HIGH 7.5

CVE-2021-47986: Parse Server Supply Chain Code Injection – Upgrade to 4.10.0

Parse Server versions before 4.10.0 contain a supply chain vulnerability caused by incorrect version tags pushed to the official repository. These tags pointed to unreviewed code residing in a personal developer fork rather than the main codebase. An attacker could exploit this by tricking developers into declaring one of these malicious version tags as a dependency, causing their builds to pull and execute potentially harmful code. The vulnerability exploits the trust developers place in official version numbers and repository tags.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 7.5 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-494
Affected products
30 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-25 / 2026-07-30

NVD description (verbatim)

Parse Server before 4.10.0 contains a supply chain vulnerability where incorrect version tags were pushed to the repository linking to unreviewed code in a personal fork. Attackers could exploit this by specifying affected version tags in dependency declarations to execute unreviewed and potentially malicious code.

2 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

CVE-2021-47986 is a supply chain attack vector affecting Parse Server's version control infrastructure. Incorrect version tags (before 4.10.0) were published to the repository, linking to code in an unreviewed personal fork. This violates the expected integrity of semantic versioning and repository tagging conventions. The attack surface depends on developers using exact or loose version pinning (e.g., ^4.9.x) that would resolve to the malicious tags during dependency resolution. The vulnerability is classified as CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check), reflecting the core issue: code execution without validation that the source matches the expected repository state.

Business impact

Organizations using Parse Server face supply chain contamination risk. Compromised builds could introduce backdoors, data exfiltration, or lateral movement capabilities into production environments. The impact compounds across the dependency chain—any service depending on a tainted Parse Server build inherits the malicious payload. For teams with continuous deployment pipelines, automated builds during the vulnerability window could have already deployed compromised versions without visibility. Incident response and forensic analysis become necessary if affected versions are discovered in production, with potential regulatory and compliance implications depending on data sensitivity and jurisdiction.

Affected systems

Parse Server prior to version 4.10.0 is affected. Organizations should audit dependency manifests (package.json, requirements.txt, etc.) for Parse Server declarations using version constraints that would include the vulnerable tags. This includes exact pinning to affected versions, minor-version ranges (e.g., 4.9.x), and major-version ranges (e.g., ^4.0.0) that encompass pre-4.10.0 releases. Container images, Docker layers, and artifact repositories that were built during the vulnerability window should be considered suspect and may require rebuilding from clean sources.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires that a developer or build system declare an affected Parse Server version in their dependency configuration. The attack does not require network access at exploit time—it manifests during the dependency resolution and build phase. User interaction is necessary in the sense that a developer must explicitly reference a vulnerable version, though this interaction is often automated via CI/CD pipelines or inherited from upstream projects. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R) reflects that while the attack originates over the network and requires user interaction, it achieves high impact (confidentiality, integrity, availability). Active exploitation likely required social engineering or targeting of repositories with loose version constraints. There is no evidence of widespread in-the-wild exploitation at scale, and the issue was detected and corrected relatively quickly.

Remediation

Upgrade Parse Server to version 4.10.0 or later immediately. This version includes corrected tags and restored repository integrity. After patching, rebuild all artifacts, container images, and deployments from the updated source to eliminate any residual tainted binaries. Audit build logs and artifact repositories to identify which builds consumed the vulnerable versions and determine whether they reached production. If compromised versions were deployed, conduct threat hunting for indicators of the injected malicious code (backdoors, data exfiltration, unexpected outbound connections). Consider re-pulling dependencies with a clean package cache to ensure no local copies of malicious packages persist.

Patch guidance

Upgrade Parse Server to version 4.10.0 or later. Verify the upgrade directly against the official Parse Platform repository and advisory to confirm tag integrity. After patching the source, trigger a full rebuild of any services that depend on Parse Server—do not assume previously cached or incremental builds are clean. For organizations using Docker or container orchestration, rebuild all images from scratch rather than layering patches. If using npm/yarn, clear node_modules and package-lock.json, then reinstall to ensure fresh downloads. Verify that dependency resolution now points to code in the main repository branch, not external forks, by inspecting the resolved version's commit history or source URL metadata.

