HIGH 7.4

CVE-2026-12992: Apicurio Registry WSDL SSRF Vulnerability - High Risk

Apicurio Registry contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its WSDL document processing. When handling Web Services Description Language files, the registry can be tricked into making HTTP requests to internal URLs that an attacker specifies. This occurs because the WSDL parser doesn't restrict where it can fetch imported documents from. An attacker with Developer-level permissions can exploit this by uploading a malicious WSDL file, allowing them to probe or interact with internal systems that should be isolated from external access.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 7.4 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-918
Affected products
1 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-25 / 2026-07-15

NVD description (verbatim)

A flaw was found in Apicurio Registry. The WSDLReaderAccessor creates a wsdl4j WSDLReader without disabling the javax.wsdl.importDocuments feature. When the VALIDITY rule is set to FULL, an attacker with Developer-role access can upload a WSDL document containing attacker-controlled import locations, causing the registry to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary internal URLs (server-side request forgery).

5 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability exists in the WSDLReaderAccessor component, which instantiates a wsdl4j WSDLReader without disabling the javax.wsdl.importDocuments feature. When the VALIDITY rule is configured to FULL, the parser processes WSDL imports without validation of the import locations. An authenticated attacker (Developer role or above) can craft a WSDL document with arbitrary URLs in import statements, causing Apicurio Registry to issue HTTP requests to those URLs on the attacker's behalf. This classic SSRF pattern allows reconnaissance of internal network resources, interaction with internal APIs, or potential data exfiltration depending on what services are reachable from the registry process.

Business impact

An attacker with Developer access could map internal network topology, probe for internal services, or potentially compromise connected systems. The impact depends on network segmentation and what internal services are accessible from the registry's network position. In environments where Apicurio Registry has broad network access, this could lead to lateral movement, credential harvesting, or unauthorized access to backend systems. The requirement for Developer-level access limits the immediate blast radius to insider threats or compromised developer accounts.

Affected systems

Red Hat Build of Apicurio Registry is affected. Organizations running Apicurio Registry should verify their specific version and deployment configuration. The vulnerability is triggered when the VALIDITY rule is explicitly set to FULL; deployments with different validation configurations may have different exposure levels.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires network access to the registry (CVE vector shows AV:N), valid Developer-level credentials, and the VALIDITY rule must be set to FULL. The attack surface is limited to authenticated users, reducing the likelihood of opportunistic exploitation. However, the attack is straightforward once credentials are obtained: upload a crafted WSDL file and the registry performs the request automatically. No user interaction is required from administrators or other parties.

Remediation

Apply security patches from Red Hat when available. As an interim mitigation, restrict WSDL import validation by disabling the VALIDITY:FULL setting if your use case permits, or restrict network egress from the registry process to only necessary destinations. Additionally, audit Developer-level access controls and consider implementing network segmentation to limit what internal resources the registry can reach.

Patch guidance

Monitor Red Hat's security advisories for Apicurio Registry updates addressing CVE-2026-12992. Apply patches to the Red Hat Build of Apicurio Registry as soon as they become available in your supported version stream. Verify patch status against the vendor advisory before deploying to production. Test patches in a staging environment to ensure compatibility with your WSDL validation workflows.

Detection guidance

Monitor Apicurio Registry logs for WSDL upload events, particularly those followed by unexpected outbound HTTP requests from the registry process. Network-level detection should focus on egress traffic from the registry to internal IP ranges or services not typically accessed by the application. Watch for WSDL documents that contain import or include elements pointing to unusual or internal URLs. Establish baselines for normal import behavior to identify anomalies.

Why prioritize this

Although the CVSS score of 7.4 is HIGH, prioritization depends on your deployment context. If your Apicurio Registry instance is in a network-isolated environment or Developer access is tightly controlled, priority can be moderate. However, if the registry has broad network access, if VALIDITY:FULL is enabled, or if Developer credentials are widely distributed, this should be prioritized for patching. The SSRF nature makes this particularly dangerous in cloud or hybrid environments where internal service discovery is valuable to attackers.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 3.1 score of 7.4 (HIGH) reflects: network-accessible attack surface (AV:N), low attack complexity (AC:L), requirement for Developer-level privileges (PR:L), ability to impact the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of internal systems (C:L/I:L/A:L), and changed scope (S:C) indicating impact beyond the registry itself. The score is elevated by the changed scope, which accounts for lateral movement potential. The privilege requirement prevents a higher severity rating.

Frequently asked questions

Do we need to apply this patch if our Apicurio Registry doesn't validate WSDL files with VALIDITY:FULL?

The vulnerability is specifically triggered when the VALIDITY rule is set to FULL. If your deployment does not use this setting, your exposure is reduced, but you should still apply patches when available as security practices evolve and defense-in-depth is important.

Can this vulnerability be exploited by someone without Developer access?

No, the CVE explicitly requires Developer-level or higher credentials within Apicurio Registry. This limits exploitation to insider threats or scenarios where developer accounts have been compromised.

What's the difference between this and a typical SSRF in a web application?

This SSRF occurs during document processing rather than in request handling. The attacker's control is embedded in the WSDL file structure itself, making it a persistence mechanism that triggers requests each time the file is parsed.

Should we restrict outbound network access from Apicurio Registry as a mitigation?

Yes, network segmentation is a strong interim control. Limit egress to only necessary destinations (e.g., schema registries, specific API endpoints) and deny access to internal metadata services, cloud provider APIs, and other sensitive internal systems.

This analysis is based on the CVE description and CVSS vector provided as of the published date. Patch availability, affected version ranges, and specific remediation steps should be verified against Red Hat's official security advisories and vendor documentation. No exploit code or weaponized proof-of-concept is provided. Organizations should conduct their own risk assessment based on their specific deployment configuration, network architecture, and access controls. This information is for security planning and does not replace vendor guidance or professional security consultation. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-04. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).