MEDIUM 5.5

CVE-2026-53208: Linux Bluetooth L2CAP MTUsig Enforcement Vulnerability

A flaw in the Linux kernel's Bluetooth BR/EDR (Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate) stack allows an unpaired attacker within radio range to trigger a denial-of-service condition. The vulnerability exists in the L2CAP (Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol) signaling layer, which fails to enforce the minimum packet size limit (MTUsig = 48 bytes) for Bluetooth signaling commands. An attacker can craft a single oversized signaling packet containing many ECHO_REQ (echo request) commands, forcing the target device to respond with numerous ECHO_RSP (echo response) frames, consuming bandwidth and processing resources without authentication.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 5.5 MEDIUM · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
Affected products
12 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-25 / 2026-07-02

NVD description (verbatim)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject BR/EDR signaling packets over MTUsig net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:l2cap_sig_channel() accepts BR/EDR signaling packets up to the channel MTU and dispatches each command without enforcing the signaling MTU (MTUsig). A Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range can send a fixed-channel CID 0x0001 packet that is larger than MTUsig and contains many L2CAP_ECHO_REQ commands before pairing. In a real-radio stock-kernel run, one 681-byte signaling packet containing 168 zero-length ECHO_REQ commands made the target transmit 168 ECHO_RSP frames over about 220 ms. Impact: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range, before pairing, can force 168 ECHO_RSP frames from one 681-byte fixed-channel signaling packet containing packed ECHO_REQ commands. Define Linux's BR/EDR signaling MTU as the spec minimum of 48 bytes and reject any larger signaling packet with one L2CAP_COMMAND_REJECT_RSP carrying L2CAP_REJ_MTU_EXCEEDED before any command is dispatched. The Bluetooth Core spec wording for MTUExceeded says the reject identifier shall match the first request command in the packet, and that packets containing only responses shall be silently discarded. Linux intentionally deviates from that prescription: silently discarding desynchronizes the peer because the remote stack never learns its responses were dropped, and locating the first request command requires walking command headers past MTUsig, i.e. processing bytes from a packet we have already decided is too large to process. We therefore always emit one reject and use the identifier from the first command header, a single fixed-offset byte read. The unrestricted BR/EDR signaling parser and ECHO_REQ response path both trace to the initial git import; no later introducing commit is available for a Fixes tag.

8 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The Linux kernel's L2CAP signaling handler (l2cap_sig_channel in net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c) accepts BR/EDR signaling packets up to the negotiated channel MTU without validating against the Bluetooth specification's mandated MTUsig minimum of 48 bytes. This permits a peer to send a single fixed-channel (CID 0x0001) packet that exceeds MTUsig while containing multiple L2CAP_ECHO_REQ commands. Each embedded command is processed independently, generating corresponding ECHO_RSP responses. A 681-byte test packet with 168 zero-length ECHO_REQ commands elicited 168 response frames over ~220 milliseconds on real hardware. The fix implements MTUsig enforcement by rejecting any signaling packet exceeding 48 bytes with a single L2CAP_COMMAND_REJECT_RSP carrying L2CAP_REJ_MTU_EXCEEDED, before any embedded command is dispatched.

Business impact

This vulnerability enables resource exhaustion attacks on Linux systems with Bluetooth BR/EDR enabled, achievable without pairing or authentication. While the CVSS score is medium (5.5), the practical impact depends on the target system's role and Bluetooth exposure. On mobile devices, laptops, or IoT systems with ambient Bluetooth, an attacker can degrade responsiveness by flooding the radio interface. Enterprise environments where Bluetooth-enabled devices operate in proximity to untrusted spaces face elevated risk. Repeated attacks could accelerate battery drain and thermal stress on affected endpoints. However, the attack requires proximity (radio range) and affects availability rather than confidentiality or integrity.

Affected systems

All Linux kernel versions are affected, as the vulnerability traces to the initial git import with no later introducing commit. Affected systems include any device running a vulnerable Linux kernel with Bluetooth BR/EDR support enabled, including desktop systems, notebooks, servers with Bluetooth modules, and embedded/IoT platforms. Android systems using the Linux kernel are in scope. Check your kernel version against available security advisories and your distribution's patch timeline.

Exploitability

Exploitation is straightforward and requires no special tools beyond standard Bluetooth radio access. An attacker must be within Bluetooth radio range (typically 10–100 meters depending on power class) of a target device. No pairing, authentication, or user interaction is required; attacks can occur opportunistically against any device with BR/EDR enabled. The attacker crafts a single malformed L2CAP signaling packet with a size exceeding 48 bytes and embeds multiple ECHO_REQ commands. This packet is sent to the fixed signaling channel (CID 0x0001) on any Bluetooth BR/EDR interface. No exploit code or sophisticated tooling is needed; basic Bluetooth packet construction suffices. The vulnerability has not been added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, but the attack method is trivial to implement.

