HIGH 7.4

CVE-2026-10629: Verizon IMS VoLTE Signaling Lacks IPsec Protection – Call Eavesdropping Risk

Verizon's IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) platform handles VoLTE call signaling without proper encryption and authentication protections. An attacker positioned on the network path—such as a rogue cell tower operator, compromised router, or ISP-level adversary—can eavesdrop on, modify, or spoof VoLTE call setup messages. This breaks the confidentiality of who is calling whom and when, and enables attackers to hijack, redirect, or terminate calls by tampering with unprotected signaling traffic.

Source data · NVD / CISA · public domain

CVSS
3.1 · 7.4 HIGH · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Weaknesses (CWE)
Affected products
0 configuration(s)
Published / Modified
2026-06-02 / 2026-06-17

NVD description (verbatim)

SIP signaling stack in Verizon IMS (unspecified version) implements SIP signaling without IPsec integrity protection (missing Security-Client/Security-Server headers and ESP traffic), which allows an on-path attacker to compromise confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of VoLTE signaling via passive monitoring and active manipulation of unsecured SIP messages over the radio and core network.

2 reference(s) · View on NVD →

SEC.co analysis · AI-assisted, reviewed against source

Technical summary

The vulnerability stems from the absence of IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protection and missing Security-Client/Security-Server SIP headers in Verizon's IMS signaling stack. The SIP protocol, which orchestrates VoLTE call establishment and teardown, is transmitted over the radio and core network without cryptographic integrity or confidentiality guarantees. An on-path attacker can passively intercept SIP messages to extract call metadata (caller, callee, timing, location hints) or actively modify messages to manipulate call routing, inject commands, or create denial-of-service conditions. The vulnerability affects an unspecified version range of the Verizon IMS platform, meaning deployment scope across Verizon's network requires clarification from the vendor.

Business impact

This vulnerability directly undermines the security posture of Verizon's VoLTE infrastructure and affects millions of subscribers. Business consequences include: (1) loss of call privacy—competitors, law enforcement, or criminal actors can monitor high-value communications; (2) call fraud and service disruption—attackers can redirect calls, hijack billing, or deny service to target users; (3) regulatory and compliance risk—telecommunications carriers are subject to FCC, HIPAA (if medical), and privacy law requirements; (4) brand and customer trust damage if exploits become public; (5) potential cascade effects if signaling manipulation triggers cascading network failures or incorrect call routing across carrier boundaries.

Affected systems

The vulnerability is specific to Verizon's IMS signaling stack, affecting VoLTE call processing and all dependent services (video calling, messaging integration, etc.). The precise version range is not disclosed in the CVE; organizations relying on Verizon's VoLTE or IMS-based services should treat this as potentially pervasive until Verizon issues a detailed advisory specifying affected versions and deployment scopes. Third-party devices and networks that interoperate with Verizon IMS may inherit secondary risk if they rely on the integrity of Verizon-originated signaling.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires network-level access (on-path position) such as control of a cell site, core network node, or BGP/DNS hijacking capability. The CVSS score of 7.4 reflects HIGH severity partly because the attack complexity is rated HIGH—the attacker must be positioned on the data path—but requires no authentication or user interaction. Passive interception is trivial once positioned; active manipulation requires understanding of SIP protocol semantics but is well within the capability of state-sponsored or advanced criminal actors. Public exploit code is not known to exist, but the technical barrier is low for motivated adversaries.

Remediation

Verizon must implement mandatory IPsec ESP encryption and authentication for all SIP signaling traffic, including Security-Client and Security-Server header negotiation per RFC 3329. This requires updates to the IMS signaling stack, core network infrastructure, and possibly endpoint provisioning. Until patched, network operators should enforce perimeter controls: restrict SIP traffic to trusted, encrypted tunnels; implement SIP-aware firewalls with protocol validation; monitor for anomalous call signaling patterns; and consider temporary use of alternate calling mechanisms (WiFi calling over encrypted networks) for sensitive communications.

Patch guidance

Verizon will release patches through its standard IMS platform update process. Verify the affected version range and deploy in coordination with service continuity plans, as IMS updates may require brief signaling service interruption. Test patches in a staging environment first, as SIP protocol changes can interact unexpectedly with third-party equipment. Once available, apply patches to all IMS nodes, SBC (Session Border Controller) instances, and provisioning systems. Confirm that Security-Client/Security-Server negotiation is enabled and that IPsec SA (Security Association) establishment is logged and monitored.

