HIGH 7.5

CVE-2026-53199: Linux Hyper-V Network Driver Crash

The Linux kernel's Hyper-V network driver (hv_netvsc) has a memory access flaw that causes system crashes during network packet transmission. The vulnerability arises when the driver attempts to copy network packet data into a shared memory buffer used for communication with the Hyper-V hypervisor. On 32-bit x86 systems with high memory support enabled, certain pages (specifically user-space or cached pages) can exist above a memory boundary where the driver's address translation method breaks down. When the driver tries to access these incorrectly translated addresses, it triggers a fatal fault in the networking code path. The fix replaces the flawed address translation with proper page mapping functions that work correctly regardless of where the page resides in memory.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 7.5 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
Affected products
8 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-25 / 2026-07-06

NVD description (verbatim)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hv_netvsc: use kmap_local_page in netvsc_copy_to_send_buf netvsc_copy_to_send_buf() copies page buffer entries into the VMBus send buffer using phys_to_virt() on the entry PFN. Entries for the RNDIS header and the skb linear data come from kmalloc'd memory and are always in the kernel direct map, but entries for skb fragments reference page cache or user pages, which on 32-bit x86 with CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y can live above the LOWMEM boundary. For such a page phys_to_virt() returns an address outside the direct map and the subsequent memcpy() faults on the transmit softirq path, which is fatal. Map the pages with kmap_local_page() instead, handling two properties of the page buffer entries: - pb[i].pfn is a Hyper-V PFN at HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (4K) granularity, not a native PFN. Reconstruct the physical address first and derive the native page from it, so the mapping stays correct where PAGE_SIZE > HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (e.g. arm64 with 64K pages). - Since commit 41a6328b2c55 ("hv_netvsc: Preserve contiguous PFN grouping in the page buffer array"), an entry describes a full physically contiguous fragment and pb[i].len can exceed PAGE_SIZE, while kmap_local_page() maps a single page. Copy page by page, splitting at native page boundaries. The copy path only handles packets smaller than the send section size (6144 bytes by default); larger packets take the cp_partial path where only the RNDIS header is copied. So entries here are bounded by the section size and a copy is split at most once on 4K-page systems. On !CONFIG_HIGHMEM configs kmap_local_page() folds to page_address() and no mapping work is added.

8 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability resides in netvsc_copy_to_send_buf(), which copies packet buffer entries into VMBus send buffers. The function uses phys_to_virt() to translate Hyper-V PFNs into kernel virtual addresses, assuming all referenced pages reside in the kernel's direct map region. However, skb fragments from page cache or user-space pages can live above the LOWMEM boundary on 32-bit x86 systems with CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y, causing phys_to_virt() to return out-of-bounds addresses. The subsequent memcpy() in the transmit softirq path then faults fatally. The fix employs kmap_local_page() for proper page mapping while accounting for two architectural subtleties: (1) pb[i].pfn values are Hyper-V PFNs at 4K granularity, requiring reconstruction to native pages where PAGE_SIZE exceeds 4K (e.g., arm64 with 64K pages), and (2) buffer entries can describe contiguous physical fragments exceeding single page size, necessitating per-page iteration at native page boundaries rather than single-page assumption.

Business impact

This vulnerability causes unscheduled system reboots or hangs in Hyper-V virtual machines transmitting network traffic, directly impacting availability of workloads running on affected hypervisors. For production environments relying on Hyper-V virtualization, particularly those running 32-bit guest systems or mixed 32/64-bit deployments, affected nodes become unreliable during normal operations. Virtual machine uptime expectations, service availability SLAs, and cluster stability are all compromised until remediation. Organizations operating public cloud services or managed infrastructure on Hyper-V face customer impact and potential SLA violations.

Affected systems

The Linux kernel is affected across multiple versions running on Hyper-V hypervisors. The vulnerability specifically impacts 32-bit x86 architectures with CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y enabled, as this configuration allows user-space pages and page cache to reside above the direct-map boundary where phys_to_virt() fails. The issue also affects other architectures with PAGE_SIZE greater than HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (4K), such as ARM64 with 64K pages, where the PFN reconstruction logic becomes critical. Verify the specific affected kernel versions and patch availability against the official Linux kernel security advisories.

