HIGH 7.2

CVE-2026-11409: TP-Link TL-WR940N v6 Authenticated Command Injection Vulnerability

CVE-2026-11409 is an authenticated command injection flaw in TP-Link TL-WR940N v6 routers affecting the IPv6 PPPoE configuration feature. An attacker with admin credentials can inject arbitrary operating system commands that execute with elevated privileges on the device. While this requires existing administrative access, successful exploitation could allow complete device compromise, network traffic interception, or lateral movement into the network behind the router.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 7.2 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-78
Affected products
2 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-17 / 2026-06-18

NVD description (verbatim)

An authenticated OS command injection vulnerability exists in the IPv6 PPPoE configuration handler in TL-WR940N v6 due to improper sanitization of user input. An attacker with administrative access may exploit this issue to execute arbitrary system commands with elevated privileges.

3 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability exists in the IPv6 PPPoE configuration handler of the TL-WR940N v6 firmware. User-supplied input passed to this handler is not properly sanitized before being processed in a system command context, creating a classic OS command injection vulnerability (CWE-78). The flaw permits an authenticated administrator to break out of intended command boundaries and execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the affected process, typically root or system-level context on the router.

Business impact

Compromise of a TL-WR940N v6 router can have significant downstream effects. An attacker gaining elevated command execution can modify firewall rules, sniff network traffic, redirect DNS queries, inject malware into network traffic, establish persistent backdoors, or pivot to internal systems. Organizations relying on these routers for branch office connectivity, small office/home office (SOHO) operations, or network perimeter defense face potential data exfiltration, compliance violations, and extended dwell time for adversaries on their networks.

Affected systems

TP-Link TL-WR940N v6 devices running vulnerable firmware versions are affected. The vulnerability is tied specifically to this model and firmware line; other TL-WR940N versions (v1–v5) and other TP-Link product lines may not be impacted. Organizations should inventory TL-WR940N v6 deployments across branch offices, remote locations, and edge networks to prioritize remediation efforts.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires valid administrative credentials for the router's web management interface or SSH/command-line access, making this a privileged-access vulnerability. The attack vector is network-based (AV:N) with low attack complexity (AC:L), meaning an authenticated admin can exploit this without user interaction (UI:N) or special conditions. The prerequisite of administrative access limits the immediate external threat surface, but compromised admin accounts, insider threats, or weak default credentials create practical risk. Given the common use of default or weak passwords on SOHO equipment, this risk tier warrants urgent attention.

Remediation

TP-Link should release a patched firmware version for the TL-WR940N v6 that sanitizes input to the IPv6 PPPoE configuration handler. Organizations must obtain and deploy this patch as soon as it becomes available. Until patching is possible, restrict administrative access to the router through network segmentation, strong authentication (disable defaults), and limiting access to trusted IP ranges or VPN-only administration. Disable IPv6 PPPoE configuration if not actively used.

Patch guidance

Monitor TP-Link's official security advisory and firmware download pages for a patched release. When available, verify the patch version against TP-Link's advisory documentation. Apply patches during a maintenance window given their role in network connectivity. For devices where patching is delayed, prioritize those in critical infrastructure roles (datacenter gateways, branch office aggregation points) first. Document patching records for compliance audit trails.

Detection guidance

Monitor router logs for unusual administrative access patterns and unexpected configuration changes to IPv6 PPPoE settings. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) should flag suspicious command characters (pipes, semicolons, backticks, command substitution syntax) in HTTP requests to the router's management interface. Network defenders can look for anomalous process execution on affected devices post-authentication or unexpected outbound connections initiated by router processes. SIEM integration of router syslog and management audit logs will help detect exploitation attempts.

Why prioritize this

Although this is an authenticated vulnerability requiring admin access, the HIGH CVSS score (7.2) reflects the severity of potential impact: complete compromise of router functionality, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Organizations should treat this as a near-term priority because (1) default or weak admin credentials on SOHO equipment are common, (2) router compromise enables lateral network movement, and (3) patched firmware may take time to release and deploy across distributed locations. Prioritize based on whether affected routers are internet-facing, support critical branch connectivity, or operate in high-sensitivity network zones.

Risk score, explained

CVSS 3.1 score of 7.2 (HIGH) reflects a network-accessible vulnerability with high impact across confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C:H/I:H/A:H). The score is tempered by the requirement for high privilege level (PR:H), meaning an attacker must already possess admin credentials. The attack complexity is low (AC:L), indicating no special conditions are needed once authenticated. This balanced scoring recognizes both the severe potential impact and the prerequisite of administrative access. Organizations should not downgrade risk assessment based on the authentication requirement, given the prevalence of weak admin credentials in SOHO environments.

Frequently asked questions

Can this vulnerability be exploited remotely without an account?

No. The vulnerability requires valid administrative credentials to access the router's configuration interface. However, if an organization uses default credentials, weak passwords, or allows remote management from untrusted networks, the practical threat increases significantly. Ensure strong, unique admin passwords and restrict management access to trusted IPs or VPN.

Does this affect IPv4 PPPoE or only IPv6?

The vulnerability specifically affects the IPv6 PPPoE configuration handler. IPv4 PPPoE functionality is not mentioned as vulnerable. However, both protocols should be reviewed in patch notes, and organizations should verify the scope of patched code against TP-Link's official advisory.

What should we do if we cannot patch immediately?

Implement compensating controls: disable the IPv6 PPPoE feature if not in use, restrict router admin access to specific trusted IPs or a VPN tunnel, enforce strong non-default admin credentials, disable remote management access, and enable all available logging for administrative actions. Monitor logs closely for unauthorized configuration changes.

Are other TP-Link router models at risk?

The vulnerability is specific to TL-WR940N v6 firmware. Other TL-WR940N versions (v1–v5) and other TP-Link models are not listed as affected. Always consult TP-Link's official security advisory for the complete list of impacted devices and firmware versions.

This analysis is based on publicly available vulnerability data as of 2026-06-18. SEC.co does not guarantee the completeness or real-time accuracy of patch availability or vendor advisory details. Organizations should verify all remediation steps against official TP-Link security advisories and their own internal risk assessment policies. No exploit code or weaponized proof-of-concept is provided herein. Always test patches in a non-production environment before wide deployment. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-07-27. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).