HIGH 7.4

CVE-2026-55759: Rocket.Chat Apple Sign-In JWT Validation Bypass – Authentication Takeover

Rocket.Chat's Apple Sign-In feature has a critical authentication bypass vulnerability. The application correctly verifies that an Apple identity token is cryptographically signed by Apple, but it fails to validate important claims within that token—such as the intended audience, expiration time, or nonce. This means an attacker who obtains a valid Apple identity token (whether from logs, network interception, or another application) can replay it indefinitely to log in as the victim user without any time limit. The vulnerability affects multiple versions of Rocket.Chat across several release branches and is resolved in patched versions released in mid-June 2026.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 7.4 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-287, CWE-294
Affected products
0 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-24 / 2026-06-26

NVD description (verbatim)

Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, 8.0.7, and 7.10.13, Rocket.Chat's Apple Sign-In handler verifies JWT signatures but skips claims validation. Any Apple-signed JWT with a non-empty iss is accepted regardless of aud, exp, nbf, or nonce. An attacker who obtains a target user's Apple identity token (from server logs, an intercepted sign-in flow, or another application sharing the same Apple developer team) can replay it to authenticate as that user, with no expiration on the replay window. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, 8.0.7, and 7.10.13.

1 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

CVE-2026-55759 is an authentication bypass in Rocket.Chat's Apple Sign-In handler caused by incomplete JWT validation. The handler performs signature verification against Apple's public keys but omits validation of critical JWT claims including iss (issuer), aud (audience), exp (expiration), nbf (not-before), and nonce. An attacker can take any Apple-signed JWT with a non-empty issuer claim and use it to authenticate as the associated user indefinitely. The vulnerability requires network access and knowledge of a valid identity token but no interaction with the target user. This is classified under CWE-287 (improper authentication) and CWE-294 (authentication bypass by capture-replay).

Business impact

An attacker exploiting this vulnerability gains unauthorized access to Rocket.Chat accounts. Because Rocket.Chat is commonly used for team communication, incident response, and sensitive project coordination, account takeover can lead to exposure of confidential conversations, intellectual property theft, lateral movement to connected systems, impersonation of team members, and disruption of critical communications. Organizations using Rocket.Chat with Apple Sign-In are directly impacted. The lack of any replay window expiration means tokens obtained months or years ago remain valid, increasing the window of exposure for historical token leakage incidents.

Affected systems

Rocket.Chat versions prior to 8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, 8.0.7, and 7.10.13 are vulnerable when Apple Sign-In is configured and enabled. The vulnerability is present across multiple maintained release branches (7.10, 8.0, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5). Only deployments using Apple Sign-In as an authentication method are affected; deployments relying solely on other authentication providers (email, LDAP, OAuth via other providers) are not impacted.

Exploitability

The vulnerability has moderate-to-high exploitability. An attacker must first obtain a valid Apple identity token, which could come from server logs (if debug logging is enabled), interception of a sign-in flow over unencrypted connections, or from another application that shares the same Apple developer team and leaks tokens. Once a token is obtained, exploitation is trivial: replay it to Rocket.Chat's Apple Sign-In endpoint with no special privileges or user interaction required. The attack is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog as of the publication date, but the simplicity of exploitation once a token is acquired means organizations should prioritize remediation.

Remediation

Upgrade Rocket.Chat to a patched version immediately. The fixes are available in 7.10.13 (for the 7.10 branch), 8.0.7, 8.1.6, 8.2.6, 8.3.6, 8.4.4, and 8.5.1 (for newer branches). Organizations unable to upgrade immediately should disable Apple Sign-In as an authentication method if alternative authentication providers are available. If Apple Sign-In must remain active, implement network-level controls to restrict access to Rocket.Chat to trusted networks and monitor authentication logs for suspicious login patterns or impossible travel scenarios.

Patch guidance

Rocket.Chat has released patches across all supported release branches. Identify your current version and upgrade to the earliest patched version in your branch (for example, if running 8.2.x, upgrade to 8.2.6 or later; if running 8.5.x, upgrade to 8.5.1 or later). Test patches in a staging environment before production deployment to ensure compatibility with customizations and integrations. After patching, consider invalidating existing Apple Sign-In sessions and requiring users to re-authenticate using the updated handler.

Detection guidance

Monitor Rocket.Chat authentication logs for successful Apple Sign-In events, paying particular attention to logins from unusual geographic locations, times, or devices associated with a single user account. Enable detailed audit logging if available. Check Rocket.Chat server logs for evidence of token replay attempts or authentication handler errors during the vulnerable period. If you suspect token leakage, review access logs and backups for any unauthorized data access coinciding with suspicious login events. Organizations with centralized SIEM systems should create alerts for multiple failed authentication attempts followed by successful Apple Sign-In from different IP addresses within a short window.

Why prioritize this

This vulnerability merits HIGH priority remediation due to the combination of complete account takeover capability, the broad scope (multiple Rocket.Chat versions), the ease of exploitation once a token is obtained, and the indefinite replay window. Although obtaining a token requires separate access (logs, interception, or another application), the attack surface is larger than a typical authentication flaw and the impact is complete. The availability of patches across all branches removes deployment barriers.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 3.1 score of 7.4 (HIGH) reflects high impact on confidentiality and integrity (account takeover leads to unauthorized access to communications and data), medium complexity to exploit (attacker must obtain a valid token), and network-based attack vector. The score does not account for the indefinite replay window or the multiple pathways to obtain a token, which increase practical exploitability. The absence of availability impact (reflected in the A:N vector component) is appropriate since this is an authentication bypass, not a denial-of-service or resource exhaustion flaw.

Frequently asked questions

If we don't use Apple Sign-In, are we affected?

No. The vulnerability is specific to Rocket.Chat's Apple Sign-In authentication handler. Organizations using email, LDAP, OAuth via Google, or other authentication methods are not vulnerable. You can verify your authentication configuration in the Rocket.Chat Administration panel under Workspace > Authentication.

What should we do if we suspect Apple tokens have been logged or exposed?

Immediately upgrade to a patched version and review authentication logs for suspicious Apple Sign-In events, particularly from unfamiliar locations or devices. Consider forcing all users to reset their Apple Sign-In connection and, if feasible, rotating credentials for any other systems accessed by compromised accounts. If you have detailed logs, check for evidence of unauthorized access to conversations or data downloads.

Does the patch break existing Apple Sign-In sessions?

After patching, existing Apple Sign-In sessions will remain active, but future authentication requests will enforce proper JWT claims validation. We recommend testing the patched version in staging first and notifying users that they may need to re-authenticate if they encounter authentication issues post-upgrade.

Why does the vulnerability have no expiration on the replay window?

Because the patched validation routine was missing the 'exp' (expiration) and 'nbf' (not-before) checks, a token issued months or years ago remains valid as long as it carries a valid Apple signature and a non-empty issuer claim. This is why tokens obtained from old logs, intercepted communications, or leaked backups can still be replayed to gain access today.

This analysis is based on the CVE-2026-55759 official description and vendor patches. Security teams should verify current vulnerability status, patch availability, and compatibility with their specific Rocket.Chat deployment and configuration. Patch version numbers and compatibility details should be cross-checked against the official Rocket.Chat security advisory and release notes before production deployment. This document does not constitute legal advice and is provided for informational purposes to aid risk assessment and remediation planning. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-02. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).