Detection guidance

Review build logs and artifact metadata for Parse Server versions prior to 4.10.0. Cross-reference dependency declarations in source control against actual resolved versions in built artifacts. Monitor container image manifests and layer digests for Parse Server components; mismatches between declared and actual versions indicate potential compromise. Inspect git history and tag objects in repositories where Parse Server is declared; look for tags pointing to external forks or unexpected commit hashes. If available, compare binary checksums of Parse Server modules against official release manifests published by Parse Platform. Network-level detection is limited since the malicious code executes post-build, but monitor outbound connections from Parse Server processes for anomalous destinations or protocols not expected in baseline builds.

Why prioritize this

Although CVE-2021-47986 is marked HIGH severity (CVSS 7.5) and involves code execution, it requires developer action (declaring an affected version) rather than triggering automatically. However, given the supply chain context, the risk to organizations with automated dependency management or loose version pinning is acute. Projects using Parse Server that pulled dependencies during the vulnerability window should prioritize immediate inventory and remediation. The fact that this was a repository-level integrity issue—affecting the trust model of version control itself—elevates its precedent and risk profile beyond typical bugs. Teams with continuous deployment and minimal review processes face heightened exposure.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 7.5 HIGH score reflects the attack's potential for remote code execution with high impact across confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R assigns network attack surface, high attack complexity (requiring specific version constraints and developer action), no privilege requirements, and user interaction (explicit version specification). While attack complexity is elevated by the need for developers to consume the malicious versions, the impact potential is severe—arbitrary code execution in the context of the Parse Server process, which typically has database and application-level access. The score appropriately weights supply chain context: even one compromised build in a critical dependency chain poses significant organizational risk.

Frequently asked questions

How would an attacker have created malicious versions in the first place?

The attacker would have needed to compromise or socially engineer a Parse Platform maintainer account, or exploit access controls on the repository to push tags to their personal fork. The mechanism likely involved creating or gaining access to a personal fork and then pushing version tags pointing to unreviewed code in that fork to the official repository. This suggests a compromise of a developer account or repository settings rather than a purely external attack vector.

Does upgrading to 4.10.0 automatically clean up my existing deployments?

No. Upgrading the source code only prevents future builds from pulling malicious versions. Any Parse Server binaries or containers built from vulnerable versions prior to the upgrade will remain tainted unless explicitly rebuilt. You must regenerate all artifacts, restart containers, and redeploy from the new source. Verify the integrity of previously deployed instances by checking their version numbers and source commit hashes.

What if I use Parse Server through a third-party wrapper or managed service?

Check with your service provider or wrapper maintainer for their Parse Server version and upgrade timeline. Managed Parse services may have already remediated on the backend, but self-hosted or container-based deployments are your responsibility. Request explicit confirmation that the service has upgraded to 4.10.0 or later and has rebuilt all artifacts.

Are there indicators I can use to detect if malicious code from this vulnerability was executed?

Look for unexpected processes spawned by or after Parse Server startup, outbound network connections to unfamiliar destinations, filesystem modifications outside expected paths, or database access patterns inconsistent with your application logic. Process monitoring, container egress rules, and database audit logs are your best detection tools. If you have build-time artifact hashes, compare them against runtime processes to detect tampering.

This analysis is provided for informational purposes. Specific affected version numbers, patch versions, CVSS scores, and CWE classifications are based on the CVE record and should be verified against official Parse Platform security advisories and vendor documentation. Organizations should conduct independent risk assessments based on their dependency inventory and deployment topology. No exploit code or weaponizable proof-of-concept is provided. For the most current information, consult the official Parse Platform security advisory and repository release notes. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-04. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).