CVE-2026-53155: Linux Kernel Device-Private Memory Corruption Leading to Denial of Service
A bug in the Linux kernel's memory management code corrupts the state of anonymous page tracking when device-private memory (used by GPUs and accelerators) is involved. The kernel incorrectly interprets memory flags when migrating pages between RAM and device memory, leading to assertions that crash the system. The issue surfaces in scenarios where a process with child processes (fork) migrates memory to and from device-private storage, particularly with large pages. A local user can trigger this by running specific memory-migration workloads.
Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain
- CVSS
- 3.1 · 5.5 MEDIUM · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Weaknesses (CWE)
- —
- Affected products
- 8 configuration(s)
- Published / Modified
- 2026-06-25 / 2026-07-07
NVD description (verbatim)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/huge_memory: use correct flags for device private PMD entry Commit 65edfda6f3f2 ("mm/rmap: extend rmap and migration support device-private entries") updated set_pmd_migration_entry() to use pmdp_huge_get_and_clear() in the softleaf case, but made no further adjustments to the function itself. Therefore this function continues to incorrectly use pmd_write(), pmd_soft_dirty() and pmd_uffd_wp() to determine whether the installed migration entry should be marked writable, softdirty or uffd-wp respectively. Whilst all are incorrect, the most problematic of these is pmd_write(), as this can lead to corrupted rmap state. On x86-64 _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY is aliased to _PAGE_RW. So calling pmd_write() on a softleaf will return the softdirty state encoded in the entry, assuming CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY was enabled. This was observed when running the hmm.hmm_device_private.anon_write_child selftest: 1. The test faults in a range then migrates it such that a device-private THP range is established. 2. The parent then migrates it to a device-private writable PMD entry whose folio is entirely AnonExclusive with entire_mapcount=1, softdirty set (accidentally correct write state). 3. The parent forks and the PMD entries are set to device-private read only entries, entire_mapcount=2, softdirty still set. 4. [BUG] The child writes to the range then migrates to RAM - intending to install non-writable migration entries - but replacing parent and child PMD mappings with WRITABLE entries due to misinterpreting the softdirty bit. 5. In remove_migration_pmd(), if !softleaf_is_migration_read(entry) we set the RMAP_EXCLUSIVE flag when calling folio_add_anon_rmap_pmd() for both parent and child, which are therefore AnonExclusive. 6. [SPLAT] Child sets migrated folio entire_mapcount=1, parent sets entire_mapcount=2 and we end up with an AnonExclusive folio with entire_mapcount=2! Assert fires in __folio_add_anon_rmap(): VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO(folio_test_large(folio) && folio_entire_mapcount(folio) > 1 && PageAnonExclusive(cur_page), folio) This patch fixes the issue by correctly referencing the softleaf entry fields for writable, softdirty and uffd-wp in set_pmd_migration_entry(). It also only updates A/D flags if the entry is present as these are otherwise not meaningful for a softleaf entry. This patch also flips the if (!present) { ... } else { ... } logic in set_pmd_migration_entry() so it is easier to understand, and adds some comments to make things clearer. I was able to bisect this to commit 775465fd26a3 ("lib/test_hmm: add zone device private THP test infrastructure") which first exposes this bug as it was the commit that permitted test_hmm to generate the test. However commit 65edfda6f3f2 ("mm/rmap: extend rmap and migration support device-private entries") is the commit that actually enabled this behaviour.
2 reference(s) · View on NVD →
SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source
Technical summary
CVE-2026-53155 is a logic error in set_pmd_migration_entry() within mm/huge_memory.c. The function uses incorrect flag-checking functions (pmd_write(), pmd_soft_dirty(), pmd_uffd_wp()) on device-private PMD entries when they should use entry-specific accessors. On x86-64, _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY is aliased to _PAGE_RW, so pmd_write() misinterprets the soft-dirty bit as the write bit when CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY is enabled. This causes migration entries to be marked writable when they should be read-only, corrupting the folio's AnonExclusive refcount state. The resulting entire_mapcount mismatch triggers a VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO assertion in __folio_add_anon_rmap(), causing a kernel panic. The bug is exposed by fork + device-private THP migration patterns in workloads like the hmm_device_private.anon_write_child selftest.
Business impact
This vulnerability affects Linux systems running HPC, AI/ML, or GPU-accelerated workloads that use device-private memory migration APIs. A local unprivileged user can crash the kernel without requiring elevated privileges, resulting in denial of service. Systems without such workloads or device-private memory configurations are not affected. The crash is deterministic under the right memory migration sequence, making it reliably exploitable in multi-process GPU or accelerator applications.
