CVE-2026-49278: Rocket.Chat Visitor Token Exposure in API Response
Rocket.Chat versions before specific patched releases leak authentication tokens in the visitors.info API endpoint response. An attacker with administrative privileges could retrieve visitor information and capture these tokens, potentially using them to escalate access or impersonate users. The vulnerability requires high privilege level to exploit but exposes sensitive authentication material that should never be returned by the API.
Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain
- CVSS
- 3.1 · 6.7 MEDIUM · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
- Weaknesses (CWE)
- CWE-285
- Affected products
- 0 configuration(s)
- Published / Modified
- 2026-06-24 / 2026-06-26
NVD description (verbatim)
Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.2, 8.3.4, 8.2.4, 8.1.5, 8.0.6, 7.13.8, and 7.10.12, in the visitors.info endpoint, https://developer.rocket.chat/apidocs/get-visitor-information-by-id-1, token is returned in the response. It looks like there's no use case for the token to be present in the response and it would be a good security practice to remove it altogether. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.2, 8.3.4, 8.2.4, 8.1.5, 8.0.6, 7.13.8, and 7.10.12.
2 reference(s) · View on NVD →
SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source
Technical summary
The vulnerability exists in the visitors.info REST API endpoint (documented at https://developer.rocket.chat/apidocs/get-visitor-information-by-id-1) across multiple Rocket.Chat versions. When querying visitor information by ID, the API response includes authentication tokens that should not be exposed. This violates API security best practices: tokens must never appear in response bodies and should only be transmitted via secure channels (HTTP headers, secure cookies) with appropriate protections. The issue affects versions prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.2, 8.3.4, 8.2.4, 8.1.5, 8.0.6, 7.13.8, and 7.10.12. Remediation removes token data from API responses entirely.
Business impact
Token leakage in API responses creates a credential exposure risk that could undermine access controls. An authenticated admin querying visitor data now captures tokens that may grant broader access than intended. In multi-team or multi-organization deployments, exposed tokens could facilitate lateral movement or unauthorized access to other communication channels. The risk is compounded in environments with shared administrative accounts or insufficient token rotation policies.
Affected systems
Rocket.Chat open-source communication platform installations running unpatched versions: 8.4.x (before 8.4.2), 8.3.x (before 8.3.4), 8.2.x (before 8.2.4), 8.1.x (before 8.1.5), 8.0.x (before 8.0.6), 7.13.x (before 7.13.8), and 7.10.x (before 7.10.12). Organizations running version 8.5.0 or later are unaffected. Self-hosted and on-premises Rocket.Chat deployments are the primary concern, though managed instances should verify their version status.
Exploitability
Exploitation requires administrative or API-privileged credentials—this is not exploitable by unauthenticated attackers. However, the barrier is the privileged user, not the vulnerability itself. Once a high-privilege account is compromised or an insider has access, extracting visitor tokens requires only a standard API call to visitors.info. The CVSS score of 6.7 reflects the requirement for elevated privileges but acknowledges the high confidentiality and integrity impact of exposed tokens. No public exploit code is known to exist; the vulnerability is a logical flaw in API response handling.
Remediation
Upgrade Rocket.Chat to a patched version: 8.5.0, 8.4.2, 8.3.4, 8.2.4, 8.1.5, 8.0.6, 7.13.8, or 7.10.12 depending on your current release line. Patched versions remove tokens from the visitors.info API response entirely. For organizations unable to patch immediately, restrict API access to the visitors.info endpoint to strictly necessary administrative accounts and monitor access logs for unusual queries.
Patch guidance
Rocket.Chat provides patched versions across eight release branches. Identify your current version and select the matching patch: if you run 8.4.x, upgrade to 8.4.2 or higher; if 8.3.x, upgrade to 8.3.4 or higher, etc. Test patches in a staging environment before production deployment. Consult the official Rocket.Chat release notes to verify no breaking changes affect your deployment. Organizations on very old versions (earlier than 7.10) should plan an upgrade path and consider whether extended support options are available.
Detection guidance
Search API access logs for calls to the /api/v1/visitors.info endpoint, particularly those made by administrative accounts. Examine response payloads for leaked tokens—they typically appear as Bearer tokens or session identifiers in JSON responses. Monitor for repeated or automated queries to this endpoint that may indicate token harvesting. Implement network-level detection to flag responses containing authentication credentials. In Rocket.Chat audit logs, look for visitor information lookups paired with access from external systems or unusual IP addresses.
Why prioritize this
Although CVSS 6.7 (MEDIUM) reflects the privilege requirement, this vulnerability should be prioritized for patching because it directly leaks authentication tokens—a critical asset in any security posture. Token exposure is a persistent threat; leaked tokens can be reused until rotated or revoked. The barrier to exploitation (admin access) is lower in smaller organizations or those with shared admin credentials. If your Rocket.Chat instance handles sensitive communications, visitor tokens must be protected.
Risk score, explained
CVSS 3.1 score of 6.7 is driven by: (1) High privilege requirement (PR:H)—reduces attack complexity; (2) Network-adjacent vector (AV:N)—remotely exploitable; (3) High confidentiality impact (C:H)—tokens are secrets; (4) High integrity impact (I:H)—stolen tokens enable unauthorized actions; (5) Low availability impact (A:L). The score does not account for the rarity of the vulnerability in the wild or business context; it reflects the technical severity of exposing authentication material to a privileged user.
Frequently asked questions
Do we need to rotate all tokens if we're running an unpatched version?
If your Rocket.Chat instance has been running an unpatched version and you have reason to believe an admin accessed the visitors.info endpoint, you should assume tokens have been exposed. Implement token rotation for all active visitor and user accounts as a precaution. After upgrading to a patched version, tokens generated before the patch should be considered suspect.
Can an unauthenticated user trigger this vulnerability?
No. The visitors.info endpoint requires administrative or API-level authentication to access. However, if your admin credentials are compromised through phishing, weak passwords, or other means, an attacker can immediately exploit this to harvest visitor tokens without additional effort.
Does this affect Rocket.Chat Cloud or only self-hosted deployments?
Rocket.Chat Cloud (managed instances) should be automatically patched by Rocket.Chat's operations team; verify your instance version in the admin panel. Self-hosted and on-premises installations are your responsibility to patch. If you operate a hybrid model, confirm patch status for each deployment.
What should we check in our logs if we suspect token leakage?
Review API access logs for calls to /api/v1/visitors.info between your deployment date and the patch date. Check if the response bodies in your Web Application Firewall or API gateway logs contain token patterns (typically 'Bearer ' followed by a long alphanumeric string, or session IDs). Cross-reference API calls with your known administrative accounts to identify suspicious access patterns.
This analysis is based on CVE-2026-49278 as published. Verify all patch versions and upgrade paths against the official Rocket.Chat security advisories and release notes before deploying changes to production. The vulnerability intelligence provided is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or compliance advice. Organizations must conduct their own risk assessment based on their deployment configuration, data sensitivity, and threat environment. No exploit code or weaponized proof-of-concept has been provided; security researchers should disclose findings responsibly through Rocket.Chat's official channels. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-02. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).
Weaknesses (CWE)
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