CVE-2026-55667: File Browser Privilege Escalation – Symlink Bypass Enables Arbitrary File Deletion
File Browser, a multi-tenant file management system, contains a critical authorization bypass vulnerability in versions prior to 2.63.16. An authenticated user with only basic file creation permissions can delete arbitrary files outside their assigned scope—including other tenants' data and the application's own database—by exploiting a symlink following flaw in the failed-upload cleanup routine. The vulnerability exists because the RemoveAll operation skips symlink validation that other file operations enforce, allowing a low-privilege user to chain directory escape and deletion in a single attack.
Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain
- CVSS
- 3.1 · 8.2 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
- Weaknesses (CWE)
- CWE-22, CWE-59
- Affected products
- 0 configuration(s)
- Published / Modified
- 2026-06-25 / 2026-06-26
NVD description (verbatim)
File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. Prior to 2.63.16, a scoped, non-admin File Browser user holding only the Create permission can delete arbitrary files outside their scope (other tenants' data, and the application's own database) via the upload failure-cleanup path. ScopedFs.RemoveAll is the one dereferencing operation that skips the symlink guard every other method enforces. The direct-upload handler runs RemoveAll on the user-controlled path during failed-upload cleanup, gated only by Perm.Create. If an escaping directory symlink already exists inside the user's scope, an authenticated create-only user can delete an out-of-scope target, bypassing both the ScopedFs boundary and the Perm.Delete gate. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.63.16.
2 reference(s) · View on NVD →
SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source
Technical summary
The vulnerability stems from inconsistent symlink handling across File Browser's ScopedFs implementation. While most file operations enforce a symlink guard to prevent scope escape, the RemoveAll function does not check for symlinks before dereferencing paths. During upload failures, the direct-upload handler calls RemoveAll on a user-controlled cleanup path, gated only by Perm.Create permission. If an attacker pre-positions a directory symlink pointing outside the user's scope within their own scoped directory, the failed-upload cleanup will follow that symlink and delete the out-of-scope target. This bypasses both the ScopedFs boundary isolation and the explicit Perm.Delete permission gate. The attack requires the symlink to already exist in the user's scope and a failed upload to trigger the cleanup path.
Business impact
Multi-tenant deployments are at severe risk. A low-privilege user account in one tenant can destroy data belonging to other tenants or corrupt the application's core database, leading to data loss, service disruption, and potential compliance violations. Because the attack requires only Create permission and no admin access, the blast radius extends to any authenticated user, dramatically increasing the likelihood of exploitation. Organizations with strict least-privilege controls may inadvertently enable this attack if they grant Create-only roles to automation or untrusted users.
Affected systems
File Browser versions prior to 2.63.16 are affected. The vendor information was not included in the advisory; verify your deployment version and consult the File Browser release notes or vendor advisory for a complete list of affected versions and supported platforms.
Exploitability
Exploitation requires an authenticated account with Create-only permissions and the ability to pre-position a symlink within the user's scoped directory. The attacker must then trigger an upload failure to initiate the cleanup routine that follows the symlink. While not trivial—it requires both authentication and some filesystem setup—the attack is reliable once the symlink is in place and requires no special software or zero-day knowledge. The CVSS vector (AC:H) reflects the moderate complexity, but AC:H in this context refers to the need to pre-position the symlink and trigger a specific code path, not a requirement for exceptional circumstances.
Remediation
Upgrade to File Browser version 2.63.16 or later, which applies symlink guard checks to the RemoveAll operation, ensuring all ScopedFs methods enforce consistent path validation. After upgrading, audit for any suspicious file deletions in the application logs and verify that sensitive data in other tenants' scopes was not accessed during the vulnerability window.
Patch guidance
Apply File Browser 2.63.16 as soon as possible. Verify availability and compatibility in your environment by consulting the official File Browser release notes. Test the update in a non-production environment first to ensure no compatibility issues with custom configurations or integrations. The fix is a security-critical change that closes a privilege escalation and data destruction vector.
Detection guidance
Monitor for suspicious RemoveAll operations or failed uploads followed by unexpected file deletions outside a user's assigned scope. Examine audit logs for Create-permission users deleting files they should not have access to. Check for symlinks within user-scoped directories that point to sensitive locations (parent directories, database paths, other tenant folders). File integrity monitoring on critical application directories and database storage can alert to unauthorized modifications. If File Browser maintains detailed operation logs, search for patterns where low-privilege users trigger upload failures on paths containing directory traversal sequences.
Why prioritize this
This vulnerability should be patched urgently in multi-tenant environments. The combination of a low privilege requirement (Create-only), high-impact scope escape (any file in the system), and reliable exploit path makes it a critical priority. The CVSS score of 8.2 (HIGH) underestimates the practical severity in shared-tenant scenarios where data isolation is a core security assumption. No public exploit code or active attacks are reported (KEV status is false), but the straightforward nature of the attack makes it likely to be weaponized once widely known.
Risk score, explained
CVSS 8.2 (HIGH) reflects the severity correctly: the vulnerability requires low privilege (Perm.Create) and authentication, but has high impact (arbitrary file deletion across scopes, affecting both confidentiality indirectly through data loss and availability through database destruction). The AV:N (network-accessible) and S:C (scope change—affecting other tenants) elevate the score. AC:H acknowledges the need to pre-position a symlink, but this is a one-time setup cost that becomes a persistent threat. Organizations should treat this as critical despite the HIGH label due to its ability to compromise data isolation in multi-tenant deployments.
Frequently asked questions
Can an attacker delete files without pre-positioning a symlink first?
No. The vulnerability requires a symlink already present within the attacker's scoped directory that points to the target outside their scope. The attack is not instantaneous; it requires setup. However, once the symlink exists, any failed upload can trigger the deletion.
Does this affect single-tenant deployments of File Browser?
Single-tenant deployments are technically vulnerable to the same privilege escalation, but the data impact is more limited since there are no separate tenant boundaries. A low-privilege user can still delete application database files or other sensitive files they shouldn't access, causing availability loss. The risk is lower than in multi-tenant scenarios but should not be ignored.
Are there workarounds if we cannot patch immediately?
Mitigations are limited. Consider restricting Create permission to highly trusted users only, disabling directory-based uploads if possible, or implementing filesystem-level access controls to prevent symlinks in scoped directories. However, these are incomplete defenses. Patching is the recommended remediation.
How would we know if this vulnerability was exploited?
Look for unexpected file deletions (especially of database or system files), gaps in audit logs, or failed upload attempts followed by cascading failures. Audit logs should show Create-permission users attempting to delete files, which is normally blocked. File integrity monitoring would flag unauthorized changes to database or critical application files.
This analysis is based on the CVE description and public sources available as of the publication date. Vendor information and affected product versions were not included in the source advisory; verify against official File Browser documentation and vendor advisories before making deployment decisions. No active exploits are publicly known as of this writing, but exploit feasibility is high. Security teams should validate this analysis against their specific File Browser deployment and configuration. This content is for informational purposes and does not constitute professional security advice. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-04. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).
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