HIGH 8.1

CVE-2026-44454: Coder Dotfiles Command Injection RCE – Patch Now

Coder is a platform that lets organizations set up remote development environments through Terraform automation. A vulnerability in versions before 2.29.7 and 2.30.2 allowed attackers to run arbitrary code inside provisioned workspaces by injecting shell commands into the dotfiles configuration. An attacker could craft a special URL that automatically provisions a workspace with malicious code, requiring only a user click—no explicit confirmation needed. Coder fixed this by validating user input and removing unsafe shell execution patterns.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 8.1 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-78
Affected products
1 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-07-07 / 2026-07-08

NVD description (verbatim)

Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. Prior to versions 2.29.7 and 2.30.2, the `dotfiles` registry module passed unsanitized user input to shell commands, allowing arbitrary code execution inside a provisioned workspace. Any user who supplied a crafted `dotfiles_uri` value (for example, one containing shell command substitution such as `$(...)`) could achieve command execution in their own workspace. The Create Workspace page's `mode=auto` deep links amplified this into a one-click attack: an attacker could craft a URL that prefilled `param.dotfiles_uri` and silently provisioned a workspace with the attacker-controlled value, with no explicit user confirmation. In versions 2.29.7 and 2.30.2, input validation was added to the dotfiles module to reject URIs and usernames containing special characters, and the unsafe `eval`/`sh -c` usage was removed. This eliminated the command injection at its source.

7 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability stems from OS command injection in the dotfiles registry module (CWE-78). The module accepted user-supplied `dotfiles_uri` values and passed them unsanitized to shell commands via `eval` or `sh -c` constructs. An attacker could embed command substitution syntax (e.g., `$(malicious_command)`) in the URI parameter. The attack surface was widened by Coder's `mode=auto` deep-link feature, which allowed URL prefilling of `param.dotfiles_uri` and automatic workspace provisioning without explicit user interaction. Versions 2.29.7 and 2.30.2 remediate the issue through input validation (rejecting special characters in URIs and usernames) and removal of unsafe shell evaluation patterns.

Business impact

This vulnerability enables direct code execution within provisioned development environments. An attacker could steal credentials, inject malware, exfiltrate source code, or establish persistence. The one-click attack mechanism means non-technical users could be compromised via deceptively crafted links, lowering the barrier to initial compromise. Organizations using Coder for distributed development teams face heightened risk of lateral movement and supply-chain attacks if development environments are trusted jump points to production infrastructure.

Affected systems

Coder versions prior to 2.29.7 and 2.30.2 are vulnerable. Organizations should verify their deployed Coder version and apply patches immediately. Environments provisioned with untrusted dotfiles URIs or accessed via user-generated links are at highest risk.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires only network access and a single user click. No authentication is required if the attacker can socially engineer a victim into clicking a malicious link. The `mode=auto` feature removes friction by automating workspace creation, making this a practical attack vector against even security-conscious users. The CVSS score of 8.1 (HIGH) reflects the combination of remote exploitability, low complexity, and no privilege requirement, though impact is limited to the individual workspace and does not directly affect confidentiality of other systems.

Remediation

Upgrade to Coder 2.29.7, 2.30.2, or later. These versions introduce input validation to reject dotfiles URIs and usernames containing shell metacharacters, and replace unsafe `eval`/`sh -c` patterns with safer alternatives. After patching, review and revoke any suspicious workspace provisioning activity in audit logs and inspect development environments for unauthorized code or persistence mechanisms.

Patch guidance

Apply Coder updates 2.29.7 or 2.30.2 or later according to your release branch. Test patches in a non-production environment first. Verify the dotfiles module is properly updated by checking module checksums or version tags in your Terraform registry. Consult Coder's official release notes to confirm all security changes are in place.

Detection guidance

Monitor Coder audit logs for workspace creation events with unusual or specially crafted `dotfiles_uri` parameters (containing `$`, backticks, or other shell metacharacters). Look for `mode=auto` deep-link accesses from external or suspicious sources. Search workspace provisioning logs for failed input validation errors post-patch, which may indicate attempted exploitation. Review Git or registry access logs for unauthorized pulls or pushes coinciding with workspace creation. Inspect running processes within provisioned workspaces for unexpected child processes or network connections.

Why prioritize this

HIGH priority. The vulnerability combines unauthenticated remote code execution, low attack complexity, and a user-friendly attack vector that bypasses explicit confirmation. While impact is scoped to individual workspaces, compromise of development environments can serve as a foothold for broader infrastructure attacks. Patching is straightforward and should be expedited, especially for internet-facing Coder instances.

Risk score, explained

CVSS 8.1 reflects a remote, unauthenticated attack with low complexity and no special conditions required. High confidentiality and integrity impact within the workspace justifies the elevated score. Availability impact is rated as none because command execution does not inherently stop the workspace from running. The score appropriately captures the practical risk from the one-click attack mechanism, though it does not account for downstream organizational damage if the development environment is trusted infrastructure.

Frequently asked questions

Can an attacker execute code in other users' workspaces?

No. Exploitation grants code execution only within the attacker's own provisioned workspace. However, if that workspace has network access to shared resources (repositories, artifact stores, deployment systems), the compromised workspace can be used as a pivot point.

Does this affect Coder versions 2.29.7, 2.30.2, and later?

No. Input validation and removal of unsafe shell evaluation in these versions block the injection. Verify your version with `coder version` or check your deployment manifest.

What if I cannot patch immediately?

Restrict workspace provisioning to users with explicit approval workflows. Disable the `mode=auto` feature if your Coder configuration allows it. Monitor audit logs closely for suspicious dotfiles URIs. Isolate development environments from sensitive infrastructure until patched.

Is there a known public exploit for this vulnerability?

The vulnerability is not currently tracked on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. However, the attack is straightforward to execute, so assume active exploitation is possible post-disclosure.

This analysis is provided for informational purposes and should not be construed as professional security advice. Patch versions, affected product ranges, and remediation steps must be verified against official vendor documentation before implementation. SEC.co makes no warranty regarding the completeness or accuracy of this assessment. Organizations are responsible for conducting independent risk assessment and validation in their environments. CVSS scores and vulnerability details are derived from authoritative sources; however, real-world impact may vary based on deployment architecture and access controls. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-16. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).