MEDIUM 6.5

CVE-2026-53466: ImageMagick XCF Decoder Integer Overflow – CVSS 6.5 MEDIUM

ImageMagick, a widely-used image editing and manipulation library, contains an integer overflow flaw in its XCF (GIMP native format) decoder. When processing a specially crafted XCF file, the overflow can trigger an out-of-bounds memory read, potentially crashing the application. The vulnerability affects ImageMagick versions before 6.9.13-51 and 7.1.2-26. While the immediate risk is denial of service through application crashes, the out-of-bounds read could theoretically expose sensitive information from adjacent memory regions.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 6.5 MEDIUM · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-190, CWE-681
Affected products
1 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-07-01 / 2026-07-02

NVD description (verbatim)

ImageMagick is free and open-source software used for editing and manipulating digital images. Prior to versions 6.9.13-51 and 7.1.2-26, an integer overflow in the XCF decoder can result in an out of bounds read when a crafted image is read, potentially resulting in a crash. This issue has been fixed in versions 6.9.13-51 and 7.1.2-26.

1 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability stems from improper integer handling in the XCF decoder component. During parsing of malformed XCF image files, an integer overflow occurs that bypasses bounds checking, allowing the decoder to read memory beyond allocated buffer boundaries. This falls under CWE-190 (integer overflow or wraparound) and CWE-681 (incorrect conversion between numeric types). The flaw requires no authentication or user privileges to trigger—an attacker simply needs to supply a crafted XCF file to an ImageMagick instance. The CVSS 3.1 vector (6.5 MEDIUM, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) reflects network accessibility, low attack complexity, and the combination of confidentiality impact (information disclosure) and availability impact (crash).

Business impact

Organizations deploying ImageMagick for automated image processing, web-based image services, or embedded image handling face two primary risks: service disruption from unexpected crashes and potential data leakage. If ImageMagick processes untrusted user-supplied images—common in content platforms, photography services, or document conversion pipelines—a malicious XCF file could disrupt operations or expose backend memory. The severity is moderated by the fact that XCF is GIMP's native format and less commonly encountered in typical web workflows, but anywhere ImageMagick is exposed to user input warrants patching.

Affected systems

ImageMagick versions 6.9.13-50 and earlier in the 6.x line, and 7.1.2-25 and earlier in the 7.x line are vulnerable. This includes distributions and container images shipping these versions, as well as third-party software bundling ImageMagick. Both source builds and packaged versions (from operating system repositories, Docker Hub, etc.) are affected. Verify your specific ImageMagick version using 'convert -version' or 'identify -version'.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires only the ability to supply a crafted XCF file to an ImageMagick process. No special conditions, authentication, or user interaction beyond opening the file are needed. However, practical exploitation is somewhat limited by the relative rarity of XCF handling in public-facing services—most web platforms default to JPEG, PNG, or WebP. The vulnerability is not listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, meaning active exploitation in the wild is not currently documented, though the technical barrier to weaponization is low.

Remediation

Upgrade ImageMagick to version 6.9.13-51 or later (6.x series) or 7.1.2-26 or later (7.x series). Verify the updated version post-deployment. For organizations unable to patch immediately, restrict or disable XCF file handling by configuring ImageMagick's policy.xml to block the XCF coder, or implement strict file-type validation upstream to reject XCF submissions before they reach ImageMagick.

Patch guidance

Update ImageMagick from the official repository or vendor-maintained packages for your operating system. Debian/Ubuntu users should apt-get upgrade imagemagick; Red Hat/CentOS users should yum update ImageMagick. For container deployments, rebuild images from updated base layers or pull updated ImageMagick container images from trusted registries. Verify the fix by confirming the version string reflects 6.9.13-51, 7.1.2-26, or later. Test with your existing image workflows to confirm compatibility before full rollout.

Detection guidance

Monitor ImageMagick process crashes and segmentation faults, particularly in service logs for image-processing pipelines. Use SIEM correlation to detect unusual process terminations associated with ImageMagick. If feasible, enable ImageMagick debug logging to identify which files trigger crashes. File integrity monitoring and network anomaly detection can catch attempts to upload suspicious XCF files to web services. Intrusion detection systems should flag uploads of XCF files to image-processing endpoints if XCF is not legitimate for your workflow.

Why prioritize this

Although rated MEDIUM severity and not yet exploited in the wild, this vulnerability should be prioritized for patching because: (1) ImageMagick is ubiquitous in cloud and web infrastructure; (2) the attack surface is large for organizations accepting user-supplied images; (3) exploitation is straightforward for an attacker; (4) the combination of information disclosure and availability impact poses real operational risk. Organizations with public image upload or processing services should treat this as high priority. Internal-only deployments with restricted file sources can defer slightly but should still patch within a standard maintenance window.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 3.1 score of 6.5 (MEDIUM) reflects a networked, unauthenticated attack (AV:N/PR:N) requiring only a crafted file and no user interaction beyond opening it (AC:L/UI:N). The scope is unchanged (S:U), but the impact is split: low confidentiality impact from the out-of-bounds read (C:L) and low availability impact from the crash (A:L). No integrity impact (I:N) is recorded. The score is not critical because the attack requires specific conditions (XCF file format) and the impact, while real, is contained to the process boundary. However, organizations should not under-prioritize based on the MEDIUM label if ImageMagick is Internet-facing.

Frequently asked questions

Does this vulnerability affect ImageMagick running on Linux, macOS, and Windows?

Yes. The integer overflow in the XCF decoder is platform-agnostic and affects ImageMagick on all major operating systems. Patch versions are released across all platforms.

Are image formats other than XCF affected?

No. The vulnerability is specific to the XCF decoder. JPEG, PNG, GIF, WebP, and other common formats do not trigger this flaw. However, if your infrastructure accepts XCF files or cannot validate file types reliably, treat the risk as moderate to high.

What should I do if I cannot patch ImageMagick immediately?

Disable XCF decoding via policy.xml by adding a restriction for the XCF coder, or enforce strict file-type validation at the application layer to reject .xcf files before they reach ImageMagick. Monitor process logs for crashes. Plan patching within your next maintenance cycle (within 30 days recommended).

Will this vulnerability be exploited in the wild?

The vulnerability is not currently listed in CISA's KEV catalog, but the low barrier to exploitation and widespread deployment of ImageMagick mean it could be weaponized. Proactive patching is the best defense.

This analysis is based on the CVE record and vendor advisory as of the publication date. Readers should verify patch availability and compatibility with their specific environments before deployment. No exploit code or weaponized proof-of-concept is provided. This page does not constitute security advice; organizations should consult their security teams and vendor documentation. CVSS scores and severity classifications are sourced from NIST and NVD and may be updated over time. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-10. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).