HIGH 8.5

CVE-2026-10055: Eclipse Theia SSRF Vulnerability in /services/request-service

Eclipse Theia versions 1.26.0 and later contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the `/services/request-service` RPC endpoint. An attacker who gains access to a Theia service connection can trick the server into making HTTP requests to internal systems and returning the responses. This allows circumvention of network boundaries to access resources like localhost services, cloud metadata endpoints, and administrative interfaces that should not be accessible from the internet. The risk is highest in multi-tenant or publicly-exposed Theia deployments.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 8.5 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-200, CWE-918
Affected products
0 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-07-03 / 2026-07-06

NVD description (verbatim)

In Eclipse Theia since version 1.26.0, the backend /services/request-service RPC accepts an attacker-controlled URL from any client connected to the standard /services messaging endpoint, performs the HTTP request server-side, and returns the full response body to the caller. Because the destination URL is neither validated nor allowlisted, a remote attacker with access to the Theia service connection can issue server-side HTTP requests to localhost or other backend-reachable hosts and read their responses, exposing internal administrative endpoints, cloud instance metadata services, and other resources that are intentionally outside the browser network boundary. The vulnerability affects deployments where the Theia service connection is reachable by untrusted users (for example, multi-tenant or publicly-reachable Theia deployments).

2 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability resides in the `/services/request-service` RPC handler, which accepts user-supplied URLs and executes HTTP requests server-side without validation or allowlisting. The full response body is returned to the caller. An authenticated client connected to the `/services` messaging endpoint can supply arbitrary URLs—including localhost addresses, internal IP ranges, or cloud metadata service endpoints—and receive their responses. The lack of URL validation means internal services, administrative endpoints, and credential-bearing metadata services become accessible to any user with Theia connection access. This is a classic SSRF pattern (CWE-918) compounded by information disclosure (CWE-200).

Business impact

In multi-tenant environments, a single malicious user can probe and exfiltrate data from other tenants' backend systems or shared infrastructure. Public-facing Theia instances become a beachhead for reconnaissance and lateral movement into internal networks. Attackers can harvest cloud instance metadata (AWS, GCP, Azure credentials), extract configuration data, or trigger unintended actions on internal services. The combination of network-boundary bypass and information disclosure elevates risk significantly in cloud-native and hosted IDE scenarios.

Affected systems

Eclipse Theia versions 1.26.0 through the time of publication are affected. The vulnerability requires an attacker to have network access to the Theia service's `/services` messaging endpoint. Deployments where this endpoint is restricted to trusted networks or internal use only face lower risk. Public cloud IDE platforms, self-hosted Theia instances exposed to the internet, and multi-tenant SaaS offerings using Theia are at highest risk.

Exploitability

Exploitability is straightforward once an attacker has access to the Theia service connection. No authentication bypass is required—only the ability to send a crafted RPC message to `/services/request-service`. The attacker controls the target URL and receives the full response. Attack complexity is low, and the attacker needs only a single authenticated or semi-trusted connection. In public deployments, an attacker may register a free account or use a guest connection to trigger exploitation.

Remediation

Apply patches from Eclipse Theia that add URL validation and allowlisting to the `/services/request-service` endpoint. Validate that target URLs are restricted to approved domains or internal ranges, or disable the endpoint entirely if not required. As an interim mitigation, restrict network access to the Theia `/services` endpoint to trusted internal networks only, and disable public access. Review IAM and network policies to ensure Theia backend processes cannot reach sensitive internal services or metadata endpoints.

Patch guidance

Monitor Eclipse Theia release notes and security advisories for patches addressing this SSRF vulnerability. Verify vendor guidance for the specific patched version numbers and apply updates to all Theia installations as soon as available. Test patches in a non-production environment first. If you run a managed Theia service or IDE platform, contact your vendor immediately for patching timelines and workarounds.

Detection guidance

Monitor Theia logs and network traffic for suspicious `/services/request-service` RPC calls, particularly those targeting localhost (127.0.0.1), private IP ranges (10.x.x.x, 172.16–31.x.x, 192.168.x.x), or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254). Look for HTTP requests from the Theia backend process to unexpected destinations. Set up alerts for repeated failed requests or successful connections to sensitive internal services. Network segmentation monitoring and egress filtering can help detect and block outbound requests from the Theia service to internal resources.

Why prioritize this

This vulnerability merits high priority due to its high CVSS score (8.5), low attack complexity, and broad impact in cloud and multi-tenant scenarios. It enables network-boundary bypass and unauthorized information disclosure with minimal attacker effort. Organizations running Theia in any shared or publicly-accessible mode should treat this as critical. Even in internal-only deployments, the risk of lateral movement and credential theft justifies rapid patching.

Risk score, explained

CVSS 8.5 (HIGH) reflects the combination of network-accessible attack vector, low attack complexity, required but easy-to-obtain authentication (user connection to the service), significant confidentiality impact (internal resource disclosure), and limited but present integrity impact (potential to trigger unintended backend actions). The scope is changed, elevating risk. The vulnerability does not grant direct code execution or persistent access, preventing a critical rating, but the breadth of information exposure and network-boundary bypass justify the high score.

Frequently asked questions

Does this vulnerability require internet-facing Theia?

No. The attacker needs only network-level access to the Theia service's `/services` endpoint. In a corporate environment, an insider with internal network access or a compromised internal workstation could exploit this. Public exposure significantly increases risk, but internal deployments are not immune.

Can an unauthenticated attacker exploit this?

The vulnerability requires a client connection to the `/services` messaging endpoint. If that endpoint requires authentication or is behind a firewall, the barrier is higher. However, many Theia deployments allow guest or free-tier access, lowering the authentication hurdle. Always verify your Theia access controls.

What data is at risk?

Any HTTP-accessible resource reachable from the Theia backend server, including cloud metadata services (which often contain temporary credentials), internal administrative dashboards, local configuration files served over HTTP, and other backend systems not intended for external access. The attacker receives the full HTTP response body.

Is there a workaround if I cannot patch immediately?

Restrict network access to Theia's `/services` endpoint to trusted IPs only. Implement egress filtering to block Theia from connecting to internal networks and metadata services. Disable the `/services/request-service` RPC endpoint if it is not essential. These measures reduce but do not eliminate risk; patching is the definitive fix.

This analysis is based on CVE-2026-10055 as published and does not constitute legal or definitive security guidance. Specific patch version numbers, vendor release schedules, and affected product variants should be verified directly with Eclipse Theia maintainers and your deployment vendor. Exploit information is intentionally withheld. Consult your internal security team and vendor documentation before implementing mitigations. SEC.co assumes no liability for losses arising from the use or misuse of this intelligence. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-12. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).