HIGH 8.8

CVE-2026-56247: Capgo RBAC Role-Scope Validation Bypass

Capgo versions before 12.128.2 contain a role-based access control (RBAC) vulnerability that allows organization administrators to bypass security restrictions. An admin can assign powerful organization-level roles to users at the app level without proper validation, and critically, can do this to people who haven't yet accepted their invitations. When those invited users later accept and join, they retain these elevated permissions—even though they were only supposed to have limited app-level access. This means a low-privilege user could suddenly perform high-privilege actions they should never be allowed to do.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 8.8 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-266
Affected products
0 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-30 / 2026-07-01

NVD description (verbatim)

Capgo before 12.128.2 allows org admins to assign org-scoped RBAC roles at app scope without validating role scope compatibility, including to pending invitees. Attackers can pre-seed malformed high-privilege bindings that survive invite acceptance, enabling accepted low-privilege users to perform unauthorized privileged app actions.

3 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability stems from insufficient scope validation in Capgo's RBAC implementation. When org admins assign roles via the org-scoped API endpoint, the system fails to enforce that only app-scoped roles can be bound at the app level. This validation gap exists for both active users and pending invitees. The malformed role bindings—org-scoped roles assigned at app scope—are persisted in the data store and are not sanitized or corrected when the invited user accepts their invitation. An attacker with org admin privileges can exploit this by pre-seeding high-privilege bindings on pending invitations, effectively creating a privilege escalation vector that triggers upon invite acceptance. The CVSS 3.1 score of 8.8 (HIGH) reflects the requirement for authenticated admin access but the high impact across confidentiality, integrity, and availability once exploited.

Business impact

This vulnerability creates a supply-chain and insider-risk exposure for Capgo deployments. An org admin—whether malicious, compromised, or negligent—can silently grant excessive permissions to new team members before they join. This is particularly dangerous in scenarios where admin accounts are breached or where rogue insiders seek to plant backdoor access. The impact extends to data breach risk (confidentiality), unauthorized modifications (integrity), and potential service disruption (availability). Organizations relying on Capgo for access control of applications may find their privilege model completely undermined if admins exploit this flaw.

Affected systems

Capgo versions prior to 12.128.2 are affected. The vendor product list in the source data is empty, so verification against the Capgo official advisory is essential to confirm all affected product SKUs and editions. Typically, this means any Capgo deployment running versions 12.128.1 or earlier on any supported platform should be treated as vulnerable.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires valid org admin credentials (PR:L in the CVSS vector), but once an attacker or compromised admin account exists, the attack is straightforward and does not require user interaction (UI:N). The network-accessible API (AV:N) and lack of complex conditions (AC:L) make this easily repeatable at scale. An attacker can enumerate pending invitations and assign malicious roles without triggering typical user-facing alerts. The low barrier to execution—once admin access is obtained—makes this a credible near-term threat, especially in organizations with weaker admin account hygiene.

Remediation

Upgrade Capgo to version 12.128.2 or later. This patch introduces proper scope validation to prevent org-scoped roles from being assigned at the app level, and ensures that role bindings are correctly validated and cleaned up during invite acceptance. After patching, conduct a review of existing RBAC role assignments—particularly those created before the patch date—to identify and remediate any malformed bindings that may have already been created. Consider temporarily restricting org admin permissions to a small, audited group during the patching window.

Patch guidance

Apply Capgo 12.128.2 or later as soon as possible. Test the patch in a staging environment first to ensure compatibility with any custom RBAC automation or external identity management integrations. If your deployment uses automated role provisioning, verify that your provisioning scripts do not inadvertently replicate the vulnerable pattern. Capgo should publish release notes and a detailed advisory; consult those for any additional configuration changes needed post-patch. Prioritize patching systems that host high-value applications or that manage sensitive data access.

Detection guidance

Look for RBAC role assignments that mismatch scope—specifically, org-level roles bound at the app level in audit logs. Review pending invitation records and completed invitations from the vulnerability publication date backward to identify pre-seeded bindings. Check for org admin API calls that use role assignment endpoints with unexpected role IDs or scope parameters. If you have native RBAC audit logging enabled, filter for calls that assign roles to pending invitees. Additionally, examine active user permissions in production to spot users with org-level privileges when only app-level access is expected. A security audit of the current RBAC state is recommended for all organizations.

Why prioritize this

HIGH severity rating and exploitability characteristics demand rapid prioritization. The vulnerability is authenticated-admin-gated, which limits its immediate broadcast attack surface, but the persistent nature of the flaw—malformed bindings survive invite acceptance—means damage is not easily reversible. Organizations with multi-tenant SaaS deployments, sensitive application portfolios, or admins with broad permissions should prioritize patching within days, not weeks. The relatively low noise level (requires admin action) may also mean existing exploits go undetected longer, making post-patch forensics important.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 3.1 score of 8.8 reflects a HIGH-severity vulnerability due to high impact in all three confidentiality, integrity, and availability dimensions (I:H, C:H, A:H). The network-accessible, low-complexity attack vector (AV:N, AC:L) increases the score, but the requirement for low-privilege authentication (PR:L) and no user interaction (UI:N) appropriately scope the threat to insider or compromised-admin scenarios. The unchanged scope (S:U) keeps the score from reaching CRITICAL. This is a textbook privilege escalation vulnerability that justifies rapid response, but not emergency response, assuming your org admin accounts are reasonably protected.

Frequently asked questions

Can a non-admin user exploit this vulnerability?

No. The vulnerability requires valid organization admin credentials to assign roles. A regular app user cannot trigger this flaw. However, a regular user can be victimized by it if an admin pre-seeds their pending invitation with high-privilege roles.

Does the patch validate and remove existing malformed bindings automatically?

The patch prevents new malformed bindings from being created and corrects bindings during invite acceptance going forward. However, you should audit your RBAC state after patching to identify and manually remediate any pre-existing malformed role assignments created before 12.128.2 was released.

What is the attack window if we delay patching?

Any org admin—compromised or malicious—can create malformed bindings at any time before you patch. Once created, those bindings are 'armed' and will grant elevated privileges to the invited user upon acceptance. There is no time-based expiration, so the longer you remain unpatched, the greater the risk of silent privilege escalation already in place.

Should we rotate all org admin credentials after patching?

Not necessarily, unless you have evidence of compromise. However, conducting a review of recent admin activity and pending invitations is prudent. If you identify suspicious role assignments, consider credential rotation for the admins who made those assignments.

This analysis is provided for informational purposes and reflects publicly available information as of the publication date. No exploit code or detailed weaponization steps are included. Organizations should verify patch availability and compatibility with their specific Capgo versions and configurations against the official vendor advisory before deployment. Consult Capgo's security documentation and support channels for environment-specific guidance. SEC.co does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of this analysis and recommends independent validation by your security team. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-09. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).