MEDIUM 5.3

CVE-2026-54105: GAO EPDS and CBCA EDS Unauthenticated Email Disclosure API Vulnerability

Two U.S. government systems used for federal contract disputes—the GAO's Electronic Protest Docketing System and the CBCA's Electronic Docketing System—leak user email addresses and account details through an unprotected API endpoint. An attacker can request information about any user account without logging in, simply by guessing or iterating user ID numbers. The systems fail to validate that a requester has permission to view account data belonging to someone else.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 5.3 MEDIUM · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-639
Affected products
0 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-18 / 2026-06-24

NVD description (verbatim)

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Electronic Protest Docketing System (EPDS) and Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) Electronic Docketing System (EDS) expose sensitive account information through the 'update-profile/' API endpoint. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can submit a request containing an arbitrary 'user_id' parameter and receive a JSON response containing account-specific information, including the associated email address.

4 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The 'update-profile/' API endpoint in both EPDS and EDS systems lacks proper access controls (CWE-639: Authorization through User-Controlled Key). Remote, unauthenticated requests can enumerate user accounts by supplying arbitrary 'user_id' parameters. The API returns a JSON response containing personally identifiable information, including email addresses associated with each account. No authentication or session token is required to trigger the disclosure.

Business impact

Parties involved in federal contract appeals—contractors, government agencies, and legal representatives—face exposure of their email addresses and associated account information in two critical dispute-resolution systems. This information can be harvested for targeted phishing campaigns, identity verification attacks, or reconnaissance prior to more sophisticated intrusions. Compromise of these systems undermines the integrity of federal procurement oversight, potentially affecting confidentiality of proprietary bid information and case details.

Affected systems

The vulnerability affects two systems operated by U.S. government agencies: (1) GAO Electronic Protest Docketing System (EPDS), and (2) Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) Electronic Docketing System (EDS). Both systems are directly accessible over the public internet and handle sensitive federal contract dispute documentation. Organizations submitting protests or appeals to either system should assume their associated email addresses and account metadata are accessible to unauthenticated attackers.

Exploitability

Exploitability is straightforward. The attack requires no authentication, no special tools, and minimal technical sophistication—any attacker with network access can craft HTTP requests to the endpoint with different user_id values and harvest results. The endpoint does not rate-limit or otherwise restrict enumeration attempts. No user interaction is needed. The only barrier is knowledge that the vulnerable endpoint exists, which is minimal given that API paths are often discoverable through standard reconnaissance.

Remediation

Both EPDS and EDS must immediately implement proper authentication and authorization controls on the 'update-profile/' endpoint. Users should only be able to retrieve or modify their own account profile data, verified through session validation or cryptographic token binding. A second remediation layer should include parameter validation and rate limiting to prevent brute-force account enumeration. Affected parties should assume compromise and monitor for phishing or social engineering targeting their email addresses.

Patch guidance

Contact the GAO and CBCA directly via their official security contacts for patched versions and deployment timelines. Given the federal government context and sensitivity of these systems, patches will likely be coordinated through official government channels. Verify patch applicability and deployment status directly with your agency's IT security team or the system operator. Do not rely on third-party advisories for patch versions; confirm through official government notices.

Detection guidance

Monitor HTTP request logs for repeated or anomalous access to '/update-profile/' endpoints, particularly requests with sequential or random 'user_id' parameter values submitted by a single source IP. Alert on any successful 200-status responses to that endpoint from unauthenticated sessions or sessions lacking proper authorization tokens. Network-based detection should flag GET or POST requests to these endpoints from external IP ranges if the systems are intended for internal or VPN-authenticated use only. Consider a temporary WAF rule to block direct access to the endpoint pending patches.

Why prioritize this

Although the CVSS score of 5.3 (Medium) reflects limited direct impact, the context elevates urgency: this is a U.S. government system handling federal contract disputes, the attack requires zero authentication, and the leaked information directly enables social engineering and phishing. The reputational and operational risk to federal procurement integrity is significant. Organizations dependent on these systems should treat this as a near-term priority.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 3.1 score of 5.3 reflects the attack vector (network-accessible, no authentication required), low complexity, and confidentiality impact (email disclosure). The score does not account for integrity or availability impact, which are absent here. Severity is Medium because the information disclosed, while sensitive, is limited to email addresses and basic account metadata rather than full personal data or financial records. However, this information serves as a beachhead for follow-on attacks, and the ease of exploitation argues for prompt remediation despite the moderate numeric score.

Frequently asked questions

Can an attacker modify or delete accounts using this vulnerability?

The vulnerability is limited to confidentiality disclosure—reading email addresses and account metadata. The description does not indicate that attackers can modify or delete accounts, change passwords, or alter case information. However, organizations should verify the full scope of the API endpoint's capabilities in coordination with the system operators.

Does this affect users who do not actively use these systems?

Only users who have created accounts in EPDS or CBCA EDS are at risk. If your organization has submitted federal contract protests or appeals through either system, your registered email and account information should be considered compromised and monitored for phishing activity.

Is there a workaround if patches are delayed?

Since the vulnerability is an API-level authorization flaw, client-side workarounds are not feasible. Mitigation must occur at the system operator level through WAF rules, IP-based access controls, or emergency patching. Organizations cannot self-protect; they must await remediation from the GAO or CBCA.

Why is this listed as Medium severity if it only leaks email addresses?

Email addresses appear low-risk in isolation, but they are the starting point for targeted phishing, social engineering, and reconnaissance attacks. Federal contract participants and their attorneys are attractive targets for espionage or disruption. The ease of exploitation (zero authentication, no rate limiting) and the government system context justify prioritization despite the numeric score.

This analysis is provided for informational purposes and reflects the vulnerability data available as of the publication date. No exploit code or weaponization guidance is provided. Patch versions, deployment timelines, and official remediation steps must be confirmed through official communications from the U.S. Government Accountability Office and the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. Organizations should coordinate with their government IT security contacts and follow official incident response procedures. SEC.co makes no warranty regarding the completeness or applicability of this intelligence to your specific environment. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-07-27. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).