CVE-2026-56766: Hydra NTLM Stack Buffer Overflow RCE Vulnerability
Hydra, a popular password-cracking tool, contains a critical flaw in how it handles authentication with certain server types. When a malicious server sends a specially crafted authentication challenge during login attempts to email or web services, it can trigger a memory overflow in Hydra's process. This could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a system running a vulnerable version of Hydra. The vulnerability affects Hydra versions through 9.7 and has been patched in a later commit.
Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain
- CVSS
- 3.1 · 8.8 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Weaknesses (CWE)
- CWE-121
- Affected products
- 0 configuration(s)
- Published / Modified
- 2026-06-25 / 2026-07-14
NVD description (verbatim)
Hydra through 9.7, fixed in commit 9cc84c2, contains a stack buffer overflow in NTLM authentication across SMTP, POP3, IMAP, NNTP, HTTP, HTTP-Proxy, and HTTP-Proxy-Urlenum modules when processing malicious NTLM Type-2 challenges. A malicious server can send a crafted NTLM Type-2 challenge with an excessively long domain string, causing base64-encoded response data to overflow a 500-byte stack buffer by 18 to 330 bytes, enabling remote code execution on systems without stack protection.
2 reference(s) · View on NVD →
SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source
Technical summary
CVE-2026-56766 is a stack buffer overflow (CWE-121) in Hydra's NTLM authentication implementation across multiple modules: SMTP, POP3, IMAP, NNTP, HTTP, HTTP-Proxy, and HTTP-Proxy-Urlenum. The vulnerability is triggered when processing a malicious NTLM Type-2 challenge with an excessively long domain string. The base64-encoded response data overflows a 500-byte stack buffer by 18 to 330 bytes, depending on the crafted input. On systems without stack protection mechanisms (ASLR, stack canaries, DEP), this enables remote code execution. The fix is available in commit 9cc84c2.
Business impact
Organizations using Hydra for authorized penetration testing or security assessments face potential compromise of their testing infrastructure if operated against untrusted or attacker-controlled targets. The tool runs with the privileges of the user executing it; successful exploitation could grant an attacker equivalent access. In red-team scenarios, this creates an operational security risk where the testing system itself becomes a pivot point. Development and security teams relying on Hydra should prioritize patching to prevent supply-chain style risks if tools are shared across infrastructure.
Affected systems
Hydra through version 9.7 is affected. The vulnerability manifests across NTLM authentication pathways in SMTP, POP3, IMAP, NNTP, HTTP, HTTP-Proxy, and HTTP-Proxy-Urlenum modules. Any system running an unpatched Hydra binary and performing authentication testing against untrusted targets is at risk. The fix is available in commit 9cc84c2; users should verify their deployed version against the project repository to confirm patched status.
Exploitability
Exploitation requires an attacker to control a target server that Hydra will attempt to authenticate against. The attack is network-accessible with no authentication barriers—an attacker simply crafts a malicious NTLM Type-2 response and waits for Hydra to connect. User interaction is required in the sense that a Hydra operator must initiate a scan against the attacker's server, making this primarily a risk in scenarios where red-teamers target untrusted infrastructure or where adversaries can inject malicious hosts into a target list. Systems with stack protection (DEP, ASLR, or stack canaries) may reduce exploitability, but the underlying overflow remains present.
Remediation
Update Hydra to a version incorporating commit 9cc84c2 or later. Verify with the upstream Hydra project repository for the exact release version or rebuild from the patched commit. If immediate patching is not possible, restrict Hydra usage to testing against trusted, controlled targets and avoid scanning untrusted or Internet-facing servers. Implement network segmentation to limit the blast radius if a Hydra system is compromised. Consider deploying host-based exploit mitigations (ASLR, DEP, stack canaries) on systems running Hydra.
Patch guidance
Consult the official Hydra project repository to identify the release version that includes commit 9cc84c2. Apply the update across all systems where Hydra is deployed. Verify the patched version by checking the commit history and release notes. If running Hydra from source, rebuild from the patched commit. For binary distributions, obtain updates from trusted package repositories. Test the patched version in a non-production environment before wide deployment.
Detection guidance
Monitor for outbound NTLM authentication attempts from Hydra processes, particularly to unexpected or external hosts. Network signatures can detect unusual NTLM Type-2 responses with abnormally long domain strings (exceeding typical lengths seen in legitimate authentication). Host-based detection should flag process execution of unpatched Hydra binaries (version 9.7 or earlier) combined with network authentication activity. Memory protection violations or crash dumps from Hydra processes may indicate exploitation attempts. Behavioral indicators include Hydra connecting to suspicious servers, high-volume authentication failures, or Hydra processes spawning unexpected child processes.
Why prioritize this
This is a HIGH severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 8.8, reflecting remote code execution potential with low attack complexity. Although exploitation requires the target user to initiate a scan against an attacker-controlled server—limiting widespread risk—the consequences are severe for affected systems. Organizations using Hydra should treat this as a priority security update to prevent compromise of their testing infrastructure. The vulnerability's presence across multiple authentication modules increases the surface area and likelihood of incidental exposure during broad security testing campaigns.
Risk score, explained
The CVSS 3.1 score of 8.8 (HIGH) reflects: (1) Network accessibility with no prerequisites (AV:N, AC:L, PR:N), (2) High impact across confidentiality, integrity, and availability on the affected system (C:H, I:H, A:H), and (3) user interaction required to initiate Hydra scan (UI:R), which slightly reduces but does not eliminate risk. The score appropriately captures the severity of unauthenticated remote code execution, tempered by the operational requirement that a user must actively connect to the attacker's server.
Frequently asked questions
Does this vulnerability affect systems running Hydra in a typical IT security assessment?
Yes, if the assessment includes scanning untrusted targets or infrastructure controlled by an attacker. The risk is highest in red-team exercises, bug-bounty testing against unfamiliar systems, or scenarios where an attacker can inject a malicious host into the target list. Testing against well-known, trusted internal infrastructure carries lower risk.
Can I be exploited if I run Hydra in an isolated lab environment?
Only if the targets you scan from that lab include attacker-controlled systems. The exploit requires Hydra to connect to a malicious server. Isolated labs testing against sanitized, legitimate targets are not at risk.
What is the difference between versions and commits? How do I know if I'm patched?
Commits are individual changes in the source code repository; versions are stable releases bundled from multiple commits. Commit 9cc84c2 contains the fix. Check your Hydra version (run 'hydra -h' or check installation) and verify against the project's release notes to confirm whether your version includes that commit. If unsure, rebuild from the upstream repository's main branch or contact your distribution maintainer.
Are there workarounds if I cannot patch immediately?
Yes: restrict Hydra usage to testing only against trusted, internal servers; avoid scanning external or untrusted infrastructure; run Hydra with minimal privileges; use network segmentation to isolate the Hydra system; and enable OS-level protections like ASLR and DEP. These reduce risk but do not eliminate it—patching is the proper long-term solution.
This analysis is based on the official CVE record published 2026-06-25 and modified 2026-07-14. No exploit code or weaponized proof-of-concept is provided. Readers should verify patch availability and version applicability against the official Hydra project repository and their vendor documentation before implementing remediation. This assessment assumes standard operational security practices; unusual configurations or custom builds may alter risk profiles. SEC.co makes no guarantee of completeness and recommends consultation with vendor advisories and internal security teams for definitive guidance. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-04. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).
Weaknesses (CWE)
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