CVE-2026-54018: Open WebUI SSRF Bypass via HTTP Redirect Chain (0.9.6 Patch)
Open WebUI versions before 0.9.6 contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that allows authenticated users to access internal network resources despite security restrictions. The flaw exists because the application validates the initial URL provided by a user but fails to validate the final destination after HTTP redirects. An attacker can exploit this by providing a legitimate-looking URL that redirects to internal services like localhost or cloud metadata endpoints, effectively bypassing SSRF protections.
Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain
- CVSS
- 3.1 · 7.7 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Weaknesses (CWE)
- CWE-918
- Affected products
- 1 configuration(s)
- Published / Modified
- 2026-06-23 / 2026-06-25
NVD description (verbatim)
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, the SafePlaywrightURLLoader implements a validate_url function to prevent SSRF attacks by checking the IP address of the user-provided URL. However, this validation is performed only on the initial URL. Since Playwright automatically follows HTTP redirects (301/302) by default, an attacker can bypass the validation by providing a safe URL that redirects to a restricted internal network address (e.g., localhost, Docker container network, or Cloud Metadata). This allows the application to access internal services despite ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH being set to False This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.
2 reference(s) · View on NVD →
SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source
Technical summary
The SafePlaywrightURLLoader in Open WebUI implements a validate_url function intended to prevent SSRF attacks by inspecting the IP address of user-supplied URLs. However, validation occurs only on the initial request URL, not on redirected destinations. Because Playwright follows HTTP 301/302 redirects automatically, an attacker can chain a redirect from an approved external URL to a restricted internal address (localhost, private IP ranges, Docker networks, cloud metadata services). This permits unauthorized access to internal services even when ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH is disabled. The root cause is incomplete redirect chain validation.
Business impact
This vulnerability enables authenticated attackers to access internal services and resources that should be isolated from external or untrusted network access. In environments where Open WebUI is deployed with RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) features, attackers could extract sensitive data from internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or administrative interfaces. The requirement for authentication limits blast radius but does not eliminate risk, especially in organizations where user accounts have loose access controls. Organizations relying on ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH=False for security posture should consider this control bypassed until patched.
Affected systems
Open WebUI versions prior to 0.9.6 are affected. The vulnerability requires the SafePlaywrightURLLoader to be in use and typically impacts deployments leveraging the RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) or web-fetch functionality. Self-hosted instances are affected; SaaS deployments depend on vendor patch status. Authenticated users are required to trigger the attack, meaning internal users, federated accounts, or accounts compromised through other means pose risk.
Exploitability
Exploitability is straightforward for authenticated users. No special tools or advanced techniques are required—the attacker simply provides a redirect chain (external URL → internal destination) through standard Open WebUI interfaces. Publicly available redirector services or attacker-controlled domains can be used to craft the redirect. The attack requires network-level access to the Open WebUI instance (authenticated session) but is otherwise low-complexity. Detection by defensive measures is minimal if redirect chains are not explicitly logged or monitored.
Remediation
Upgrade to Open WebUI version 0.9.6 or later, which fixes the validation logic to inspect final destination URLs after redirects. Organizations should verify their current version and plan upgrade timing accordingly. In the interim, network segmentation isolating Open WebUI from sensitive internal services provides defense-in-depth; disable ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH if the feature is not actively required. Review authentication and access controls to limit which user accounts can interact with RAG/web-fetch functionality.
Patch guidance
Apply Open WebUI version 0.9.6 or any subsequent release. Verify the patch by checking the version string in application settings or through the package manager used for deployment. If using containerized deployment, pull the updated image and redeploy. Test the patched version in a non-production environment first to ensure RAG and web-fetch functionality operate as expected. No data migration or configuration changes are required.
Detection guidance
Monitor application logs for HTTP redirect chains, especially redirects from external domains to private IP ranges (127.0.0.1, 10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x, 192.168.x.x) or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254). Audit authentication logs for unusual session activity preceding web-fetch requests. Deploy network detection rules triggering on outbound connections from Open WebUI to localhost or RFC1918 ranges if such connectivity is unexpected. Inspect HTTP request/response headers for Location headers pointing to internal addresses. WAF or proxy rules can flag requests with redirect payloads targeting internal networks.
Why prioritize this
This vulnerability scores CVSS 7.7 (HIGH) due to high confidentiality impact coupled with low complexity and no special privileges required beyond authentication. While the attack requires an authenticated user, the ability to bypass a critical security control and access internal resources represents significant risk in multi-tenant or high-security environments. The vulnerability directly undermines the intended isolation of internal services and should be prioritized for patching within 30 days, sooner if sensitive internal services are exposed on the same network.
Risk score, explained
CVSS 3.1 score of 7.7 (HIGH) reflects: (1) Network-adjacent attack vector requiring only valid authentication; (2) Low attack complexity—standard HTTP redirect mechanism; (3) Limited privileges needed—authenticated users can trigger; (4) High confidentiality impact due to potential access to internal secrets, metadata, or administrative interfaces; (5) Changed scope—the vulnerability allows escaping the intended isolation boundary; (6) No integrity or availability impact in the typical attack scenario. The score appropriately captures the risk of internal data exposure while acknowledging the authentication prerequisite.
Frequently asked questions
Does disabling ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH prevent this attack?
No. According to the vulnerability description, the attack succeeds 'despite ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH being set to False.' The validation bypass occurs in the underlying URL loader and is not controlled by this flag. You must upgrade to 0.9.6 to fully remediate.
Can network firewalls or segmentation stop this attack?
Partially. If the Open WebUI instance cannot reach internal services due to firewall rules or network isolation, the attack cannot succeed. However, network segmentation should be considered a temporary mitigation, not a replacement for patching. Many environments inadvertently allow east-west traffic between services, making this layered defense insufficient on its own.
Does this affect Open WebUI deployments that do not use RAG or web-fetch features?
No. If RAG and web-fetch features are completely disabled at the application level, the SafePlaywrightURLLoader is not invoked and this vulnerability is not exposed. However, patching is still recommended as the default configuration in most deployments includes these features.
What if my users do not have direct access to web-fetch functionality?
Reduced risk, but not zero. If you have disabled RAG/web-fetch at the feature level or restricted it through role-based access controls, the attack surface is smaller. Verify your RBAC configuration and review which user roles can invoke web-fetch operations. Even so, patch promptly to close the vulnerability entirely.
This analysis is provided for informational purposes and represents SEC.co's interpretation of the published vulnerability details. Organizations should independently verify all patch version numbers, affected product lists, and remediation steps against official vendor advisories and release notes. No exploit code or proof-of-concept is provided. Testing of patches and mitigations should occur in non-production environments first. CVSS scoring reflects the published vector and should be adapted to organizational context and actual exposure. This document does not constitute legal advice or a guarantee of security after patching. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-07-29. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).
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