HIGH 8.1

CVE-2026-49291: mcp-memory-service Authorization Bypass Allows Read-Only Users to Modify Data

mcp-memory-service, a semantic memory layer used in AI applications, contains an authorization flaw that allows attackers with read-only access to perform write operations. The vulnerability exists in the HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at `/mcp`, which fails to enforce proper permission checks when dispatching tool calls. Specifically, authenticated users granted only read-level OAuth scope can invoke the `store_memory` and `delete_memory` functions despite those operations being restricted to write-scope users at the REST API layer. This permission bypass enables unauthorized data modification in memory stores that should be protected.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 8.1 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-862
Affected products
0 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-19 / 2026-06-23

NVD description (verbatim)

mcp-memory-service is a semantic memory layer for AI applications. Prior to version 10.65.3, the HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at `/mcp` requires only OAuth `read` scope for all requests, then dispatches `tools/call` directly to handlers that include mutating tools. A read-only OAuth client can call `store_memory` and `delete_memory` through MCP even though the corresponding REST endpoints require `write` scope. Version 10.65.3 patches the issue.

3 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability stems from inconsistent authorization enforcement between two API endpoints. The `/mcp` HTTP endpoint validates only that incoming requests carry an OAuth `read` scope before accepting and dispatching JSON-RPC `tools/call` requests. However, the MCP layer fails to re-validate permission levels when routing to specific tool handlers, including those that mutate state. The `store_memory` and `delete_memory` tools are implemented as handlers without scope gating, allowing them to be called by read-scoped OAuth clients. In contrast, equivalent REST endpoints properly enforce `write` scope requirements. The flaw is classified as improper authorization (CWE-862) and affects the integrity and availability of stored memory resources.

Business impact

This vulnerability can result in unauthorized modification or deletion of semantic memory used by AI applications. An attacker with limited read-only API access could corrupt, erase, or manipulate memory stores that other parts of the application or users depend on. For organizations running AI systems that use mcp-memory-service as a backend, this could degrade model context quality, cause application logic failures, or enable data loss attacks. The impact is heightened in multi-tenant or shared-memory scenarios where one read-only token could compromise data integrity for other users or applications.

Affected systems

All versions of mcp-memory-service prior to version 10.65.3 are affected. Organizations using mcp-memory-service to manage semantic memory for AI workloads should verify their installed version. The advisory does not list specific vendor products bundling this service, so you should check your deployment's component inventory and dependency trees for mcp-memory-service and its version.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires network access to the `/mcp` endpoint and possession of valid OAuth credentials with at least read scope. No user interaction or complex configuration is needed; an attacker with a standard read-only API token can immediately call mutating tools. The attack is straightforward to execute once credentials are obtained, making this a practical risk for any organization where read-scope tokens are distributed or where credential leakage is a concern.

Remediation

Upgrade mcp-memory-service to version 10.65.3 or later. The patched version enforces proper OAuth scope validation at the MCP endpoint level, ensuring that `tools/call` dispatch includes permission checks commensurate with the requested operation. Verify against the vendor advisory that 10.65.3 is the minimum safe version for your deployment.

Patch guidance

Plan an upgrade to version 10.65.3 as soon as feasible, prioritizing systems that expose the `/mcp` endpoint to untrusted networks or where read-only tokens are widely distributed. The patch involves updating the mcp-memory-service package; consult the vendor release notes for any breaking changes or configuration adjustments. Test the upgrade in a staging environment to confirm that existing read-scope clients remain functional for legitimate read operations while being blocked from store_memory and delete_memory calls.

Detection guidance

Monitor logs for `tools/call` requests to `store_memory` or `delete_memory` coming from OAuth tokens with only read scope. API gateway or application logs should record the scope associated with each request; filter for calls that mismatch operation severity and scope. Also monitor for unusual patterns of memory deletion or modification that correlate with low-privilege token activity. If you have audit logging on memory operations, cross-reference the user/token identity with the scope they were granted.

Why prioritize this

This vulnerability scores CVSS 8.1 (HIGH) due to low attack complexity, no user interaction requirement, and high impact on integrity and availability. The ability for read-only users to perform write operations directly undermines access control assumptions and can lead to data loss or corruption. Organizations should treat this as a high-priority patch, especially if read-only API tokens are issued to third parties, partner integrations, or less-trusted applications.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 8.1 score reflects a network-accessible endpoint (AV:N), low attack complexity (AC:L), and the requirement for a low-privileged authenticated account (PR:L). The vulnerability does not require user interaction (UI:N) and is scoped to the affected component (S:U). The impact is high for both integrity (I:H)—unauthorized modification of memory—and availability (A:H)—unauthorized deletion—while confidentiality is not directly compromised. The combination of easy exploitation and serious write-access abuse justifies the HIGH severity rating.

Frequently asked questions

How do I know if my application is affected?

Check your installed version of mcp-memory-service. If it is earlier than 10.65.3, your deployment is vulnerable. Review your deployment manifest, lock files, or package manager to determine the exact version in use.

Can an attacker delete all data stored in memory without authorization?

Yes, if they possess a valid read-only OAuth token. The vulnerability allows them to call delete_memory and remove data from the semantic memory store. The extent of damage depends on what data is stored and how critical it is to your application.

Does the patch break backward compatibility with existing read-scope clients?

No, the patch enforces proper scope checking. Read-scope clients will continue to perform legitimate read operations; they will simply be denied access to write operations like store_memory and delete_memory, which is the intended behavior.

Is this vulnerability being actively exploited in the wild?

The vulnerability is not listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, meaning there is no confirmed evidence of active exploitation as of the publication date. However, you should not delay patching, as the ease of exploitation makes it an attractive target once widely discovered.

This analysis is provided for informational purposes and based on the official CVE record and vendor advisory. No exploit code or proof-of-concept is included. Patch version numbers and timelines should be verified against the official vendor advisory before implementation. Organizations are responsible for assessing applicability to their environment, testing patches before deployment, and maintaining their own security controls. SEC.co makes no warranty regarding the completeness or accuracy of derived recommendations. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-07-28. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).