MEDIUM 6.5

CVE-2026-49086: Apache Camel DAPR Message Routing Vulnerability

Apache Camel's DAPR Pub/Sub component has a routing vulnerability that allows an attacker to redirect messages to unintended destinations. When a Camel route consumes messages from one DAPR topic and republishes them to another, a message publisher can craft CloudEvents with manipulated routing headers that override the route's intended destination. This causes messages to be delivered to arbitrary topics or Dapr components instead of where the route was configured to send them, potentially exposing sensitive data or bypassing access controls. The vulnerability requires only the ability to publish to the topic the route subscribes to—no special authentication is needed.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 6.5 MEDIUM · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-20, CWE-441
Affected products
1 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-07-06 / 2026-07-08

NVD description (verbatim)

Improper Input Validation, Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy') vulnerability in Apache Camel DAPR component. The camel-dapr Dapr Pub/Sub consumer (DaprPubSubConsumer) copied two fields from each inbound CloudEvent - its Pub/Sub component name and its topic - into the CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic Exchange headers. These two headers are producer-direction routing headers: when the route republishes through a Dapr producer, DaprConfigurationOptionsProxy reads them back and prefers them over the destination configured on the endpoint. As a result, in a route that consumes from one Dapr Pub/Sub topic and republishes to another (for example from('dapr-pubsub:p:t').to('dapr-pubsub:p:other')), an actor able to publish a message to the subscribed topic could set the CloudEvent's pub/sub-name and topic to values of their choosing and cause the re-published message to be delivered to an arbitrary Dapr Pub/Sub component and topic instead of the configured destination - redirecting or exfiltrating the message and bypassing the route's intended routing and any topic-level access controls in the underlying broker. Exploitation requires the ability to publish to the topic the route subscribes to; no other authentication or user interaction is needed. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.12.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, remove the CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic headers from the Exchange between the Dapr consumer and any Dapr producer in the route (for example removeHeaders('CamelDaprPubSubName', 'CamelDaprTopic')), and restrict who can publish to the subscribed Dapr Pub/Sub topic so that only trusted producers can send to it.

2 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability stems from improper handling of CloudEvent metadata in the DaprPubSubConsumer. Two fields—the Pub/Sub component name and topic—are extracted from inbound CloudEvents and placed into CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic Exchange headers. However, these headers are producer-direction routing headers; when DaprConfigurationOptionsProxy processes outbound messages through a Dapr producer, it reads these headers and grants them priority over the endpoint's configured destination. This creates a confused deputy scenario where untrusted data from inbound messages influences outbound routing decisions. An attacker who can publish to the subscribed topic can set arbitrary values in the CloudEvent's pub/sub-name and topic fields, causing the route to republish the message to a destination of the attacker's choice rather than the route's intended target.

Business impact

Routes that use Camel DAPR components to process and republish messages between topics risk message interception, redirection, and data exfiltration. An attacker with publish access to any subscribed topic can silently redirect sensitive messages to alternative destinations, potentially exposing them to unauthorized parties or causing messages intended for processing by one component to be delivered to another. This undermines message routing integrity and topic-level access control enforcement in Dapr Pub/Sub brokers, particularly in multi-tenant or security-sensitive messaging architectures where topic isolation is a key control.

Affected systems

Apache Camel versions 4.12.0 through 4.14.7, 4.15.0 through 4.18.2, and 4.19.0 through 4.20.x are affected. The vulnerability is introduced in version 4.12.0 and is fixed in 4.21.0 (general release stream), 4.14.8 (4.14.x LTS), and 4.18.3 (4.18.x stream). Deployments using DAPR Pub/Sub consumers that republish messages to other topics or components are at risk.

Exploitability

Exploitation is straightforward and requires only network-accessible publish permissions to the topic the Camel route subscribes to. No authentication bypass, user interaction, or complex attack chain is needed. The attacker simply publishes a CloudEvent with malicious pub/sub-name and topic values. CVSS 3.1 score of 6.5 (MEDIUM) reflects the low barrier to exploitation (network accessible, no privileges required) and moderate impact (confidentiality and integrity of message routing). The vulnerability is not currently tracked in the CISA KEV catalog.

Remediation

Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.21.0, 4.14.8 (for 4.14.x LTS users), or 4.18.3 (for 4.18.x users). For environments unable to patch immediately, implement a workaround by explicitly removing the CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic headers from the Exchange between the Dapr consumer and any Dapr producer in the route. Additionally, restrict publish access to subscribed Dapr Pub/Sub topics to only trusted producers, limiting the blast radius if the vulnerability is exploited before patching.

Patch guidance

Consult the Apache Camel project's official release notes and security advisory to confirm the exact patched versions for your release stream. For users on the 4.14.x LTS stream, upgrade to version 4.14.8 or later. For the 4.18.x stream, upgrade to 4.18.3 or later. For other releases, upgrade to 4.21.0 or a newer version. Test patches in a non-production environment before deploying to production to ensure compatibility with custom extensions and message processing logic.

Detection guidance

Review Camel route configurations that use camel-dapr consumers feeding into camel-dapr producers (patterns like from('dapr-pubsub:...').to('dapr-pubsub:...')). Enable detailed audit logging on Dapr Pub/Sub message delivery to detect unexpected message routing to off-configuration destinations or topics. Monitor CloudEvent attributes and Exchange headers in Camel message processing pipelines for suspicious or unexpected routing field values. If currently vulnerable, watch for messages arriving at topics or components not specified in route definitions.

Why prioritize this

Prioritize patching based on whether your deployment uses DAPR Pub/Sub routing logic and whether untrusted parties can publish to subscribed topics. If your Camel routes republish messages between Dapr topics and the originating topic is accessible to external or less-trusted publishers, exploitation risk is elevated. In architectures where all publishers are trusted or internal, risk is lower but should still be addressed during a regular patching window.

Risk score, explained

CVSS 3.1 6.5 MEDIUM is justified by the low attack complexity (network accessible, no special privileges) and straightforward exploitation, balanced against the fact that impact is scoped to message routing and confidentiality/integrity rather than system availability or remote code execution. The vulnerability creates a genuine security gap for organizations relying on topic-level access controls and message isolation.

Frequently asked questions

Does this vulnerability allow remote code execution?

No. The vulnerability enables message redirection and data exfiltration by redirecting messages to unintended topics or Dapr components. It does not permit code execution on the Camel broker or underlying infrastructure.

What if our Camel routes don't use DAPR Pub/Sub or don't republish messages to other topics?

If your routes do not use the camel-dapr component with Pub/Sub consumers, or if they only consume messages without republishing them, this vulnerability does not apply. Review your route definitions to confirm.

Can we stay on an older version if we restrict publisher access to our subscribed topics?

Restricting publisher access reduces the attack surface, but does not fully mitigate the vulnerability. Patching remains the recommended solution. Access restrictions can serve as a temporary supplementary control while you plan an upgrade.

Does the workaround of removing headers fully protect us until we can patch?

Removing CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic headers between consumer and producer, combined with strict publisher access controls, substantially reduces risk by forcing the producer to use the route's configured destination. However, patching is the authoritative fix.

This advisory is based on the official CVE record and Apache Camel security guidance as of the publication date. For the most current patch status, version numbers, and remediation instructions, consult the Apache Camel project's official security advisory and release notes. This analysis is provided for informational purposes and does not constitute legal or professional security advice. Organizations should validate all patch versions and workarounds in their own environments before production deployment. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-15. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).