CVE-2026-49097: Apache Camel IRC Header Injection – Message Redirection Vulnerability
Apache Camel's IRC component contains a flaw that allows attackers to redirect IRC messages to unintended recipients through HTTP requests. When a web application uses Camel to bridge HTTP traffic into IRC channels, an attacker can inject special HTTP headers that override the intended destination, causing messages to be diverted to attacker-controlled IRC channels or users. This leak can expose sensitive message content or make automated bots appear to send malicious messages on an attacker's behalf. The vulnerability requires an unauthenticated HTTP consumer to function but does not require credentials or specialized attack tools.
Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain
- CVSS
- 3.1 · 6.5 MEDIUM · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- Weaknesses (CWE)
- CWE-20, CWE-74
- Affected products
- 1 configuration(s)
- Published / Modified
- 2026-07-06 / 2026-07-08
NVD description (verbatim)
Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component. The camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component's other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it into a public channel, or delivering messages that appear to come from the bot. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set IRC headers via the raw header names must use the CamelIrc* names (for example CamelIrcSendTo) instead of the old irc.* values. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the irc.* headers from any untrusted ingress before the irc: producer (for example removeHeaders('irc.*') at the start of the route), and set the IRC destination from a trusted source.
2 reference(s) · View on NVD →
SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source
Technical summary
The Apache Camel IRC component fails to validate the origin and safety of control headers when they arrive via HTTP ingress. Specifically, headers like 'irc.sendTo', 'irc.target', 'irc.messageType', and related 'irc.user.*' fields lack the Camel namespace prefix (which would be 'CamelIrc*'). Because they do not match the 'Camel' or 'camel' prefix pattern, the HttpHeaderFilterStrategy—designed to block Camel-namespaced headers at HTTP boundaries—allows them to pass through from untrusted HTTP clients directly into the Exchange object. When the IRC producer reads these headers, it uses them to determine the message destination, allowing an HTTP client to override the endpoint's configured channel and redirect outbound IRC traffic to an arbitrary destination. The root cause is improper input validation of untrusted headers and inadequate namespace isolation of IRC control directives.
Business impact
Organizations deploying Camel-based integration routes that bridge web traffic into IRC channels face message exfiltration and impersonation risks. Sensitive data intended for internal channels may leak to public channels or attacker-controlled IRC users. Automated bots may be manipulated to send messages that appear legitimate, damaging trust and potentially facilitating social engineering or coordination of attacks. The impact is highest for environments relying on IRC for operational communication or bot-driven monitoring alerts.
Affected systems
Apache Camel versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.7, versions 4.15.0 through 4.18.2, and versions 4.19.0 through 4.20.x are affected. Notably, the LTS release stream 4.14.x is vulnerable up to 4.14.7. The vulnerability applies to any deployment that combines an HTTP consumer (such as platform-http) with an irc: producer in the same route without additional header filtering.
Exploitability
Exploitation is straightforward and requires no authentication when the HTTP consumer is unauthenticated. An attacker simply adds 'irc.sendTo' or similar IRC control headers to an HTTP request, which Camel will honor. No exploit code, advanced techniques, or credential compromise is necessary. The barrier to exploitation is low, and any organization exposing an HTTP endpoint connected to an IRC producer is at risk. CVSS 3.1 score of 6.5 (Medium) reflects the network-accessible nature and lack of required privileges, offset by limited impact scope (confidentiality and integrity but not availability).
Remediation
Upgrade Apache Camel immediately to version 4.21.0 (general releases), 4.14.8 (LTS stream 4.14.x), or 4.18.3 (release stream 4.18.x). After upgrading, refactor routes to use the Camel-namespaced header names (e.g., 'CamelIrcSendTo') instead of the legacy 'irc.*' names. Organizations unable to patch immediately should add a removeHeaders('irc.*') filter at the start of routes that accept external HTTP input, ensuring untrusted clients cannot inject IRC control headers. Additionally, always set the IRC destination from a trusted, authenticated source rather than from client-supplied headers.