Remediation

Apply a patched Linux kernel version that enforces MTUsig (48 bytes) validation for BR/EDR L2CAP signaling packets. Verify the specific patch version from your Linux distribution or kernel.org advisories. As a temporary mitigation, disable Bluetooth BR/EDR on systems where it is not required, or use Bluetooth-aware network segmentation and firewall rules to limit Bluetooth traffic from untrusted sources. However, this mitigation is imperfect because Bluetooth attacks occur at the radio layer, outside traditional network defenses. Prioritize patching as the definitive fix.

Patch guidance

Check your distribution's security advisory portal (Red Hat, Canonical, SUSE, Arch, etc.) for the patched kernel version addressing CVE-2026-53208. Apply the patch through your standard update mechanism (apt, yum, pacman, etc.) and reboot to activate the new kernel. Verify the fix by confirming the kernel version and checking the changelog for mention of L2CAP MTUsig enforcement or Bluetooth signaling packet validation. Test in a controlled environment before deploying to production to ensure compatibility with your hardware and modules.

Detection guidance

Monitor Bluetooth interface statistics for anomalous ECHO_RSP frame counts or sustained high Bluetooth traffic over short periods. Kernel logs may show L2CAP command processing warnings on vulnerable systems under attack. Use tools such as btmon (Bluetooth monitor) to capture and analyze L2CAP signaling traffic; look for signaling packets larger than 48 bytes being accepted and processed. Monitor CPU and radio utilization during suspected attack windows. Intrusion detection systems with Bluetooth protocol parsing can flag oversized signaling packets. However, detection at the network layer is limited; host-based monitoring of kernel statistics is more reliable.

Why prioritize this

Although the CVSS score is medium (5.5), prioritize this patch for systems where Bluetooth BR/EDR is enabled and exposed to untrusted environments. Desktop systems, laptops, and mobile devices in open office or public spaces should be patched urgently because an attacker within radio range can exploit the vulnerability without authentication. Servers in data centers with Bluetooth disabled are lower priority. The lack of authentication and the ease of triggering the issue without tools elevate practical risk despite the moderate CVSS score. The cost of patching is low (standard kernel update), making this a high-return security action.

Risk score, explained

CVSS 5.5 reflects a medium-severity availability issue: local attack vector (AV:L), low complexity (AC:L), low privileges (PR:L), no user interaction (UI:N), unchanged scope (S:U), no confidentiality or integrity impact (C:N/I:N), but high availability impact (A:H). However, the CVSS vector is conservative. In practice, the attack vector should be considered 'adjacent' or 'network-adjacent' (radio proximity), and privilege requirement is effectively none (pre-pairing). The true risk for high-exposure endpoints exceeds the numeric score. Conversely, on well-segmented, Bluetooth-disabled systems, risk is minimal. Adjust your risk posture based on Bluetooth deployment in your environment.

Frequently asked questions

Can this attack happen over the internet or only via direct Bluetooth radio?

Only via direct Bluetooth radio within range (typically 10–100 meters). The attack requires radio proximity to the target device; it cannot be launched remotely over networks.

Do I need to be paired with the target device to exploit this vulnerability?

No. Pairing is not required. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability before any pairing or bonding occurs, making it a pre-authentication attack.

What is MTUsig and why does the Linux kernel now enforce it?

MTUsig is the Bluetooth Core Specification's minimum signaling MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) of 48 bytes. All BR/EDR signaling packets must not exceed this size. Linux originally accepted larger packets, violating the spec and allowing packet amplification attacks. The patch enforces the 48-byte limit and rejects oversized packets.

If I disable Bluetooth entirely, am I protected?

Yes. Disabling Bluetooth BR/EDR eliminates the attack surface. However, this may not be practical for laptops and mobile devices. Patching the kernel is the recommended fix.

This analysis is based on the CVE-2026-53208 advisory and Linux kernel documentation as of the publication date. Security landscapes evolve; verify all patch versions and affected product versions against official Linux distribution advisories and kernel.org before taking action. CVSS scores and KEV status reflect information available at the time of analysis. Exploit code or weaponized proof-of-concept details are not provided. Organizations should conduct independent risk assessment and testing in controlled environments before deploying patches to production. This document does not constitute legal or compliance advice; consult your organization's security policy and legal counsel regarding vulnerability management timelines. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-03. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).