HIGH 8.8

CVE-2026-45170: Idira Vendor PAM TLS Certificate Validation Bypass

Idira Vendor PAM Self-Hosted Connector versions before 1.1.100504 contain a flaw in how they validate TLS certificates. Under specific conditions and configurations, the connector may not properly enforce certificate validation, potentially allowing an attacker on the same network segment to intercept or manipulate encrypted communications. This is a serious issue because PAM solutions are trusted with sensitive credentials and authentication tokens—weakened encryption validation undermines that trust.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 8.8 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-295
Affected products
1 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-12 / 2026-06-23

NVD description (verbatim)

Idira Vendor PAM - Self-Hosted Connector versions prior 1.1.100504 under specific conditions and configuration scenarios, TLS certificate validation may not be fully enforced. CyberArk Security Bulletin: CA26-17

1 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

CVE-2026-45170 involves improper TLS certificate validation in Idira Vendor PAM Self-Hosted Connector. The vulnerability is rooted in CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation), meaning the connector fails to fully validate TLS certificates under certain deployment or configuration scenarios. An attacker positioned on the local network (AV:A) can exploit this without elevated privileges or user interaction to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of communications. The CVSS 3.1 score of 8.8 (HIGH severity) reflects the attack's local-network requirement but the significant impact on all security properties of the connection.

Business impact

PAM solutions are critical trust anchors in enterprise security—they manage privileged accounts, SSH keys, and API credentials. If an attacker can bypass TLS validation on the connector, they gain a foothold to intercept credentials in transit, inject malicious commands, or perform man-in-the-middle attacks. Compromised connector communications can cascade into lateral movement, data exfiltration, and unauthorized privileged access. Organizations relying on this connector for secure credential delivery face direct risk to their crown-jewel authentication infrastructure.

Affected systems

Palo Alto Networks Idira Privilege Cloud Connector (Self-Hosted variant) in versions prior to 1.1.100504 are affected. The vulnerability only manifests under specific conditions and configurations, which means not all deployments are equally exposed—organizations should verify their connector version and configuration posture. Self-hosted connectors are typically deployed in on-premises or private-cloud environments with direct network access to critical systems.

Exploitability

This vulnerability requires the attacker to be on the same network segment as the affected connector (local network attack vector). No user interaction, elevated privileges, or authentication is required to trigger the flaw. Once positioned on the network, an attacker can passively intercept or actively manipulate TLS-encrypted communications. The 'specific conditions and configuration scenarios' language in the vendor advisory suggests that certain deployment patterns are more vulnerable than others; organizations should consult CyberArk Security Bulletin CA26-17 to determine their exposure.

Remediation

Upgrade Idira Vendor PAM Self-Hosted Connector to version 1.1.100504 or later. Before upgrading, review CyberArk Security Bulletin CA26-17 to understand which configuration scenarios trigger the vulnerability and confirm your environment is exposed. After patching, verify that TLS certificate validation is fully functional by testing connector communications with both valid and invalid certificates.

Patch guidance

Obtain and deploy Idira Vendor PAM Self-Hosted Connector version 1.1.100504 or later from Palo Alto Networks. Consult the official security bulletin (CA26-17) for specific upgrade procedures and any interim mitigations. Test the patched connector in a staging environment to ensure it validates certificates correctly before promoting to production. Verify that the update includes the full TLS certificate validation fix and does not introduce regressions in connector functionality or performance.

Detection guidance

Monitor network traffic between connectors and backend services for anomalous TLS handshake patterns, certificate mismatches, or bypass attempts. Log and alert on any deprecation or disabling of certificate validation settings. Check connector configuration files for non-standard TLS settings that may indicate partial validation. Review connector version inventory to identify any instances still running 1.1.100504 or earlier. Enable detailed logging on TLS and certificate events within the PAM platform.

Why prioritize this

This vulnerability scores 8.8 (HIGH) and directly compromises the security of credential traffic in a PAM system—the most sensitive data in an enterprise. Although it requires local network access, the lack of authentication or user interaction requirement and the ability to achieve full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact make it a critical patch priority. Organizations with on-premises or hybrid PAM deployments should treat this as urgent.

Risk score, explained

The CVSS 3.1 score of 8.8 reflects: (1) Local attack vector—requires network adjacency but not internet exposure; (2) Low complexity—straightforward exploitation once on the network; (3) No privilege or user interaction required; (4) Severe impact on confidentiality (credential exposure), integrity (command injection), and availability (connector disruption). The score is not 9.0+ because the attack vector is localized to the network segment rather than adjacent systems or network-wide. However, the broad impact across all security properties (C:H, I:H, A:H) and the criticality of PAM make this a high-severity issue in practice.

Frequently asked questions

Does this vulnerability allow remote exploitation over the internet?

No. The attack vector is AV:A (Adjacent Network), meaning the attacker must be on the same network segment as the connector. Remote attackers cannot directly exploit this without first gaining network access to the connector's location. However, the vulnerability is still serious because internal network access is often easier to obtain than believed.

What does 'under specific conditions and configuration scenarios' mean?

The vendor advisory (CA26-17) indicates that not all deployments of this connector version are vulnerable. Certain configuration choices or deployment patterns may disable or enable the vulnerability. You should review the CyberArk bulletin to determine whether your specific configuration is at risk. Upgrade regardless, but understanding your exposure helps prioritize testing.

Can we mitigate this without patching?

Mitigation depends on the specific conditions that trigger the vulnerability. CyberArk Security Bulletin CA26-17 may describe interim configuration hardening steps, but patching to 1.1.100504 or later is the definitive remediation. Do not rely on mitigation alone if you operate in a high-risk network environment.

What is the business risk if we delay patching?

If an attacker gains access to your network segment, they can intercept and manipulate credentials flowing through the connector, potentially compromising all privileged accounts managed by the PAM system. This can lead to unauthorized access to critical infrastructure, databases, cloud platforms, and other high-value targets. Delay increases exposure window and risk.

This analysis is based on publicly available information from Palo Alto Networks and CyberArk Security Bulletin CA26-17. Patch version numbers and vendor guidance should be verified against official CyberArk and Palo Alto Networks advisories. This explainer is for informational purposes and does not constitute security advice for your specific environment. Organizations should conduct their own risk assessment based on their network architecture, configuration, and threat model. Always test patches in staging before production deployment. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-07-20. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).