MEDIUM 5.5

CVE-2026-53219: Linux Kernel Netfilter Pointer Leak – Local Information Disclosure

A flaw in the Linux kernel's netfilter subsystem allows unprivileged local users to extract internal memory pointers used for performance counters. When retrieving firewall rule information, the kernel temporarily exposes the raw address of a per-CPU memory allocation before replacing it with sanitized data. If a user-space program causes a memory fault at precisely the right moment during this window, the raw pointer leaks out, potentially revealing kernel memory layout details that aid further exploitation.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 5.5 MEDIUM · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
Affected products
8 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-25 / 2026-07-02

NVD description (verbatim)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: x_tables: avoid leaking percpu counter pointers The native and compat get-entries paths copy the fixed rule entry header from the kernelized rule blob to userspace before overwriting the entry's counter fields with a sanitized counter snapshot. On SMP kernels, entry->counters.pcnt contains the percpu allocation address used by x_tables rule counters. A caller can provide a userspace buffer that faults during the initial fixed-header copy after pcnt has been copied but before the later sanitized counter copy runs. The syscall then returns -EFAULT while leaving the raw percpu pointer in userspace. Copy only the fixed entry prefix before counters from the kernelized rule blob, then copy the sanitized counter snapshot into the counter field. Apply this ordering to the IPv4, IPv6, and ARP native and compat get-entries implementations so a fault cannot expose the internal percpu counter pointer.

8 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

CVE-2026-53219 affects the netfilter x_tables module's get-entries code paths (native and compat variants for IPv4, IPv6, and ARP). The vulnerability stems from a race-like condition in the copy-to-userspace sequence: the code first copies a fixed rule header containing entry->counters.pcnt (a percpu allocation address on SMP systems), then later overwrites the counter fields with sanitized snapshots. A malicious caller can trigger a page fault during the initial copy after pcnt has been read but before the sanitized counter copy executes, leaving the raw kernel pointer in the userspace buffer and returning -EFAULT. The fix reorders the copy sequence to extract only the fixed prefix before the counter fields, then separately copy the sanitized counter snapshot into place, preventing the window where the percpu pointer can leak.

Business impact

Information disclosure vulnerabilities that leak kernel memory layout undermine address space layout randomization (ASLR) and enable attackers to refine subsequent privilege-escalation or code-execution attacks. While this alone is not a direct code-execution vector, it removes a key defensive layer. Organizations running SMP Linux systems with unprivileged user accounts or containers face increased risk from local attackers who can map kernel memory and use that knowledge to target further vulnerabilities more reliably.

Affected systems

The Linux kernel across multiple versions is affected. The vulnerability is present in the netfilter x_tables subsystem, impacting systems that use iptables, ip6tables, or arptables for network filtering. Affected configurations include all SMP (multi-processor) Linux systems, since single-processor kernels do not use per-CPU counters in the same manner. Any distribution shipping an unpatched Linux kernel with the x_tables subsystem is susceptible.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires local access and is straightforward for an unprivileged user or containerized workload. No special kernel module, debugger, or exotic hardware is needed—only the ability to call the netfilter get-entries ioctl (e.g., via standard iptables listing operations) while triggering a userspace page fault. Reliability is high because the fault window, though small, can be hit repeatedly. Remote exploitation is not possible; this is a local-only vulnerability.

Remediation

Apply kernel patches from your Linux distribution that incorporate the upstream netfilter x_tables fix. Verify that patches address the native and compat code paths for IPv4, IPv6, and ARP variants. Alternatively, disable or restrict unprivileged access to iptables operations via LSM policies or containers with reduced capabilities. Monitor for suspicious iptables queries or unusual kernel memory access patterns in system logs.

Patch guidance

Check your distribution's kernel security advisories for the fix to netfilter x_tables get-entries code. The upstream patch reorders copy operations in the native and compat get-entries functions to sanitize counter data before it is exposed to userspace. Verify the patch applies to your kernel version and architecture (x86_64, ARM, etc.). Test in a staging environment before production rollout, particularly if you rely on iptables for policy enforcement.

Detection guidance

Monitor system call tracing (strace, audit) for repeated calls to netfilter get-entries ioctls (e.g., SO_GET_ENTRIES variants) that return -EFAULT. Detect attempts by unprivileged users to query firewall rules repeatedly in short bursts, which may indicate reconnaissance. Implement mandatory access controls to restrict direct iptables access to authorized administrators. Enable kernel Address Sanitizer (KASAN) or similar kernel debugging to catch pointer leaks in lab environments.

Why prioritize this

Although the CVSS score is MEDIUM (5.5) and the vulnerability requires local access, kernel memory disclosure significantly amplifies the risk of chained local privilege escalation attacks. Organizations with strong privilege boundaries and container isolation may deprioritize this relative to remote vectors, but those permitting unprivileged user accounts on shared systems should treat it as important. Patch promptly within a 30-day window.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS v3.1 score of 5.5 reflects the vulnerability's local-only attack surface (AV:L), low complexity (AC:L), and requirement for low privileges (PR:L). The impact is confidentiality only—no authentication bypass, code execution, or system crash—hence High availability impact is not applicable. The score is conservative; in environments with weak privilege separation, the real-world risk is higher because leaked kernel pointers directly enable exploitation of subsequent vulnerabilities.

Frequently asked questions

Can this vulnerability be exploited remotely?

No. CVE-2026-53219 requires local access to the system and the ability to call netfilter ioctls. Remote attackers cannot trigger this flaw directly over the network.

Do single-processor Linux systems need to apply this patch?

Single-processor (non-SMP) kernels are not vulnerable because they do not use per-CPU counters in the same manner. However, for simplicity and future-proofing, applying the patch to all systems is recommended.

What is the practical impact of a leaked kernel pointer?

A leaked percpu allocation address reveals information about kernel memory layout, weakening ASLR. Attackers can use this to refine exploitation of other local vulnerabilities, such as use-after-free or integer overflow bugs, that might otherwise be unreliable to exploit.

Will I notice any performance change after patching?

No. The patch only reorders copy operations and does not alter the logic or performance characteristics of netfilter rule retrieval.

This analysis is provided for informational purposes and reflects publicly available information as of the publication date. SEC.co makes no warranty regarding the completeness, accuracy, or applicability of this content to your specific environment. Verify all patch versions, affected product lists, and remediation steps against official vendor advisories before deploying patches. Test patches in a non-production environment first. Organizations should conduct their own risk assessment based on their specific infrastructure, threat model, and security posture. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-03. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).