HIGH 7.3

CVE-2026-50132: Budibase Silent Account Linking via Chat Integration

Budibase prior to version 3.39.0 contains a critical account-linking flaw in its public chat integration endpoint. An attacker can craft a malicious link that, when clicked by an authenticated Budibase user, silently binds that user's account to the attacker's Slack, Discord, or Microsoft Teams identity—without the user's knowledge or consent. This gives the attacker the ability to impersonate the victim within chat-integrated workflows and potentially access sensitive data or perform actions on their behalf. The vulnerability requires no special privileges to exploit and succeeds through simple social engineering (tricking a user into clicking a link).

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 7.3 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-284, CWE-352
Affected products
1 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-26 / 2026-06-30

NVD description (verbatim)

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, `GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff` is a public endpoint (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with no consent UI and no CSRF protection. The session token in the URL is created by the attacker (from their own /link slash command) and embeds the attacker's externalUserId. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker's Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with "Authentication succeeded." — no indication of what was linked. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.

2 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability exists in the `GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff` endpoint, which is publicly accessible and performs a state-changing operation without authentication checks. The endpoint accepts a session token created and controlled by the attacker, which embeds the attacker's external user identifier (from Slack, Discord, or MS Teams). When an authenticated Budibase user visits this URL—either via phishing, malicious link, or in-app content—the server binds the authenticated user's Budibase account to the attacker's chat identity. The binding is permanent and silent; the user receives only a generic "Authentication succeeded" message with no disclosure of what account link was created. The vulnerability is compounded by the absence of CSRF protection and any consent UI, meaning the operation occurs entirely without user awareness or confirmation.

Business impact

Compromise of user account identity and authorization context within chat-driven workflows. An attacker gains the ability to send messages, execute commands, or trigger automations on behalf of the victim through the victim's Budibase chat integration. This may lead to unauthorized data access, malicious workflow execution, credential theft through social engineering, or reputational damage if the attacker impersonates the victim in team communications. For organizations relying on Budibase for low-code automation tied to Slack/Teams channels, this creates a vector for lateral privilege escalation and insider-like threat activity.

Affected systems

All Budibase deployments running version 3.38.x and earlier. The vulnerability is fixed in version 3.39.0 and later. Both cloud-hosted and self-hosted Budibase instances are affected if they expose the vulnerable endpoint and have chat integration features enabled. Organizations should verify their running Budibase version and confirm whether chat-linking functionality is in use.

Exploitability

Exploitability is high in practical terms despite the CVSS vector requiring an authenticated victim and user interaction. The attack requires only that an authenticated Budibase user click a link—a low bar for social engineering. No complex privilege escalation, code execution, or brute force is needed. The attacker needs only to generate a session token from their own chat account via a slash command, embed it in a malicious URL, and distribute that URL to Budibase users via email, Slack/Teams, or other channels. The endpoint offers no rate limiting, validation, or user confirmation that would slow exploitation. Organizations with staff who actively use Budibase chat integrations face elevated risk.

Remediation

Upgrade Budibase to version 3.39.0 or later immediately. This version introduces authentication and CSRF protection to the chat-linking endpoint, requires explicit user consent before binding external identities, and no longer exposes the operation to unauthenticated or cross-site requests. After upgrading, conduct a brief audit of any existing chat identity links in your Budibase instances to identify and revoke any unauthorized bindings.

Patch guidance

Budibase releases security patches via standard versioning. Review the official Budibase release notes for version 3.39.0 to confirm the fix and any breaking changes or upgrade prerequisites. If your instance is cloud-hosted, Budibase will likely auto-update; verify this with your account team. For self-hosted deployments, plan a maintenance window to test the upgrade in a non-production environment first, especially if custom plugins or integrations depend on the chat endpoint. Coordinate the upgrade with teams that rely on chat-driven workflows to minimize disruption.

Detection guidance

Monitor web application firewall (WAF) and application logs for repeated requests to `/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff` with varying tokens or from suspicious IP addresses. Unusual patterns of authentication success messages without corresponding user login events may also signal exploitation. Review Budibase audit logs for chat identity link creation events that don't correlate with user-initiated requests. If your Slack, Discord, or Teams workspace is integrated with Budibase, query for unrecognized bot or user links that may have been created without explicit action. Threat-hunting queries should focus on finding chat identity links bound to high-privilege user accounts or those created outside normal business hours or geographies.

Why prioritize this

This vulnerability warrants immediate patching due to the combination of ease of exploitation, high user impact, and silent operation. Users cannot detect or defend against the attack themselves once exploited. The flaw directly undermines the trust model of chat-integrated automation—a core feature for Budibase users. Even though exploitation requires user interaction, that interaction is trivial (clicking a link) and difficult to distinguish from legitimate requests. Organizations with mature security postures should treat this as a critical priority; those with large Budibase user populations or heavy reliance on chat integration should prioritize within 24–48 hours.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 3.1 score of 7.3 (HIGH) reflects high confidentiality and integrity impact (the attacker can access and alter the victim's chat-linked automations and workflows), balanced against the requirement for an authenticated user and social engineering interaction. The vector AV:N (network-accessible), AC:L (low attack complexity), PR:L (low privilege—victim must be authenticated, not attacker), and UI:R (user interaction required) aligns with the practical threat: phishing or in-app content can deliver the exploit with minimal friction. The score does not account for the silence and permanence of the binding, which makes post-exploitation detection harder; in real-world risk assessment, this may warrant internal elevation.

Frequently asked questions

Can an unauthenticated attacker exploit this vulnerability?

No. The attacker must have the ability to generate a session token via their own Slack, Discord, or Teams account integrated with the target Budibase instance. However, once the token is generated, the victim who clicks the link does not need to be authenticated at the time of click—if they are already authenticated to Budibase (e.g., in another tab), the binding will succeed silently. So the barrier is low but not zero.

If my Budibase instance does not use chat integrations, am I affected?

The vulnerability is in the chat-linking endpoint, so if chat integration is not deployed or not enabled, the endpoint is unreachable and the risk is eliminated. However, if you are running Budibase 3.38.x or earlier, the code path exists and should be patched proactively to avoid future risk if chat features are enabled.

Will upgrading to 3.39.0 break existing chat links?

No. Upgrading will fix the security flaw and add consent requirements for future linking, but existing legitimate chat identity links will remain intact. However, if any unauthorized links were created via this vulnerability before patching, you should identify and remove them after upgrading.

How can I tell if my account has been compromised by this vulnerability?

Check your Budibase user settings or account panel for chat identity links (Slack, Discord, MS Teams). If you see a link you did not explicitly create or recognize, it may be the result of exploitation. Contact your Budibase administrator to revoke it. Additionally, review any chat-triggered workflows or automations that executed around the time of potential exploitation to spot unauthorized activity.

This vulnerability analysis is provided for informational purposes and current as of the published and modified dates above. SEC.co does not verify vendor-supplied patch version numbers or release notes independent of official vendor advisories; readers should consult the official Budibase security advisory and release notes to confirm patch availability and compatibility. No proof-of-concept or working exploit code is provided. This document does not constitute legal or compliance advice. Organizations should assess their own risk posture, dependencies, and deployment architecture before determining remediation priority. If you believe you have been compromised, engage your incident response team or a qualified third party. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-05. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).