Detection guidance

Monitor IMS signaling traffic for: (1) SIP messages arriving without Security-Client or Security-Server headers when they should be present; (2) absence of IPsec ESP traffic on signaling interfaces; (3) unexpected SIP INVITE, CANCEL, or BYE messages from unknown sources; (4) mismatches between call setup records and actual SIP message flows; (5) geographic or temporal anomalies in VoLTE call origination. Deploy SIP-aware IDS/IPS rules to flag unencrypted or unsigned SIP signaling. Use IMS platform audit logs to correlate signaling events with call detail records (CDRs) and flag discrepancies.

Why prioritize this

HIGH severity is justified because: (1) confidentiality and integrity of telecommunications infrastructure are foundational to national security and commercial trust; (2) the vulnerability affects millions of VoLTE subscribers across a major carrier; (3) exploitation requires only network-level access, which state-sponsored actors routinely possess; (4) no user awareness or interaction is required to eavesdrop or manipulate calls; (5) the fix requires significant platform updates and coordination. While KEV status is not yet assigned, the risk profile warrants expedited patching and defensive monitoring.

Risk score, explained

CVSS 7.4 (HIGH) reflects: Attack Vector Network (exploitable over internet-connected infrastructure), Attack Complexity High (attacker must be on-path, limiting casual exploitation), Privileges Required None, User Interaction None, Scope Unchanged, Confidentiality High (call metadata and content exposure), Integrity High (call signaling manipulation), Availability None. The absence of Availability impact is appropriate because the attack does not directly cause service outage, but downstream impacts (call hijacking, misdirection) could indirectly affect availability. The score appropriately penalizes the lack of authentication and user interaction while crediting the on-path requirement.

Frequently asked questions

Can this vulnerability be exploited over the public internet, or only within Verizon's network?

Exploitation requires on-path positioning on the radio access network (between handset and cell site) or the core IMS network. This typically requires carrier-level network access (rogue cell tower, compromised core router) or BGP/DNS hijacking to intercept signaling. Direct remote exploitation over the public internet is not possible unless the attacker has compromised a network node. However, international roaming and interconnect agreements mean foreign carriers and state actors may have access to Verizon traffic in certain gateways.

Does this vulnerability affect calls over WiFi Calling?

WiFi Calling still uses the same Verizon IMS signaling stack at the core network level. However, the WiFi backhaul to the calling device is typically encrypted by TLS/HTTPS. The vulnerability persists in the core IMS signaling path, so an attacker with core network access can still intercept and manipulate calls. WiFi Calling does not eliminate the risk.

What immediate steps should a CISO take?

(1) Confirm Verizon's advisory on affected platforms and versions; (2) enable all available monitoring and alerting on SIP signaling anomalies; (3) restrict administrative and provisioning access to IMS infrastructure; (4) brief leadership on the risk and potential business continuity implications; (5) establish an emergency patching timeline once Verizon releases fixes; (6) consider temporary compensating controls such as VPN-based call routing for sensitive users.

Is there a workaround if Verizon cannot patch immediately?

No fully effective technical workaround exists. Compensating controls (perimeter SIP inspection, anomaly monitoring, access restrictions) reduce but do not eliminate risk. The only durable fix is IPsec enforcement on the signaling stack, which requires a platform update from Verizon. Organizations dependent on VoLTE should prioritize vendor engagement and patch deployment scheduling.

This analysis is based on the CVE record and public Verizon documentation as of the publication date. The affected version range is not fully specified in the CVE; consult Verizon's official security advisory for definitive information on impacted platforms and release timelines. No exploit code is publicly available; this assessment reflects the intrinsic exploitability of the vulnerability profile. Actual risk depends on network topology, attacker capability, and deployed controls. Organizations should conduct their own threat modeling and engage Verizon support for environment-specific guidance. SEC.co does not warrant the completeness or accuracy of third-party vendor statements referenced herein. Source: NVD (public-domain), retrieved 2026-07-07. Analysis generated by SEC.co (claude-haiku-4-5).