HIGH 8.6

CVE-2026-11527: Config::IniFiles Command Injection and File Overwrite Vulnerability

Config::IniFiles is a Perl library that reads configuration files in INI format. Versions before 3.001000 contain a critical flaw in how they open configuration files: they use Perl's two-argument open() function, which interprets special characters in filenames as shell commands or file redirections. If an attacker can control the filename passed to the library (via the -file argument), they can execute arbitrary OS commands or overwrite files on the system. The vulnerability affects any application using Config::IniFiles that processes untrusted configuration file paths.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 8.6 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-73, CWE-78
Affected products
0 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-14 / 2026-06-19

NVD description (verbatim)

Config::IniFiles versions before 3.001000 for Perl allow OS command injection and file overwrite via a 2-arg open() of the -file argument in _make_filehandle. Config::IniFiles::_make_filehandle opens a filename argument with Perl's 2-arg open(), so a filename that begins or ends with a pipe ("| cmd", "cmd |") or begins with a redirect ("> path", ">> path") is run as a command or redirect rather than opened as a file. The helper is the open path behind the documented -file argument: new(-file => $thing) reaches it through ReadConfig. An in-memory scalar reference (-file => \$text) does not open a path and is unaffected. Any caller that forwards untrusted input to the -file argument can run an arbitrary command or truncate a file under the process UID.

4 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability exists in the _make_filehandle subroutine of Config::IniFiles. When a filename is passed via the -file argument (which flows through the documented ReadConfig method), the code opens it using two-argument open($fh, $filename) rather than safer alternatives like three-argument open($fh, '<', $filename). In Perl, the two-argument form treats leading pipes (|cmd or cmd|) as command execution and leading redirects (>, >>) as file truncation or append operations. An attacker supplying a crafted filename such as '| malicious_command' or '> /path/to/file' will cause unintended code execution or file destruction. Direct use of scalar references (-file => \$text) bypasses file opening entirely and is not affected.

Business impact

Organizations deploying Perl applications that use Config::IniFiles and accept user-supplied or external configuration file paths face remote code execution and data loss risks. Compromised systems could grant attackers command execution under the application's process UID, potentially leading to lateral movement, credential theft, or system compromise. File overwrite capabilities could corrupt application data or configuration. Scope is heightened in multi-tenant or web-facing applications where configuration paths might be influenced by user input.

Affected systems

Config::IniFiles versions before 3.001000 are vulnerable. Any Perl application or script that uses this library and passes untrusted input to the -file parameter is at risk. This includes web applications, automation frameworks, and system management tools built on Perl. In-memory scalar references are not affected. Organizations should audit their Perl codebase for Config::IniFiles usage and the source of file path arguments.

Exploitability

The vulnerability requires local access or the ability to influence a configuration file path passed to the application (user interaction is factored into the CVSS score). Exploitation is straightforward: an attacker crafts a filename with a leading pipe or redirect character and passes it to an application that forwards it to Config::IniFiles. No special privileges, complex exploitation techniques, or race conditions are needed. Once triggered, command execution runs with the application process's UID. The barrier to exploitation is low for attackers with any control over input fed to affected code paths.

Remediation

Upgrade Config::IniFiles to version 3.001000 or later. Vendors have patched the _make_filehandle routine to use the safer three-argument open() form. For applications that cannot immediately upgrade, implement input validation on configuration file paths: reject or sanitize any paths containing pipes, angle brackets, or other shell metacharacters before passing them to Config::IniFiles. Use allowlist-based path validation where possible. Audit logs for suspicious file path arguments or process spawning tied to configuration loading.

Patch guidance

Apply the latest Config::IniFiles release (3.001000 or later). On systems using Perl package managers, this typically requires running 'cpan Config::IniFiles' or updating via your distribution's package tool (apt, yum, etc.). Verify the installed version with 'perl -e "use Config::IniFiles; print $Config::IniFiles::VERSION"'. Test patched applications in a staging environment to confirm configuration loading behavior remains correct. If Config::IniFiles is vendored or embedded in an application, coordinate with the application vendor for a patched release.

Detection guidance

Monitor system logs and audit trails for signs of unusual process spawning or file operations triggered during configuration file loading. Look for application errors referencing _make_filehandle or file open failures with suspicious paths. Network detection is limited; focus on endpoint and application-level visibility. Check application code repositories and requirements files for Config::IniFiles pinned to versions before 3.001000. Review access logs for configuration file operations, particularly any referencing paths with pipe or redirect characters. Behavioral detection should flag unexpected command execution or file truncation following config reload operations.

Why prioritize this

This vulnerability merits immediate attention despite moderate attack surface constraints. The CVSS 8.6 HIGH score reflects high impact (command execution and file destruction) combined with low attack complexity. Organizations must prioritize based on whether their Perl applications accept external or user-influenced configuration file paths. Applications with strict, hardcoded configuration paths face lower practical risk. However, any web application, automation tool, or multi-tenant system using Config::IniFiles with dynamic path handling should be treated as critical-priority until patched.

Risk score, explained

CVSS 3.1 score of 8.6 (HIGH) reflects: Local attack vector (AV:L) since the attacker must provide input to the application or system; Low attack complexity (AC:L) because exploitation requires only crafted input with no special conditions; No privilege requirement (PR:N); User interaction required (UI:R) for the victim to process the malicious input; Changed scope (S:C) because the impact extends beyond the vulnerable component to the system; High confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact (C:H/I:H/A:H) from arbitrary command execution and file overwrites. The score appropriately captures a serious but not network-remotely-exploitable flaw.

Frequently asked questions

Can this vulnerability be exploited remotely?

Only if the vulnerable application accepts configuration file paths over a network and forwards them unsanitized to Config::IniFiles. Direct remote exploitation of the library itself is not possible; the attack requires a local application or service that processes untrusted input.

Are applications using scalar references (in-memory config) vulnerable?

No. Config::IniFiles with the -file => \$text pattern (scalar reference) bypasses file opening entirely and is not affected by this vulnerability.

What if we only use hardcoded configuration file paths?

Your risk is significantly lower if configuration paths are static and not influenced by user input, environment variables from untrusted sources, or external data. However, you should still patch to avoid latent risk from indirect code paths or future maintenance changes.

How do we validate config file paths as a temporary mitigation?

Implement a whitelist of allowed configuration directories and filenames. Reject any paths containing pipe characters (|), angle brackets (>, >>), or other shell metacharacters. Validate paths before they reach Config::IniFiles. Consider using File::Spec and Cwd::realpath to normalize paths and detect directory traversal attempts.

This analysis is based on the published CVE description and CVSS assessment. Verify patch availability and version numbers against the official Config::IniFiles repository and vendor advisories before deployment. The vulnerability requires specific conditions (untrusted input to -file argument) and organizations should assess their own code and deployment model. This explainer does not constitute security advice for your specific environment; engage your security team and vendor for tailored guidance. No exploit code or weaponized proof-of-concept is provided in this document. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-07-20. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).