CVE-2026-59206: n8n Prototype Pollution Allows Unauthenticated Access to Sensitive Endpoints
n8n, an open source workflow automation platform, contains a prototype pollution vulnerability that allows authenticated users with basic workflow creation permissions to corrupt the platform's core object model. By crafting and saving a malicious workflow, an attacker can manipulate how the application handles object properties globally, effectively tricking the system into treating unauthenticated requests as if they came from a privileged user. This bypass exposes sensitive endpoints that list users and projects, compromising confidentiality and potentially enabling further reconnaissance for lateral movement.
Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain
- CVSS
- 3.1 · 7.1 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L
- Weaknesses (CWE)
- CWE-1321
- Affected products
- 2 configuration(s)
- Published / Modified
- 2026-07-09 / 2026-07-09
NVD description (verbatim)
n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Prior to 1.123.61, 2.27.4, and, 2.28.1, an authenticated user with the default workflow:create permission could pollute Object.prototype through a crafted workflow saved, updated, or imported via the workflow API, allowing unauthenticated requests to be treated as a privileged user and exposing user and project listing endpoints. This issue is fixed in versions 1.123.61, 2.27.4, and 2.28.1.
3 reference(s) · View on NVD →
SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source
Technical summary
The vulnerability is a prototype pollution flaw (CWE-1321) in n8n versions prior to 1.123.61, 2.27.4, and 2.28.1. An authenticated user with workflow:create permission can craft a workflow that, when saved, updated, or imported via the workflow API, pollutes Object.prototype in the Node.js runtime. This manipulation allows the platform's permission checks to fail in a way that grants unauthenticated requests the same access level as authenticated ones. The attack surface is the workflow API itself, making this exploitable without requiring privileged user credentials—only the ability to create workflows, which is a default permission in many deployments.
Business impact
This vulnerability degrades the security boundary between authenticated and unauthenticated access. An attacker who gains workflow creation rights (through a legitimate account, weak credentials, or social engineering) can expose the user and project directory to anyone on the network, enabling account enumeration, targeting, and social engineering attacks. In multi-tenant or shared n8n deployments, this could allow visibility into workflows and projects across organizational boundaries. The high CVSS score (7.1) reflects the combination of network accessibility, low attack complexity, and significant confidentiality impact, though the requirement for initial authentication limits widespread abuse to those with some level of platform access.
Affected systems
All n8n deployments running versions prior to 1.123.61 (in the 1.x branch), 2.27.4 (in the 2.x branch up to 2.27), or 2.28.1 (in the 2.x branch at 2.28) are affected. This includes self-hosted instances and cloud deployments. Organizations using n8n for critical workflow automation, API integrations, or multi-user collaboration environments face the greatest risk due to larger user bases and higher-value targets within the user directory.
Exploitability
Exploitation requires an authenticated n8n account with the default workflow:create permission—a very common baseline permission in standard deployments. No specialized tools, zero-day exploits, or user interaction is required once the malicious workflow is created. The attack is repeatable, can be executed from any network location with access to the n8n API, and leaves minimal forensic traces if logging is not configured to capture workflow API payloads in detail. The lack of KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerability) status does not imply exploitation is difficult; rather, it indicates no exploitation in the wild has been reported to CISA at this time. Given the straightforward nature of prototype pollution and the accessibility of the attack vector, practical weaponization is feasible for skilled attackers.
Remediation
Upgrade n8n immediately to version 1.123.61, 2.27.4, or 2.28.1 depending on your branch. These releases patch the prototype pollution flaw by implementing proper input validation and object property handling in the workflow API. No workarounds are available; patching is the only remediation. For organizations unable to patch immediately, restrict workflow:create permissions to trusted users only, and monitor workflow API calls for suspicious payloads.
Patch guidance
Identify your current n8n version (visible in the admin panel or via API). If running 1.x, upgrade to at least 1.123.61. If running 2.x below 2.27, upgrade to 2.27.4. If running 2.28.0, upgrade to 2.28.1. Test patches in a staging environment that mirrors production authentication and multi-user scenarios before rolling out to production. Backup your n8n database and credentials before upgrading. Verify after upgrade that workflow creation, API calls, and permission checks function as expected.
Detection guidance
Monitor n8n workflow API logs for POST/PUT requests to /workflows endpoints that contain unusual object notation or property names, particularly those with __proto__, constructor, or prototype in the payload. Alert on any workflow creation or update by users who do not typically create workflows. Check for unauthenticated requests to /users or /projects endpoints succeeding without proper authentication headers. If SIEM integration is available, correlate workflow API activity with unexpected API calls to sensitive endpoints. Review audit logs for workflows created with suspicious or obfuscated names that might indicate an attack attempt.
Why prioritize this
This vulnerability merits immediate attention for any organization running n8n, particularly in production or multi-tenant environments. The combination of ease of exploitation (default permissions, simple API call), significant impact (confidentiality breach, directory traversal), and the sensitivity of user and project metadata in automation platforms warrants rapid patching. The fact that it requires only low-privilege authentication means breach likelihood is higher than vulnerabilities requiring administrative access.
Risk score, explained
The CVSS 7.1 (HIGH) score reflects: network accessibility without additional complexity (AV:N/AC:L), a requirement for prior authentication (PR:L) that is met by default permissions rather than admin roles, no user interaction required (UI:N), confidentiality impact from exposed endpoints (C:H), and moderate availability impact from potential resource exhaustion or performance degradation (A:L). The score does not account for organizational context, such as whether the n8n instance is internet-exposed or restricted to internal networks, or the sensitivity of user and project data stored within.
Frequently asked questions
Can an unauthenticated attacker exploit this directly, or do they need an n8n account?
They need an n8n account with workflow creation permissions. However, because workflow:create is a default permission for most users, any compromised or weak account could be leveraged. Once the malicious workflow is in place, it then allows unauthenticated requests to the exposed endpoints.
What data is exposed by this vulnerability?
The user and project listing endpoints become accessible to unauthenticated users, exposing names, IDs, and metadata about projects and users in the n8n instance. This enables reconnaissance and targeting but does not directly expose credentials or workflow definitions unless those endpoints are further polluted.
Do I need to remove or audit existing workflows after patching?
After patching, the prototype pollution itself is blocked, but existing malicious workflows remain in the database. Review your workflow audit logs to identify any suspicious workflows created during the vulnerable period, particularly those with unusual names or properties. Delete any identified malicious workflows to prevent re-exploitation if the patch is somehow reverted or bypassed.
If we run n8n in an air-gapped or internal-only environment, is the risk lower?
Yes. Network isolation reduces the attack surface to insiders or compromised internal accounts. However, if your organization shares n8n access across teams or contractors, the risk remains substantial. Patch regardless, as insider threats and account compromise remain plausible.
This analysis is based on the official CVE and vendor advisory data available as of the publication date. Specific patch availability, deployment timelines, and organizational risk may vary. Organizations should verify patch versions and compatibility against their vendor's official documentation and test in non-production environments before deploying. SEC.co does not provide warranty regarding the completeness or accuracy of derived recommendations; security teams should conduct their own risk assessment in context of their infrastructure and threat model. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-17. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).
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