HIGH 7.5

CVE-2026-54341: DragonflyDB Remote Denial of Service via Malformed RESTORE Command

DragonflyDB, an in-memory data store, contains a vulnerability in how it processes RESTORE commands that can crash the entire server. An attacker without credentials can send a specially crafted command (roughly 24 bytes) to trigger this crash repeatedly. Because DragonflyDB runs without authentication by default, this is a straightforward remote denial-of-service attack. The issue affects all versions prior to 1.39.0 and is resolved in that release.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 7.5 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-125
Affected products
0 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-26 / 2026-06-26

NVD description (verbatim)

Dragonfly is an in-memory data store built for modern application workloads. Prior to 1.39.0, a crafted RESTORE payload triggers an out-of-bounds read in DragonflyDB's listpack collection loaders, crashing the entire server process (SIGSEGV). Because DragonflyDB requires no authentication by default and RESTORE is a normal keyspace command, an unauthenticated remote attacker can crash the server with a single ~24-byte command — a remote, repeatable denial of service. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.39.0.

3 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

CVE-2026-54341 is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in DragonflyDB's listpack collection loader. When a malformed RESTORE payload is processed, the loader reads beyond allocated memory boundaries, triggering a SIGSEGV segmentation fault that terminates the server process. The RESTORE command is a standard keyspace operation that accepts user input in the default authentication-disabled configuration, making exploitation trivial. The vulnerability requires no special privileges, network access control bypass, or user interaction.

Business impact

Organizations running DragonflyDB in production face service disruption from a single malformed RESTORE command sent by any network-connected attacker. Unlike exploits requiring multi-step attack chains, this vulnerability enables immediate downtime with minimal attacker effort. Repeated exploitation can create a denial-of-service loop, degrading application availability and SLA compliance. The risk is particularly acute for deployments exposed to untrusted networks or where DragonflyDB is internet-facing.

Affected systems

DragonflyDB versions prior to 1.39.0 are affected. The vulnerability does not target specific operating systems or architectures—it manifests at the application logic layer during RESTORE payload parsing. Any deployment running an affected version is vulnerable if the RESTORE command is accessible, which includes default configurations where authentication is not enabled.

Exploitability

Exploitability is very high. No authentication is required, no user interaction is needed, and the attack payload is minimal (~24 bytes). An attacker can craft and send the malicious RESTORE command over the network using standard DragonflyDB clients or raw TCP. The crash is immediate and deterministic, making this a repeatable denial-of-service primitive. No advanced exploitation knowledge or tool chains are necessary.

Remediation

Upgrade to DragonflyDB version 1.39.0 or later, which patches the out-of-bounds read in the listpack loader. Additionally, implement network-level access controls to restrict RESTORE command availability to trusted clients. Enable DragonflyDB's authentication mechanisms (if available in your version) to require credentials for keyspace operations. For environments unable to patch immediately, restrict network access to the DragonflyDB port using firewalls or security groups.

Patch guidance

Apply DragonflyDB 1.39.0 or later as a priority. Verify the upgrade by checking version output (e.g., via INFO command) and testing that RESTORE commands function correctly with legitimate payloads. If running in a containerized environment, ensure your image build includes the patched version. Test the patch in a staging environment first to validate compatibility with your application stack, though this is primarily a security fix with no expected functional changes.

Detection guidance

Monitor DragonflyDB logs and system metrics for unexpected server crashes (SIGSEGV signals or abnormal process termination). Network-level detection can identify repeated RESTORE commands with unusually small payloads or malformed structures. Implement alerting on DragonflyDB process restarts or high-frequency connection drops, which may indicate exploitation attempts. If you lack direct visibility into DragonflyDB traffic, monitor application-level symptoms such as sudden loss of cache functionality or backend service failures. Correlate timing with any suspicious network activity or user reports of service unavailability.

Why prioritize this

This vulnerability merits immediate patching despite not being on the CISA KEV catalog. The combination of zero authentication requirements, remote network access, trivial payload size, and guaranteed denial-of-service impact creates an exceptionally low-friction attack path. Any DragonflyDB instance exposed to untrusted networks is at critical risk. Prioritize patching based on whether your deployment is internet-facing or accessible from broader internal networks; instances behind strict network boundaries can be addressed in a standard maintenance window.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 3.1 score of 7.5 (HIGH) reflects network-based remote access, no authentication requirement, low attack complexity, and complete availability impact. The score does not account for the trivial 24-byte payload or the repeatability of the crash, which in operational reality make this more disruptive than the numeric score alone suggests. The absence of a confidentiality or integrity impact keeps the score from critical range, but the ease of exploitation and operational consequence justify treating this as a priority-one patch target.

Frequently asked questions

Is authentication enabled by default in DragonflyDB?

No. DragonflyDB does not require authentication by default, which means any network-accessible instance can receive the malicious RESTORE command without credentials. Organizations should immediately verify whether authentication is configured in their deployments and enable it if possible.

Can an attacker cause persistent damage or data loss with this vulnerability?

No. This vulnerability causes the server process to crash (denial of service) but does not result in data modification, deletion, or exfiltration. Once the process is restarted, the data persists. However, repeated crashes can prevent legitimate access to that data.

Do I need to patch if my DragonflyDB instance is behind a firewall with restricted network access?

Patching remains important as a defense-in-depth measure, but instances with strict network controls limiting inbound access to trusted clients face lower immediate risk. Prioritize patching internet-facing or broadly accessible instances first, then address internal deployments on a normal maintenance schedule.

What should I do if I suspect this vulnerability has been exploited against my systems?

Check DragonflyDB logs and system event logs for unexpected crashes or SIGSEGV signals around the time of suspicion. Review network logs for unusual RESTORE commands or connection patterns. Verify that data integrity was not compromised by querying expected keys and values. Upgrade to 1.39.0 and implement network-level access controls to prevent recurrence.

This analysis is based on the published CVE record and vendor advisory as of the date indicated. Organizations should verify patch availability and compatibility against official DragonflyDB releases before deployment. SEC.co does not provide exploit code or detailed attack reproduction steps; security research and penetration testing must be conducted responsibly within authorized environments only. This information is provided for defensive purposes to help security teams prioritize patching and hardening efforts. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-05. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).