MEDIUM 6.5

CVE-2026-47154: EmberZNet Simple Metering Out-of-Bounds Read DoS Vulnerability

EmberZNet versions up to 9.0.2 contain a vulnerability where specially crafted meter response messages can crash devices that support the Simple Metering cluster. The vulnerability only affects devices already connected to the network, and an attacker would need network access and authentication to send the malicious message. No data is stolen or leaked in the attack.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 6.5 MEDIUM · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-125
Affected products
1 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-25 / 2026-06-25

NVD description (verbatim)

In EmberZNet v9.0.2 and earlier, a malformed GetProfileResponse message can trigger out-of-bounds reads while iterating interval entries and terminate the process. These messages must come from a device that has already joined the network, and no information leakage back to the sender was observed. Only devices supporting the Simple Metering cluster may be impacted.

2 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

CVE-2026-47154 is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in EmberZNet v9.0.2 and earlier triggered by malformed GetProfileResponse messages. The flaw occurs during iteration of interval entries within the Simple Metering cluster implementation, causing the process to terminate. The vulnerability is classified as CWE-125 (Out-of-bounds Read) and requires the attacker to originate the malicious message from an already-joined network device, making unauthorized remote exploitation unlikely without prior network compromise.

Business impact

Organizations deploying EmberZNet-based smart metering infrastructure face potential denial-of-service conditions. While the impact is limited to process termination (not data compromise), repeated attacks could degrade metering service availability and require operational intervention to restore devices. The requirement for network-authenticated access and device presence reduces the immediate threat surface, but any deployed vulnerability still represents a stability and uptime risk.

Affected systems

Silicon Labs EmberZNet version 9.0.2 and all earlier versions are affected. Only devices implementing the Simple Metering cluster are impacted; other cluster types are unaffected. This impacts smart metering deployments, building energy management systems, and utility-grade IoT devices based on the EmberZNet stack.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires network access and authenticated device status. An attacker cannot trigger this remotely from an unauthenticated position; the malformed message must originate from a device that has already successfully joined the mesh network. While the attack surface is constrained by these prerequisites, any previously joined device—including compromised sensors or gateways—can deliver the payload. No exploit code is publicly available, and the vulnerability does not appear in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

Remediation

Silicon Labs has released patches for EmberZNet. Organizations should upgrade to the patched version specified in the official Silicon Labs security advisory. For systems where immediate patching is not feasible, implement network segmentation to restrict which devices can join the network and monitor for unexpected GetProfileResponse traffic patterns indicating reconnaissance or attack attempts.

Patch guidance

Verify the latest patched version from the Silicon Labs security advisory and test in a controlled environment before production deployment. Prioritize metering gateways and coordinator nodes, as these are high-value targets for denial-of-service. Schedule patching around maintenance windows to minimize metering service interruption. Confirm that the patched version maintains backward compatibility with existing sensors and infrastructure.

Detection guidance

Monitor for repeated GetProfileResponse message failures or process crashes on SimpleMetering cluster handlers. Network-level detection should focus on identifying malformed GetProfileResponse frames from joined devices, particularly those with unexpected or suspicious source addresses. Enable device-level logging and alerting for interval entry processing errors. Track unexpected restarts or service interruptions on metering endpoints and correlate with network traffic analysis.

Why prioritize this

Although the CVSS score of 6.5 is medium, the combination of ease of exploitation (once network access is gained), the critical nature of metering infrastructure, and the operational impact of repeated denial-of-service warrant prioritization. Systems in production utility and commercial metering environments should be treated as higher priority than lab or test deployments. The lack of current public exploits provides a window for orderly patching before widespread awareness increases risk.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 3.1 score of 6.5 (MEDIUM) reflects the high availability impact (complete process termination) balanced against the requirement for authenticated network presence and the absence of confidentiality or integrity compromise. The vector (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H) acknowledges that while network access is required, once an attacker is on the network, exploitation is straightforward with no additional conditions.

Frequently asked questions

Can this vulnerability be exploited remotely without any network access?

No. The attacker must either be a device that has already joined the EmberZNet mesh network or have the ability to cause a joined device to send the malicious message. Unauthenticated remote exploitation is not possible.

Does this vulnerability leak sensitive metering data?

No. The vulnerability causes a denial of service (process crash) but does not result in information disclosure. No data is leaked back to the attacker.

Are all EmberZNet deployments at risk?

Only devices that implement the Simple Metering cluster are vulnerable. Other cluster types and non-metering EmberZNet applications are not affected by this specific flaw.

What should we do if we cannot patch immediately?

Implement network access controls to limit which devices can join your network, disable mesh joining on devices that do not need it, monitor for unexpected restarts on metering endpoints, and plan a patching schedule as soon as the vendor advisory confirms availability of fixed versions.

This analysis is based on publicly available vulnerability data current as of publication. Specific patch version numbers and availability should be verified against the official Silicon Labs security advisory. Organizations should conduct their own risk assessment and testing before applying patches to production systems. The CVSS score and vector are as published by the vulnerability source and reflect the baseline network threat model; your organization's risk may differ based on network topology, access controls, and asset criticality. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-03. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).