS score is moderate (6.4), the vulnerability is prioritized for prompt patching because: (1) it undermines the integrity of a cross-platform integration that is critical for many organizations' incident response workflows; (2) exploitation requires only user-level credentials, which are common in organizations; (3) the fix is a straightforward version update with no known breaking changes; and (4) the attack surface is well-defined and easy to monitor. Teams running Jira-Mattermost integrations should patch within 30 days; others can follow their standard patch cadence.

Risk score, explained

CVSS 6.4 reflects a medium-severity integrity impact (I:H, A:H) that is mitigated by the requirement for authenticated access (PR:L, UI:R) and a higher attack complexity (AC:H, reflecting the need to exploit during a specific install window). The lack of confidentiality impact (C:N) further limits the score. The vulnerability is not a remote code execution or critical data breach vector, but it does enable tampering with integration data and disruption of cross-tool automation. The unscored factors—ease of exploitation, organizational reliance on Jira integration, and potential for insider threats—suggest this should not be deprioritized despite the medium score.

Frequently asked questions

Does this vulnerability allow an attacker without Mattermost credentials to exploit it?

No. The CVSS vector specifies PR:L (Privileges Required: Low), meaning an attacker must already have valid Mattermost user credentials. This limits the attack surface to users within your organization or accounts compromised through credential theft. An completely anonymous attacker cannot trigger this vulnerability.

If I do not use Atlassian Connect or Jira integration, am I affected?

While the vulnerability exists in all affected versions, it is only exploitable if Atlassian Connect integration is installed and active in your Mattermost deployment. If you do not use Jira Cloud integration, the risk is essentially zero. You may still want to patch for defense-in-depth and to simplify your vulnerability posture.

What should I do if I cannot patch immediately?

Temporarily disable the Atlassian Connect integration in Settings > Integrations > Atlassian Connect. This removes the vulnerable endpoint from being used while you plan and execute the upgrade. Enable it again only after you have verified the patched version is running. Monitor your audit logs for any suspicious activity on /ac/installed in the meantime.

How do I verify that my shared secret for Jira integration has not been tampered with?

Navigate to Settings > Integrations > Atlassian Connect and note the current SharedSecret value. Compare it against your initial setup documentation or Jira Cloud integration settings (visible in Jira under Manage Apps > Installed apps). If they do not match, or if you have no record of the original secret, assume the integration may have been compromised and regenerate the secret after patching.

This analysis is based on the Mattermost Advisory ID MMSA-2026-00654 and CVE-2026-6673 published on 2026-06-22. Patch version numbers should be verified against the official Mattermost security advisory and release notes before deployment. SEC.co does not provide guarantees regarding the completeness or real-time accuracy of vulnerability data. Organizations are responsible for validating all patch versions and testing in their own environments before production deployment. No liability is assumed for damages resulting from use or misuse of this information. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-07-29. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).