Exploitability

This is a memory handling flaw triggered during normal network packet transmission—no special conditions, authentication, or user interaction is required. Any workload transmitting network traffic through the Hyper-V virtual network adapter can inadvertently trigger the fault. The vulnerability is highly reliable to exploit in the sense that affected configurations will consistently crash when transmitting packets that reference pages living above the direct-map boundary. No remote code execution is possible; the impact is strictly denial of service through kernel panic.

Remediation

Apply the upstream Linux kernel patch that replaces phys_to_virt() with kmap_local_page()-based page mapping in netvsc_copy_to_send_buf(). This fix handles Hyper-V's 4K PFN granularity correctly and iterates through pages at native page boundaries. For systems unable to update immediately, network traffic can be redirected away from affected virtual machines as a temporary mitigation, though this does not resolve the underlying flaw. Verify the specific kernel version containing the fix against the official Linux kernel repository and your distribution's security advisories.

Patch guidance

Identify your Linux kernel version running on Hyper-V guests using 'uname -r'. Cross-reference this version against the Linux kernel repository (kernel.org) and your distribution's security advisories to locate the patched kernel version incorporating the kmap_local_page() fix for hv_netvsc. Test the patched kernel in a non-production environment with typical network traffic patterns before deploying to production. Hyper-V guests can typically be updated by installing the patched kernel package and rebooting. Coordinate updates to minimize downtime if running in a clustered or load-balanced configuration.

Detection guidance

Monitor system logs and kernel ring buffers for page faults or memory access errors originating from the hv_netvsc driver during network transmission. Look for kernel panic messages referencing netvsc_copy_to_send_buf() or VMBus operations. In virtualized environments, observe unexpected guest reboots or hangs correlated with network activity as potential indicators. Testing on affected hardware with sustained network traffic (large file transfers, high packet rates) can reproduce the fault if the configuration matches the vulnerability conditions (32-bit x86 with high memory or ARM64 with 64K pages).

Why prioritize this

This vulnerability scores 7.5 (HIGH) due to its guaranteed availability impact on affected systems—network transmission faults are fatal and require immediate recovery. While not remotely exploitable in the traditional sense, the lack of authentication or complexity barriers makes it trivial to trigger in any environment running affected kernel versions. For organizations operating Hyper-V infrastructure, particularly data centers with 32-bit guest support or ARM64 hypervisors, this directly threatens service continuity and warrants swift patching. The reliability of the fault and absence of workarounds elevate prioritization.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 3.1 score of 7.5 reflects HIGH severity: the vulnerability requires no authentication (PR:N) or user interaction (UI:N), operates over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L), and affects availability only (A:H) without confidentiality or integrity impact. The scope is unchanged (S:U). The score appropriately captures the ease of triggering denial of service in affected environments, though it does not escalate to CRITICAL because remote code execution is not possible and the vulnerability is limited to specific architectural configurations.

Frequently asked questions

Does this vulnerability affect 64-bit x86 systems running Hyper-V?

64-bit x86 systems are less commonly affected unless CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y is explicitly enabled in the kernel build (which is unusual for 64-bit). However, ARM64 systems with PAGE_SIZE=64K or other architectures where PAGE_SIZE exceeds 4K are vulnerable due to the PFN reconstruction issue. Check your kernel configuration and architecture to determine exposure.

Is a reboot required to apply the patch?

Yes, kernel patches require a system reboot to take effect. Plan updates during maintenance windows and coordinate reboots in clustered environments to maintain service availability.

Can disabling network interfaces prevent this crash?

Disabling Hyper-V virtual network adapters or redirecting traffic to alternative network paths would prevent triggering the fault, but this is a temporary workaround—not a proper fix. Apply the kernel patch as soon as feasible.

Does this affect Linux guests on other hypervisors like KVM or Xen?

No, this vulnerability is specific to the Hyper-V hv_netvsc driver. Linux running on KVM, Xen, or other hypervisors is not affected by this particular flaw.

This analysis is based on public vulnerability disclosures and Linux kernel documentation. Patch availability, affected version ranges, and deployment timelines vary by Linux distribution and should be verified against official distribution security advisories and kernel.org. Testing in non-production environments is strongly recommended before applying patches to production systems. Organizations should consult vendor-specific guidance for Hyper-V deployments and coordinate patching with their hypervisor and Linux distribution support channels. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-08-03. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).