HIGH 7.5

CVE-2026-54314: n8n Compression Node Decompression Bomb DoS Vulnerability

n8n, an open-source workflow automation platform, has a vulnerability in its Compression node that allows an attacker to crash the entire n8n instance by uploading a malicious compressed file. Before version 2.24.0, the decompression feature did not limit how much data it would expand in memory, so a small file can balloon into gigabytes once decompressed, exhausting available RAM and forcing the process to restart. Since this can be triggered through a public webhook without authentication, any organization running a vulnerable n8n instance accessible over the network faces availability risk.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 7.5 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-409
Affected products
1 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-23 / 2026-06-25

NVD description (verbatim)

n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Prior to 2.24.0, the Compression node's Decompress operation expanded attacker-controlled archives into memory without enforcing limits on decompressed output size. An unauthenticated attacker could send a small compressed archive to a public webhook workflow using this node, causing the n8n process to terminate due to memory exhaustion and disrupting all workflows in the same instance. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.24.0.

1 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The Compression node's Decompress operation in n8n versions prior to 2.24.0 lacks decompression size limits (CWE-409: Improper Restriction of Rendered UI Layers or Frames). When processing attacker-supplied archives, the node expands compressed data into memory without enforcing constraints on output size. An unauthenticated actor can deliver a specially crafted archive—often called a "zip bomb" or "decompression bomb"—through a publicly exposed webhook workflow endpoint. The decompression process consumes memory until the n8n process is killed by the operating system, triggering a denial of service. All workflows within the same n8n instance become unavailable until manual intervention restarts the process.

Business impact

Denial of service to workflow automation infrastructure. Organizations relying on n8n for critical automation tasks (API integration, data processing, scheduled operations, etc.) will experience unexpected downtime if an attacker sends a decompression bomb to a public webhook. Recovery requires manual process restart and may involve lost in-flight workflow state. Teams without robust alerting and automated restart mechanisms face extended outage windows and operational friction. Multi-tenant or shared n8n instances amplify blast radius, affecting all users on the same deployment.

Affected systems

n8n versions prior to 2.24.0 are affected. The vulnerability is exploitable only if the instance is exposed to untrusted network input via a webhook workflow that includes the Compression node's Decompress operation. Organizations running n8n in internal, non-public environments face reduced risk; however, those with public-facing webhooks or automation workflows triggered by external data are at direct risk.

Exploitability

Exploitability is high. The attack requires no authentication, no special privileges, and no user interaction—only network access to the webhook endpoint. An attacker can automate delivery of decompression bombs, and the attack succeeds regardless of the victim's security posture outside patching. The primary barrier is discoverability of the affected webhook URL; however, n8n deployments on predictable paths or discovered through reconnaissance can be targeted easily. Proof-of-concept decompression bomb generation is trivial and well-documented in security literature.

Remediation

Upgrade to n8n version 2.24.0 or later, which implements decompression size limits on the Compression node. Organizations unable to patch immediately should disable or restrict access to Compression node workflows, disable public webhook endpoints if not actively required, and implement network-level rate limiting and request size caps on webhook endpoints to mitigate attack surface. Monitoring for unexplained process restarts or memory spikes on n8n instances can signal exploitation attempts.

Patch guidance

Apply the fix by upgrading n8n to version 2.24.0 or newer. Consult the official n8n release notes and upgrade documentation to ensure compatibility with your deployment model (Docker, npm, self-hosted, managed cloud). Test the upgrade in a staging environment first, especially if your workflows depend on the Compression node, to confirm no behavioral changes. After upgrade, verify that the Decompress operation enforces memory limits by reviewing the release notes or triggering a test decompression with a known-safe archive.

Detection guidance

Monitor n8n process metrics for sudden memory exhaustion or out-of-memory kills, especially correlated with webhook requests. Check n8n logs for errors originating from Compression node decompress operations. Implement request size limits at the load balancer or reverse proxy layer to reject unusually large payloads sent to webhook endpoints. Network-based intrusion detection can flag repeated attempts to send compressed payloads to the same endpoint. Vulnerability scanners should confirm n8n version and alert on pre-2.24.0 instances.

Why prioritize this

CVSS 7.5 (HIGH) reflects immediate availability impact with zero authentication barrier. While confidentiality and integrity are not compromised, denial of service to automation infrastructure merits urgent patching. Precedence should increase if n8n instances host mission-critical workflows or multi-tenant environments. Organizations with public webhook endpoints should patch within 1–2 weeks; internal-only deployments can follow a standard patch cycle but should not be deferred indefinitely.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H reflects a network-exploitable, unauthenticated, low-complexity attack with high availability impact and no cross-boundary effects. The score does not account for attack ease via decompression bomb tooling or reputational harm from unplanned downtime; context-specific risk may be higher for organizations with strict uptime SLAs or limited incident response capacity.

Frequently asked questions

Do I need a public-facing webhook for this vulnerability to apply to me?

Yes. The vulnerability is only exploitable if a Compression node workflow is exposed via a public or otherwise untrusted webhook endpoint. If your n8n instance is isolated on an internal network and webhooks are not exposed externally, your risk is lower. However, if your instance is accessible from the internet or from less-trusted network segments, you should patch regardless of current webhook usage.

Can I safely continue using the Compression node after upgrading?

Yes. Version 2.24.0 adds decompression size limits, making the Decompress operation safe against zip bomb attacks while preserving legitimate decompression functionality. No workflow changes are required post-upgrade unless you were intentionally decompressing extremely large legitimate archives.

What does a decompression bomb look like, and how do I test for it?

A decompression bomb is a small compressed file (often kilobytes) that expands to gigabytes or terabytes when decompressed. You do not need to generate one to test; instead, verify n8n version (2.24.0+) and inspect release notes confirming size limit implementation. If you wish to test defensively, consult publicly available test files designed for this purpose, but do not execute them against production systems without explicit capacity planning.

Is there a workaround if I cannot patch immediately?

Yes. Disable or restrict access to Compression node workflows, disable public webhooks if not required, and implement rate limiting and request size caps at your load balancer or API gateway. These measures reduce attack surface but do not fully eliminate risk; prioritize patching as soon as operationally feasible.

This analysis is provided for informational purposes and represents SEC.co's interpretation of publicly available vulnerability data as of the publication date. Readers should verify patch availability and applicability to their specific n8n deployment model and configuration. No exploit code or weaponized proof-of-concept is provided. Organizations should conduct their own risk assessment and testing before applying patches. SEC.co makes no warranty regarding the accuracy, completeness, or suitability of this information for any particular use case. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-07-28. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).