HIGH 7.6

CVE-2026-54317: Home Assistant Konnected Authentication Bypass – Unauthorized Sensor Data Access

Home Assistant, a popular open-source home automation platform, contains an authentication bypass in its Konnected integration prior to version 2026.6.0. The integration exposes an HTTP endpoint that should verify API access tokens, but the verification logic only applies to write operations (POST, PUT). Read operations (GET) lack any authentication check entirely, allowing unauthenticated attackers on the local network to retrieve sensitive sensor data and configuration details.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 7.6 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-200, CWE-306
Affected products
1 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-23 / 2026-06-26

NVD description (verbatim)

Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Prior to 2026.6.0, the Konnected integration registers an HTTP endpoint, KonnectedView (homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py), that is marked as not requiring authentication (requires_auth = False). A comment next to that line says auth is instead handled "via the access token from configuration." That promise is only half true. Write requests (POST and PUT) are handled by update_sensor(), which does check the request's Authorization: Bearer <token> header against the integration's stored access tokens (using hmac.compare_digest). Read requests (GET) are handled by a separate get() method that has no authentication check at all. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.0.

2 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The Konnected integration in Home Assistant registers an HTTP endpoint (KonnectedView) with requires_auth = False, relying instead on token-based authentication documented in comments. However, the implementation is inconsistent: the update_sensor() method properly validates Authorization: Bearer tokens using hmac.compare_digest() for write operations, but the get() method handling read requests contains no authentication logic whatsoever. This leaves sensor state, device configuration, and other operational data accessible to any network-adjacent attacker without credentials.

Business impact

An attacker on the same network as a Home Assistant installation can passively reconnaissance the home automation setup, observe real-time sensor states (doors, windows, motion detectors), and infer occupancy and security posture without authentication. While write access is blocked, read-only access to this intelligence can enable physical intrusion planning, theft, or stalking. Home automation enthusiasts and small businesses relying on Home Assistant for security monitoring are most affected.

Affected systems

Home Assistant versions prior to 2026.6.0 with the Konnected integration enabled are affected. The Konnected integration is an optional add-on used to bridge Konnected security hardware with Home Assistant. Any deployment that has installed and configured this integration is vulnerable to unauthorized read access on the local network segment.

Exploitability

Exploitability is straightforward for attackers with network access to the Home Assistant instance. No authentication is required, no user interaction is needed, and the attack is unthrottled—an attacker can simply send HTTP GET requests to the endpoint to retrieve all exposed data. The attack surface is limited to the local network (CVSS AV:A), but within that boundary, the barrier to exploitation is minimal. No special tools or knowledge are required beyond HTTP client capabilities.

Remediation

Upgrade Home Assistant to version 2026.6.0 or later, which implements proper authentication checks for all HTTP methods on the Konnected endpoint. If immediate patching is not feasible, disable or uninstall the Konnected integration until the patch can be applied, or restrict network access to the Home Assistant instance via firewall rules to trusted devices only.

Patch guidance

Home Assistant users should update to version 2026.6.0, which fixes the authentication bypass by enforcing token validation on GET requests as well as write operations. Verify the patch is applied by checking the Home Assistant version in Settings > About and confirming the version is 2026.6.0 or later. If you are using automatic updates, this patch should be deployed automatically on the next update cycle.

Detection guidance

Monitor Home Assistant logs for unexpected GET requests to the Konnected endpoint at paths like /api/konnected or similar. Network intrusion detection can flag repeated unauthenticated HTTP GET requests to the Konnected integration endpoint from unexpected source IPs. On the Home Assistant host, inspect network traffic for unencrypted HTTP GET requests with missing or invalid Authorization headers targeting the Konnected integration URL. If possible, enable verbose logging on the Konnected integration to capture all endpoint accesses and review for anomalies.

Why prioritize this

This vulnerability merits immediate attention because it is easy to exploit (no authentication required), affects a sensitive security-adjacent system (home automation with door/window/motion sensors), and the CVSS score of 7.6 reflects high confidentiality impact with some integrity and availability risk. Although network proximity is required (AV:A), many home networks are shared by family members, guests, or IoT devices that may be compromised. Home Assistant often manages security-critical devices, making unauthorized read access a meaningful risk.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 3.1 score of 7.6 (HIGH) reflects the high confidentiality impact of reading sensor data and device state without authentication (C:H), combined with low integrity and availability impact (I:L, A:L). The attack vector is adjacent (AV:A) since it requires network proximity, and the attack complexity is low (AC:L) because no special conditions are needed. The lack of privilege or user interaction requirements (PR:N, UI:N) further elevates the score. The unscoped impact (S:U) means the attacker gains access only within the integration, not the broader system.

Frequently asked questions

Does this affect all Home Assistant installations?

No. Only Home Assistant instances that have the Konnected integration installed and enabled are vulnerable. Konnected is an optional integration for bridging Konnected security hardware; it is not enabled by default in standard Home Assistant deployments.

Can an attacker modify my sensors or change settings with this vulnerability?

No. Write operations (POST, PUT) are protected by proper authentication checks. An attacker can only read data. However, the information revealed—such as door/window state and motion sensor activity—can still be valuable for reconnaissance or planning a physical intrusion.

What if my Home Assistant instance is only accessible over the internet, not on a local network?

The CVSS vector specifies AV:A (adjacent network), which typically means the attacker must be on the same network segment. If your Home Assistant is exposed directly to the internet with no firewall, the effective attack surface is wider, but the vulnerability still requires network access to the HTTP endpoint. Exposing Home Assistant directly to the internet is not recommended for other security reasons regardless.

How do I know if I have the Konnected integration installed?

In Home Assistant, go to Settings > Devices & Services > Integrations and look for 'Konnected' in the list. If it appears, you have the integration installed. If it is not listed, you are not vulnerable to this specific issue.

This analysis is based on the published CVE description and vendor advisory. CVSS scores and vulnerability classifications are sourced from NVD and vendor data and reflect a point-in-time assessment. Organizations should validate all patch versions, affected product versions, and availability against official vendor advisories before deploying patches. This vulnerability has not been added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog as of the analysis date. Security decisions should be informed by your organization's specific threat model, network architecture, and risk tolerance. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-07-29. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).