Affected systems
The Linux kernel across all versions implementing device-private memory support and the rmap/migration changes introduced in commits 65edfda6f3f2 and 775465fd26a3. Affected configurations include systems with GPUs or other devices using the HMM (Heterogeneous Memory Management) API with transparent huge pages (THP) enabled. ARM64, x86-64, and other architectures are affected. Distributions shipping recent Linux kernels with GPU acceleration support (NVIDIA, AMD, Intel) or HPC accelerator drivers are at risk.
Exploitability
Exploitability is medium. A local unprivileged user can reliably trigger the kernel crash by executing memory migration patterns involving device-private memory and fork operations. No network access or special privileges are required. Exploitation requires a system with device-private memory support enabled (not default in many configs) and active workloads using the HMM API. The vulnerability is deterministic given the right sequence, but relies on specific memory migration scenarios, making opportunistic exploitation less likely than targeted attacks against known HPC/GPU deployments.
Remediation
Kernel updates implementing the fix to set_pmd_migration_entry() are required. The patch corrects the function to use appropriate softleaf entry accessors instead of pmd_* functions, and conditionally updates A/D flags only for present entries. Linux maintainers should apply the referenced fix immediately to stable and LTS branches. Verify the patch against the upstream kernel repository and vendor advisories for your distribution.
Patch guidance
Monitor your Linux distribution's security advisories for kernel updates that address CVE-2026-53155. The fix involves correcting set_pmd_migration_entry() logic and is typically backported to stable kernels. Apply kernel updates as soon as patches are available from your vendor (Red Hat, Canonical, SUSE, etc.). If your systems do not use device-private memory migration (i.e., no GPU/accelerator workloads), patch priority may be lower, but is still recommended for defense-in-depth. Verify kernel version post-patch against vendor release notes; no workarounds exist without patching the kernel source.
Detection guidance
Monitor system logs and kernel message buffers for VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO assertions or BUG/panic messages originating from __folio_add_anon_rmap() or migration code paths. The assertion message will reference folio_entire_mapcount() mismatch with AnonExclusive state. Enable kernel debugging (CONFIG_DEBUG_VM) in test/staging environments to catch the warning before panic. In production, enable kernel crash dumps (kdump) to capture the assertion context. Log aggregation and alerting on kernel panic events is essential for detecting exploitation attempts.
Why prioritize this
Although rated CVSS 5.5 (Medium), this vulnerability should be prioritized if your infrastructure includes GPU-accelerated or HPC workloads using device-private memory. The availability impact is severe—a local user can reliably crash the kernel—and the attack surface is expanding as GPU/accelerator adoption grows. Organizations running NVIDIA CUDA, AMD ROCm, Intel DPL, or OpenCL workloads should prioritize patching. For general-purpose server deployments without accelerator support, priority can be deferred but should not be ignored indefinitely.
Risk score, explained
CVSS 5.5 reflects a local-only attack vector (AV:L), low complexity (AC:L), requiring low privilege (PR:L), with no user interaction, affecting only availability (A:H). The absence of confidentiality and integrity impacts keeps the score moderate. However, the practical impact is high for affected deployments: a single unprivileged process can instantly down the system. The rating appropriately penalizes the local-only requirement but does not fully capture the severity of deterministic kernel crashes in production GPU/HPC clusters.
Frequently asked questions
Does this affect systems without GPUs or accelerators?
No, systems that do not use device-private memory migration APIs (HMM) are unaffected. This includes most traditional servers, desktops, and workstations without GPU workloads. However, if you use GPU acceleration, remote GPUs, or accelerator cards with transparent huge page support, you are at risk.
Can this be exploited remotely or over the network?
No. CVE-2026-53155 requires local access and an unprivileged user account on the affected system. It cannot be exploited over the network or via a remote service.
What is device-private memory and why does it matter?
Device-private memory refers to storage on accelerators (GPUs, AI chips, FPGAs) that the CPU can migrate data to and from. Systems using HMM (Heterogeneous Memory Management) transparently move pages between RAM and device memory. GPU-accelerated ML, HPC simulations, and real-time video processing commonly rely on this. The kernel bug corrupts tracking of these migrated pages, causing crashes in such workloads.
Is there a workaround if I cannot patch immediately?
No safe workaround exists without patching the kernel. Disabling transparent huge pages (THP) or avoiding device-private memory workloads reduces risk but is impractical for production deployments. The only mitigation is to apply the kernel patch from your vendor as soon as possible.
This analysis is based on the published CVE description and CVSS assessment as of the publication date. Patch version numbers and specific vendor advisory details should be verified against official Linux kernel repositories and your distribution's security bulletins. SEC.co does not provide guarantees regarding the accuracy of future exploit code or weaponization techniques. Readers should consult their system vendor and kernel maintainers for authoritative patch guidance specific to their platform and kernel version. This information is provided for defensive security purposes only. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-03. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).
Affected vendors
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