MEDIUM 6.5

CVE-2026-59209: n8n Credential Exposure via Pagination Expression – Patch & Detection Guide

n8n, an open-source workflow automation platform, contains a vulnerability that allows authenticated users with basic editor access to steal sensitive credentials embedded in HTTP request headers. A user with 'use-only' permissions on a shared workflow can extract secrets through pagination expressions and leak them as part of workflow item data. This affects versions before 1.123.61, 2.27.4, and 2.28.1.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 6.5 MEDIUM · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-200, CWE-522
Affected products
4 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-07-09 / 2026-07-13

NVD description (verbatim)

n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Prior to 1.123.61, 2.27.4, and, 2.28.1, an authenticated member with use-only editor access to a shared workflow could read credential-populated headers exposed via the $request object inside an HTTP Request node's pagination expression and exfiltrate the secret through item data. This issue is fixed in versions 1.123.61, 2.27.4, and 2.28.1.

3 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

CVE-2026-59209 is an information disclosure vulnerability in n8n's HTTP Request node. The flaw exists in how credential-populated headers are exposed through the $request object during pagination expression evaluation. An authenticated member with use-only editor access to a shared workflow can access this $request context, read sensitive header values (typically containing credentials or API keys), and exfiltrate them by manipulating pagination expressions to return credential data as part of the workflow's item output. The vulnerability is rooted in insufficient access controls on sensitive runtime objects and improper data isolation between credential scope and expression evaluation context (CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor; CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials).

Business impact

This vulnerability creates a privilege escalation and data theft risk within n8n deployments. Users with minimal workflow permissions—those intended only to execute pre-built automations—can gain unauthorized access to credentials that may control integrations with critical business systems, third-party APIs, cloud services, or databases. Compromised credentials can enable lateral movement, unauthorized data access, or malicious workflow modifications. Organizations using n8n to orchestrate sensitive integrations face exposure of authentication tokens, API keys, and other secrets managed within the platform.

Affected systems

The vulnerability impacts n8n versions prior to 1.123.61 (v1 line), 2.27.4 (v2 line), and 2.28.1 (v2 line). Organizations running open-source n8n instances with shared workflows and multiple users assigned editor roles are at risk. Cloud-hosted n8n accounts and self-hosted deployments are both affected. The issue only manifests when use-only editors have access to HTTP Request nodes with pagination expressions that reference the $request object.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires authentication and existing access to a shared workflow—this is not an unauthenticated remote attack. However, the barrier to exploitation is low once an attacker or insider with editor access is present. No complex technical steps are required; pagination expressions are a standard feature and reading the $request object is intuitive for anyone familiar with n8n's expression language. The attack leaves audit trails through workflow execution logs, but exfiltrated credentials can be used immediately. The CVSS 3.1 score of 6.5 (MEDIUM) reflects the requirement for authentication and local access, balanced against the high confidentiality impact.

Remediation

Upgrade to n8n versions 1.123.61, 2.27.4, or 2.28.1 or later. These versions restrict access to credential-populated headers in pagination expression contexts, ensuring that use-only editors cannot read sensitive data from the $request object. After patching, verify that your workflows continue to function correctly, as expressions depending on request metadata may need adjustment. Review access control assignments on shared workflows to ensure principle of least privilege: assign use-only access only to users who genuinely need only to execute workflows, not modify them.

Patch guidance

Apply updates immediately across all n8n instances. If you operate multiple n8n environments, prioritize production and shared-workflow instances first. Patch testing in a non-production instance is recommended to confirm workflow compatibility. The vendor has released fixes across multiple release tracks (v1 and v2), so identify which version line(s) your deployment uses and pull the appropriate patched release. Verify successful deployment by checking version information in the n8n UI and confirming that workflow execution logs show the updated version.

Detection guidance

Monitor workflow execution logs for use-only editors accessing HTTP Request nodes with pagination expressions. Look for unusual patterns: pagination expressions containing $request references, or the same user executing workflows multiple times in rapid succession. If possible, review audit logs for credential exfiltration indicators—specifically, cases where workflow item outputs contain header values or API keys. Examine shared workflows to identify which users have editor access and whether that access level is justified. Network monitoring can detect outbound exfiltration of stolen credentials if they are used in unauthorized API calls post-compromise.

Why prioritize this

While the CVSS score is MEDIUM, the practical risk depends on your n8n deployment model and user base. Organizations with shared workflows and multiple users should prioritize this patch highly, as insider threat or compromised user accounts can immediately yield high-value secrets. Single-user or isolated n8n instances face lower risk. The credential exposure potential and the likelihood that extracted keys could grant access to downstream systems warrant moving this into your patch window promptly, especially if your n8n instance orchestrates integrations with sensitive business systems.

Risk score, explained

CVSS 3.1 score of 6.5 (MEDIUM) reflects: (1) Network-accessible attack surface (AV:N); (2) Low complexity, no special conditions required (AC:L); (3) Authentication required, but only baseline user access (PR:L); (4) User interaction not required (UI:N); (5) No impact on system availability or integrity (I:N, A:N); (6) High confidentiality impact—direct exposure of stored credentials (C:H). The MEDIUM severity is appropriate for a credential disclosure within a multi-user system; the practical impact is context-dependent and could be higher if your workflows control critical integrations.

Frequently asked questions

Can an attacker without any n8n account exploit this?

No. The vulnerability requires authentication and the attacker must already have editor access to a shared workflow. This is not a pre-authentication attack.

Does this affect n8n Cloud (SaaS) the same way as self-hosted?

Yes, both deployment models are affected if they run vulnerable versions. The remediation—upgrading to patched versions—applies to both. SaaS customers should verify their instance version and contact n8n support if auto-updates have not yet been applied.

If I use HTTP Request nodes but don't use pagination expressions, am I safe?

You remain at risk if any shared workflow uses HTTP Request nodes with pagination, regardless of whether you personally authored them. The vulnerability is that use-only editors can read exposed credentials; pagination is the mechanism, but any HTTP Request node storing credentials is a potential target.

Will a patched version break my existing workflows?

The patch restricts access to sensitive data in expression evaluation; workflows that legitimately use pagination should continue to function. However, if a workflow's pagination expression relies on reading header data directly, it may need revision after patching. Test in a non-production environment before broad rollout.

This analysis is based on published vulnerability information and the n8n vendor advisory. Exploit details, proof-of-concept code, and weaponized attack steps are not provided. Organizations should verify all patch versions and deployment guidance against official n8n release notes and security advisories. CVSS and KEV status reflect data current as of the vulnerability publication date; always cross-reference with NVD and vendor sources for the latest assessment. This content is for informational and defensive planning purposes; unauthorized access to systems is illegal. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-17. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).