Patch guidance
Verify against the Apache Camel official advisory for exact version requirements, but upgrade paths are: (1) If on 4.0.0–4.14.7, upgrade to 4.14.8 or later; (2) If on 4.15.0–4.18.2, upgrade to 4.18.3 or later; (3) If on 4.19.0 or later, upgrade to 4.21.0 or later. After patching, audit all Camel routes using the irc: component and replace legacy 'irc.*' header references with 'CamelIrc*' equivalents (e.g., 'irc.sendTo' becomes 'CamelIrcSendTo'). Test routes in a staging environment before production rollout.
Detection guidance
Monitor HTTP logs and Camel route traces for the presence of 'irc.*' or 'CamelIrc*' headers in requests from external sources. Implement runtime inspection of Exchange headers in routes bridging HTTP to IRC, logging any case where irc.sendTo or similar control headers appear in untrusted input. Alert on mismatches between the configured IRC channel destination and the actual destination where messages are sent. Threat hunting should focus on routes using older Camel versions (pre-4.21) combined with unauthenticated HTTP consumers.
Why prioritize this
Although CVSS severity is Medium (6.5), this vulnerability warrants expedited patching because it requires no authentication, no user interaction, and affects message confidentiality and integrity in real-time communication. Organizations relying on IRC for operational alerts or sensitive discussions are at elevated risk. The attack surface is straightforward to identify (any HTTP-to-IRC bridging route), and the fix is well-documented. Apply patches in the next maintenance window for affected Camel deployments.
Risk score, explained
CVSS 3.1 score of 6.5 reflects: Attack Vector Network (N, +impact), Attack Complexity Low (L, +impact), Privileges Required None (N, +impact), User Interaction None (N, +impact), Scope Unchanged (U), Confidentiality Low (L, +impact), Integrity Low (L, +impact), Availability None (N). The score does not escalate to High because availability is unaffected, and the impact is confined to message content and direction rather than system compromise. However, the ease of exploitation and lack of authentication requirements merit urgent remediation.
Frequently asked questions
Can this vulnerability be exploited without access to the Camel application itself?
Yes. If a Camel route exposes an HTTP endpoint (for example via platform-http) that forwards messages to IRC, any external HTTP client can inject irc.* headers in a request, even without authentication. The vulnerability lies at the HTTP boundary.
What is the difference between the old 'irc.*' header names and the new 'CamelIrc*' names?
The old names ('irc.sendTo', 'irc.target', etc.) lack the Camel prefix and bypass the HttpHeaderFilterStrategy, allowing untrusted sources to inject them. The new 'CamelIrc*' names (e.g., 'CamelIrcSendTo') are properly namespaced and are filtered or handled securely by Camel's header validation logic. After patching, routes must be refactored to use the new names.
If we cannot upgrade immediately, can we deploy a workaround?
Yes. Add a removeHeaders('irc.*') step at the very start of any route that accepts external HTTP input, before the message reaches the IRC producer. This strips untrusted irc.* headers. Also ensure the IRC destination is set from a trusted, authenticated source (e.g., configuration or an authorized service) rather than from client-supplied headers.
Does this vulnerability affect private IRC deployments the same way as public networks?
Yes. The vulnerability applies regardless of whether the IRC server is public or private. An attacker can redirect messages to any channel or user on the IRC network that the Camel bot can reach, potentially exfiltrating sensitive data or impersonating the bot.
This analysis is based on the CVE-2026-49097 advisory and CVSS 3.1 scoring data as of the publication date. Organizations should verify patch availability and version-specific guidance directly from the Apache Camel project website and security advisory. No exploit code or weaponized proof-of-concept is provided. This document is intended for security professionals and system administrators; it does not constitute legal or compliance advice. Always validate patches in a non-production environment before deployment. SEC.co does not provide real-time vulnerability scanning or incident response services; consult with your security operations team for immediate risk assessment. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-15. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).
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