MEDIUM 6.5

CVE-2026-4526: EmberZNet ZCL Out-of-Bounds Read DoS Vulnerability (v9.0.2 and Earlier)

EmberZNet, Silicon Labs' Zigbee networking framework, contains a vulnerability in versions 9.0.2 and earlier that allows an already-connected network device to crash the framework by sending specially crafted global ZCL (Zigbee Cluster Library) messages. The vulnerability does not expose sensitive data and requires the attacker to already have network access—it is primarily a denial-of-service risk rather than a confidentiality or integrity threat.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 6.5 MEDIUM · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-125
Affected products
1 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-25 / 2026-06-25

NVD description (verbatim)

In EmberZNet v9.0.2 and earlier, malformed global ZCL messages can trigger out-of-bounds reads in framework parsing logic and terminate the process. These messages must come from a device that has already joined the network, and no information leakage back to the sender was observed.

2 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

CVE-2026-4526 is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability (CWE-125) in EmberZNet's global ZCL message parsing logic. Malformed messages trigger out-of-bounds memory access during framework parsing, causing process termination. The vulnerability is limited to authenticated network participants—the attacker must have already joined the Zigbee network. No information disclosure to the attacker was observed during testing, and the impact is restricted to availability. The CVSS 3.1 score of 6.5 (Medium) reflects a low attack complexity, low privileges required, but no impact to confidentiality or integrity.

Business impact

This vulnerability poses a denial-of-service risk to deployed EmberZNet-based Zigbee networks. A compromised or malicious device already on the network can disrupt mesh operations by repeatedly crashing coordinator or router nodes. In production environments—smart home hubs, industrial automation gateways, or medical device networks—unplanned restarts degrade service reliability and may trigger costly manual recovery procedures. The lack of information leakage limits reputational and compliance damage, but operational continuity is at stake.

Affected systems

EmberZNet versions 9.0.2 and earlier are affected. This includes embedded Zigbee stacks used by Silicon Labs and OEMs integrating EmberZNet into consumer IoT, industrial control, and healthcare devices. Any organization running legacy or unpatched EmberZNet deployments where network-authenticated attackers are a plausible threat model should assess their exposure.

Exploitability

Exploitability is moderate. The attacker must have already successfully joined the Zigbee network, which typically requires proximity and valid security credentials (network key or installation code). Once on the network, crafting malformed global ZCL messages is straightforward; no public exploit code is known, but the attack surface is well-defined. This is not an unauthenticated remote attack, but rather an insider threat within the network boundary.

Remediation

Upgrade EmberZNet to a patched version released by Silicon Labs after June 2026. Consult the vendor advisory for the exact patch version applicable to your device model. Until patching is possible, implement network segmentation to limit the devices allowed to join your Zigbee network, enforce strict installation code requirements, and monitor for unexpected device resets or framework crashes that may indicate exploitation attempts.

Patch guidance

Silicon Labs is expected to release a security patch addressing this vulnerability. Verify the exact patch version number against the official Silicon Labs security advisory or your device OEM's update documentation. If your device is part of a larger IoT platform, check with the platform vendor for coordinated patch availability and testing recommendations before deployment. Prioritize updates for devices in critical roles (coordinators, routers) before updating edge nodes.

Detection guidance

Monitor EmberZNet framework logs and system crash dumps for sudden process terminations coinciding with unusual ZCL message patterns. Network traffic analysis tools that decode Zigbee frames can inspect global ZCL message payloads for malformed structures (e.g., truncated headers, invalid length fields). Establish baseline crash rates; a spike in spontaneous restarts may indicate active exploitation. Device manufacturers may also publish YARA rules or intrusion detection signatures targeting specific malformed message patterns post-patch.

Why prioritize this

Medium CVSS score reflects the authentication requirement and availability-only impact, but the practical risk depends on network topology and threat model. Networks with untrusted or semi-trusted participant devices, or those where network joins are not strictly controlled, should prioritize this patch within 30–60 days. Organizations with rigid network perimeter controls and minimal guest device participation can defer to a quarterly patch cycle unless compensating controls are insufficient.

Risk score, explained

CVSS 3.1 score of 6.5 (Medium) is driven by: (1) Network vector (AV:N) and low attack complexity (AC:L) reflecting the ease of sending crafted messages; (2) low privilege requirement (PR:L) acknowledging the need for prior network authentication; (3) high availability impact (A:H) from process crashes; and (4) no impact to confidentiality (C:N) or integrity (I:N). The score appropriately penalizes the authentication barrier but rewards the certainty and severity of denial-of-service impact.

Frequently asked questions

Do we need to patch if our Zigbee network is closed and no untrusted devices are allowed to join?

Your risk is substantially lower, but not zero. Patch if internal devices could be compromised or if your network security practices have degraded. If you maintain strict device enrollment and ongoing device health monitoring, deferring to a planned maintenance window is reasonable.

Can this vulnerability leak sensitive data like encryption keys or sensor values?

No. The vulnerability triggers an out-of-bounds read during parsing, but no information is leaked back to the attacker. The impact is confined to availability—process crashes—not confidentiality.

Is there a workaround if we cannot patch immediately?

Not a complete workaround, but mitigations include: (1) restricting Zigbee network joins to pre-approved devices only; (2) disabling global ZCL commands if your application does not require them (consult your device documentation); (3) implementing monitoring to detect and alert on unexpected restarts.

What Zigbee device types are at highest risk?

Coordinators and routers are at highest risk because they process messages from the entire network. End devices that do not relay traffic have lower exposure. Prioritize patching coordinator nodes first.

This analysis is based on the CVE record published on 2026-06-25 and reflects the vulnerability as described by the issuer. Patch availability and version numbers should be verified directly with Silicon Labs' official security advisories. Organizations should conduct their own risk assessment based on device deployment, network architecture, and threat model. No exploit code has been developed for this analysis, and all recommendations are defensive and based on available vendor guidance. Test all patches in a non-production environment before broad deployment. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-03. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).